ADMINISTERING UNNECESSARY OATHS. See OATHS. ADMINISTRATION. See APPOINTMENT.-EXECUTOR. ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR. ADMIRALTY. See ACCESSORY, 1, 2. ADMISSION. See COSTS. 1. A plaintiff, by his notice to admit, called on a defendant to admit an authority to sell an estate " signed by defendant," and dated " 10th August, 1840;" and the judge by consent made the usual order to admit it. When the document was given in evidence, the date, "August," appeared to be written on an erasure: -Held, that the defendant, by this admission, had precluded himself from calling on the plaintiff to give evidence to explain the altered date. Poole v. Palmer, 69 2. Semble, that, by an admission of this kind, the accuracy of the document is conceded. Ibid. 3. In an action on a bill of exchange, the defendant was, by a judge's order (in the usual form), to make the admission specified in the notice to admit, and the notice called on the defendant to admit that the document therein "specified to be original, was written, signed, or executed, as it purports to have been, saving all just exceptions to the admissibility of such document as evidence in this cause." The notice then described the bill of exchange in the usual manner:-Held, that this admission did not preclude the defendant from objecting that the bill was not properly stamped, and also that this was not such an admis See BILL OF EXCHANGE, 12.STAMP, 1. An agreement in writing, made by proper authority, contained in the body of it the names of all the contracting parties, and concluded: "In witness whereof we have hereto set our hands, &c.;" but there was not any signature at the foot of the agreement by any one:-Held, that the agreement was not signed by the parties to be charged under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, because the names were inserted of necessity in the body of the agreement to make sense of it, and should not be used over again as signatures; and because it appeared from the whole of the document that the parties had not intended it to be binding upon them until the names had been signed at the foot of the paper. Hubert v. Turner, 351 AIDING A CONSTABLE, (REFUSAL). See CONSTABLE, 2, 3. AIDING AN ESCAPE. AMENDMENT. 1. On the trial of an action against officers of a court of requests, the Nisi Prius record contained only a plea of not guilty, without the words "by statute" being added. The defendant's counsel wished to amend, by adding the words "by statute" to the Nisi Prius record. The judge would not allow the amendment, as it could not be shewn that the words "by statute" were on the defendant's plea; but semble, that, if it could have been shewn that the words "by statute" had been in the issue delivered by the plaintiff's attorney, the judge would have allowed the amendment. Forman v. Dawes, 127 3. The 23rd section of the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, does not extend to the amending of omissions in pleading. Ibid. 4. An affidavit was sworn in a cause of the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests in Ireland, against J. E. D.; and in an indictment for perjury on it, the affidavit was alleged to be intitled in that cause. The affidavit was intitled the "Commissioner," instead of "Commissioners;" but the Lord Chief Justice allowed an amendment of the indictment to obviate an objection as to this variance. Reg. v. Christian, APPOINTMENT. 388 1. The jurisdiction, to determine whether a married woman has power to make an appointment in the nature of a will, belongs to the Queen's temporal Courts. Tucker v. Inman, 82 2. It is necessary that administration, in some degree, should be granted, before the Court of Chancery will adjudicate on the validity of a testamentary appointment made by a married woman. Ibid. 3. And if a married woman have a power of appointment over a particular amount of property, and that property is purchased by A. B., the Court of Chancery will adjudicate respecting it, whether the Prerogative Court grant letters limited to that amount only, or give general letters of administration. Ibid. 4. In the case where a married woman has a power of appointment over a certain amount of property bequeathed, the Prerogative Court will not grant to A. B. (he not being the husband of the deceased nor executor) administration cæterorum, but only limited to the amount in question. Ibid. 5. Where, in prohibition, there is a special traverse of the allegation of the practice of the Court of Chancery, respecting the will "so made by Sarah Inman," namely, that it was not necessary, before that Court would proceed to adjudicate, that limited letters of administration should be granted, the traverse is made out by shewing that in this case the Prerogative Court will not grant more than limited letters to the party in question, although it be shewn that the Court of Chancery would adjudicate if the letters of administration had been general. Ibid. APPREHENSION. See FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 4, 5.