1842. REGINA V. LANGFORD, riot that it should be to the terror and alarm of her Majesty's subjects, but here the only person that was at all alarmed was the old man. PATTESON, J.-I think there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to the riot. W. Johnstone Neale, for the prisoner Langford.-I submit that the first count of the indictment, which is for beginning to demolish the house, is not sustained, as the prisoners did all that they intended to do, and were not interrupted; and with respect to the second count for the actual demolition of the house, I submit that this is not proved, the house not being demolished, as a chimney was left standing. PATTESON, J.-I think that, as the cottage was destroyed to such an extent as to be no longer a house, it is a sufficient demolition within this statute. It can never be said that a house is not demolished because a few stones are left standing one upon another. C. Phillips, and W. Johnstone Neale, addressed the jury. PATTESON, J., (in summing up).—The stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, which enacts, "that if any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together to the disturbance of the public peace, shall unlawfully and with force demolish, pull down, or destroy, or begin to demolish, pull down, or destroy" "any house," &c., shall be guilty of felony, gives no definition of what is a riot; it is therefore necessary to resort to the common law, by which a riot is defined to be "a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more assembling together of their own authority, with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who shall oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards actually executing the same in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, whe ther the act intended were of itself lawful or unlawful" (a). A riot must be attended with circumstances of terror to the people. No one appears here to have been alarmed but the old man, but if you find that such force was used by the prisoners as to terrify the old man, I think that in point of law there was a riot, and the question for you to consider on that part of the case is, whether this assembly was attended with circumstances of alarm and terror to any of her Majesty's subjects, for if it was, I think that it amounts to a riot. I think, also, that on this statute a felonious demolition of a house can only be where a number of persons begin to demolish or actually demolish the house from some wrong motive or other. If therefore you believe that there was a riot, and that these persons to spite the old man did that which the witnesses have stated them to have done, it is a felonious demolition of the house within the meaning of this act of Parliament. But even if there was a riot, if you believe that the prisoners really thought that it was young Phillips's house, and that they did all this bonâ fide in the assertion of a supposed right, that will take the case out of the operation of the statute, and the demolition of the house would not be felonious, and you ought to acquit the prisoners. The jury found all the prisoners guilty (6). PATTESON, J.-I shall reserve the case for the opinion of the Judges. J. G. Phillimore, for the prosecution. C. Phillips, for the prisoners Palmer, Phillips, and Powell. W. Johnstone Neale, for the prisoner Langford. [Attornies-Downes, and Mansell.] In the ensuing term the (a) 1 Curw. Hawk. bk. 1, ch. 28, p. 513. (b) See the cases of Regina v. case was considered by the Harris, post, p. 661; and Regina 1842. REGINA บ. LANGFORD. 1842. REGINA ບ. LANGFORD. Judges, who held the conviction right, their Lordships being of opinion that the house was "demolished" within the meaning of the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 8, and that in a case of riot, it was a sufficient terror and alarm if any of the Queen's subjects being there was terrified. MONMOUTH ASSIZES. (Civil Side.) BEFORE MR. JUSTICE CRESSWELL. Where a de fendant is entitled to plead 46 not guilty by statute," he may under that plea go into any defence that MAUND V. THE COMPANY OF PROPRIETORS OF THE MON- TRESPASS.-The first count of the declaration stated, that the defendants broke, damaged, and spoiled divers chains with which certain barges or boats were moored, and seized the boats or barges, and broke the helm or rudder of one of the barges or boats, and converted the same to their own use. Second count, that the defendants "took certain goods and chattels of the plaintiff,” and converted them to their own use. Pleas-first, to the whole declaration, not guilty "by statute;" and second, to the first count, a plea of payment into Court of 10%., not, or be a de- and that the plaintiff had sustained no greater damage. independent of Replication to the second plea, an acceptance of the 107. could be specially pleaded, whether such defence be founded entirely on the statute, or partly on the sta tute and partly fence wholly the statute. Trespass will in full satisfaction of the causes of action in the first lie against a corporation aggregate for an act done by their agent within the scope of his au count. It appeared that on the 26th of August, 1841, seven boat loads of coals, together with the boats containing them, thority, and in such an action it is not necessary to shew the appointment or authority of the agent under the seal of the corporation. were distrained as they lay in the Monmouthshire Canal for a sum of 821. 13s. 1d., the amount of tolls due to the defendants from a person named Davis, and it was proved that on the 5th of September the seven boat loads of coal were sold by the direction of Mr. Cooke, the chief clerk of the company, and that on the 6th the barges were returned empty to the plaintiff. Talfourd, Serjt., for the defendants, submitted that a corporation aggregate could not be sued in trespass for an act done by their agent, unless an authority to the agent under the seal of the corporation were given in evidence; and that at all events it was necessary to shew that the agent was appointed by some instrument under seal. CRESSWELL, J.-I will give you leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendants on this point if the Court above should think it well founded. Talfourd, Serjt.-I propose to shew that the coals were not the property of the plaintiff, but belonged to a person named Davis, and that they were distrained for tolls due to the company from Mr. Davis, under the 100th section of the Monmouthshire Canal Company's act (a), which empowers the persons who are authorized to receive the tolls to distrain any boat, vessel, or goods for arrears of toll due from the owner of such boat, vessel, or goods. Ludlow, Serjt., for the plaintiff.-There is no plea that the plaintiff was not possessed. Talfourd, Serjt.-By the 147th sect. of the Monmouthshire Canal Company's act (b) it is enacted, "that if any action, suit, or information shall be brought or commenced against any person or persons for anything done or to be 1842. MAUND v. MONMOUTH CANAL CO. 1842. MAUND v. MONMOUTH done in pursuance of this act," "the defendant or defendants in such action or suit shall and may plead the general issue, and give this act and the special matter in evidence at any trial to be had thereupon, and that the same was done in pursuance and by the authority of this act.” Ludlow, Serjt.-The question whether these were the plaintiff's coals or not can have no relation to any act of Parliament; and if it was to be denied that these were the plaintiff's coals, the defendants should have pleaded that the plaintiff was not possessed of the coals. CRESSWELL, J., (having conferred with Patteson, J.)— My Brother Patteson informs me that fourteen of the Judges had a meeting to settle the question as to what could be given in evidence under the plea of not guilty "by statute;" and he tells me that the majority of the Judges were of opinion that every defence that could be specially pleaded, whether founded entirely on the statute or partly on the statute and partly not, or if it was a defence wholly independent of the statute, (as here, that the property in question was not the property or in the possession of the plaintiff), may be given in evidence under the plea of not guilty "by statute." I shall, therefore, receive the evidence. The evidence was given. Verdict for the plaintiff. Ludlow, Serjt., and F. V. Lee, for the plaintiff. Talfourd, Serjt., R. V. Richards, and Whitmore, for the defendants. [Attornies-Freeman & Co., and Mostyn.] In the ensuing term, Talfourd, Serjt., applied to the Court of Common Pleas, in pursuance of the leave given at the trial, and obtained a rule to shew cause why the |