— TRESPASS, 6. APPRENTICE. See BOARD AND LODGING. ARREST. See TRESPASS, 6. ARSON. See DEMOLISHING HOUSES, 5, 6, 7. Y Y 2 See MURDER, 4.-WOUNDING, 3, 4. 1. If one man strikes another a blow, that other has a right to defend himself and to strike a blow in his defence, but he has no right to revenge himself; and if, when all the danger is past, he strikes a blow not necessary for his defence, he commits an assault and battery. Reg. v. Driscoll, 214 2. The burglariously breaking and entering a dwelling-house, with intent to commit a rape, is not a crime that includes an assault; and therefore, in an indictment for such a burglary, the prisoner cannot be convicted of an assault under the stat. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11. Reg. v. Watkins, 264 3. Action for assault. Plea, that the plaintiff entered the defendant's close without leave and license, and that the defendant ordered him off: but he not going, the defendant molliter manus, &c. Replication, de injuriâ:-Held, that under this plea it is not necessary for the defendant to rebut all leave and license, because that is not material to the issue, the defendant's justification being complete, if he can shew that he required the plaintiff to leave the close, and the plaintiff refused to do so, although the plaintiff had, in fact, entered at first by the leave and license of the defendant, that leave and license lasting only during the defendant's pleasure. Jelly v. Bradley, 270 4. In a case of manslaughter, the ATTEMPT AT MISDEMEANOR. prisoner cannot be convicted of an assault under the 11th sect. of the stat. 1 Vict. c. 85, unless that assault is the subject-matter of the charge, and embodied in the charge, and which would itself have been the felony, but for some other cause; and the jury ought not, on a charge of manslaughter, to convict the prisoner of an assault, unless that assault conduced to the death of the deceased, although the death was not manslaughter. Reg. v. Crumpton, 597 ASSAULT, WITH INTENT TO ROB. An indictment for an assault, with intent to rob, which charges that the prisoner, in and upon R. B. "feloniously did make an assault, with intent the monies, goods, and chattels of the said R. B., from the person and against the will of him, the said R. B., then and there feloniously and violently to rob, steal, take, and carry away, against the form of the statute," &c., is good. Reg v. Huxley, Form of indictment. 596 Ibid. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MISDEMEANOR. A man went into a pawnbroker's shop in the middle of the day, and laid down eleven thimbles on the counter, saying, "I want five shillings on them." The pawnbroker's assistant asked the man if they were silver, and he said they were. The assistant tested them, and found they were not silver, and in consequence did not give the man any money, but sent for a policeman, and gave him into custody:-Held, that the conduct of the man who presented the thimbles amounted to an attempt to commit the statutable misdemeanor of obtaining money under false pretences, and by consequence that, if In the sale of certain lots of goods by auction, the conditions of sale prefixed to the auctioneer's catalogue were, among others, that the goods were to be paid for before delivery, and to be cleared off the premises by a certain day:-Held, in the absence of evidence of a specific stipulation to that effect, that the law would not imply a custom that the purchaser should inspect and measure the goods knocked down to him before he paid for them; and that the words of the catalogue," before delivery," meant before delivery for any purpose, whether to measure or to clear away. Secus, where the goods are bought by sample, in which case the purchaser has a right, before payment, to see that the bulk corresponds with the sample. Pettitt v. Mitchell, AUTHORITY. 424 1. A boarding and lodging-house keeper, who also keeps a stock of wine, which she supplies to her boarders and lodgers, by a bottle at a time, as each of them may require it, is a hotelkeeper under sect. 2 of the Bankrupt Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, and as such subject to the bankrupt laws. Gibson v. King, 458 2. A person, by suffering judgment to go by default, does not "procure" his goods to be taken in execution under sect. 3 of the Bankrupt Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, so as to be an act of bankruptcy, although his goods be afterwards taken in an execution sued out upon that judgment. Ibid. 3. A person's "procuring procuring" his goods to be taken in execution has no effect as an act of bankruptcy till the goods are actually taken. Ibid. 4. A fiat in bankruptcy issued on the 7th of March, 1842, and in an action of trover by the assignees for goods pledged by the bankrupt on the 28th of February, the trading was disputed. The bankrupt was a boarding-house keeper, and sold wine to her boarders:-Held, that a paper in the handwriting of the bankrupt, purporting to be an account between her and one of her boarders, from December, 1840, to May, 1841, was not receivable in evidence to prove the trading, unless it could be shewn to have been written before the bankruptcy; and held also, that a book containing accounts between the bankrupt and one of her boarders, of dates all antecedent to the bankruptcy, and to which the word " settled was added in the bankrupt's handwriting, was also not receivable in evidence, unless it was shewn that the entries were written before the bankruptcy. Ibid. 5. If in an action of trover by assignees of a bankrupt the defendant plead that the plaintiffs are not assignees, the plaintiffs may, on that issue, give evidence of any act of bankruptcy committed before the date of the fiat, BEGIN (RIGHT TO). 1. In an action of trespass to land the defendants pleaded not guilty, and a right of way. The plaintiffs replied de injuriâ to the plea of the right of way; and newly assigned, that the trespasses were committed "on other and different occasions" than that in the second plea mentioned. The defendants pleaded to the new assignment a payment of money into Court, and by this plea relinquished and abandoned so much of the general issue "as traverses or denies, or can be deemed or construed to traverse or deny the said trespasses newly assigned, or any part thereof." Replication to this plea, accepting the sum paid into Court, "in full satisfaction and discharge of the said several trespasses above newly assigned:" Held, that, as the plea of not guilty was not entirely withdrawn, the plaintiff had the right to begin; and that, if in a case like this the defendant wished to begin, he should take out a summons, and, by a judge's order, withdraw the general issue entirely from the record. Price v. Seaward, 23 2. If in an action on a life policy the defendants plead that at the time of the declaration of health and the policy the habits of the person whose life was insured were immoderate and intemperate, and that he was addicted to excessive drinking: Replication, that his habits were moderate and tem BEGIN (RIGHT TO). perate, and not immoderate and intemperate, and that he was not addicted to excessive drinking:-Held, that on these pleadings the plaintiff should begin, as there was an affirmative on both sides. Craig v. Fenn, 43 3. In an action by the indorsee against the maker of a promissory note, the defendant pleaded that the note was in the hands of G. V., and that, while it was so, the claim of G. V. on this note was by an order of Nisi Prius referred to an arbitrator; and that, before any award was made, the note was in violation of good faith delivered to the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff, at the time he took the note, had full knowledge of all the premises: Replication, that the plaintiff had not any knowledge of the premises :— Held, that, on these pleadings, the defendant must begin, as the plaintiff's knowledge of the facts was an essential part of the defence. Smith v. Martin, 58 4. If a declaration on promissory notes, by indorsee against drawer, contains counts on the notes only, without any other count, and the defendant plead, as to part of the amount, payment of that sum while the payee was the holder of the notes, and, as to the residue, a payment of a further sum into Court, and that the plaintiff has sustained no greater damages: Replication to the first plea, that the payment was not made while the payee was the holder of the notes; and to the second plea, that the plaintiff had sustained greater damages:-Held, that if the first issue had stood alone, the defendant would have been entitled to begin, but that the second issue entitled the plaintiff to begin, although it was stated by the defendant's counsel, that, if the defendant succeeded on the first issue, the plaintiff, as matter of calculation, could not be entitled to any thing on the second issue. Cripps v. Wells, 489 |