1842. ROWCLIFFE v. MURRAY. 1st March, 1841, were shewn, the evidence given against him by the defendant Murray, and his subsequent acquittal. For the defendants Murray and Larkin, evidence was offered, in mitigation of damages, to show the circumstances under which they acted as constables in this transaction; but it was objected to on the authority of those cases which rule that no evidence can be given for any collateral purpose which is excluded, by reason of its not having been specially pleaded, from being heard as a defence to the action. And it was answered, that these defendants, though they were not constables of Bristol, nor had any warrant from a Bristol magistrate, and though they committed the trespass alleged in Bristol, and therefore out of their jurisdiction, were nevertheless acting as constables in seizing a man whom they suspected had been guilty of a felony; that they were within the provisions of 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 8 (a); and that in the case of Barton v. Williams (b), decided under that statute, it was said by Abbott, C. J., that the officer is entitled to the protection of this section (the 8th), provided he act bonâ fide in his character of officer, and under a belief that he is exercising the authority with which he is invested; and that the constables, therefore, acting bonâ fide were protected, though by mistake they acted wrong; and then they came within the provisions of 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5. They might, therefore, perhaps give the special matter in evidence even as a defence, but that even if they could not, the evidence was receivable in mitigation of damages. WIGHTMAN, J.-I think this case is not within the (a) 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 8. No action shall be brought against any justice of the peace for any thing done in the execution of his office, or against any constable, headborough, or other officer or person acting as aforesaid, unless commenced within six calendar months after the act committed.... (“The object of this section differs from that of the sixth section, being intended for the benefit of persons who intend to act right, but by mistake act wrong.") Roscoe's Ev. edit. 4, p. 584. (b) 3 B. & A. 333. principle of the 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5, as relating to the protection afforded to constables who have done any thing touching or concerning their office being empowered to plead the general issue and give the special matter in evidence. But I think that here evidence of the special matter may be given in mitigation of damages, because the declaration avers that the trespasses were committed without any reasonable or probable cause (c). The evidence was given. WIGHTMAN, J., in (summing up).—The only question is, whether the defendants caused the imprisonment of the plaintiff, and if so, what are the damages? The defendants Murray and Larkin have pleaded not guilty. Petty has put a defence on the record, which, however, has not been proved, for there has been no evidence that any horse of his was stolen, or that the horse found upon the plaintiff's premises was that alleged to have been stolen. The whole question, therefore, reduces itself to a denial of the imprisonment. But since it is alleged in the declaration, that the imprisonment was without reasonable and probable cause, it is right for you to consider, in as (c) 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5. If any action upon the case, trespass, battery, or false imprisonment, shall be brought against any justice of peace, mayor, or bailiff of city or town corporate, headborough, portreeve, constable, tithing-man, collector of subsidy or fifteens, churchwardens, and persons called sworn-men, executing the office of churchwarden or overseer of the poor and their deputies, or any of them, or any other which, in their aid and assistance, or by their commandment, shall do any thing touching or concerning his or their 1842. ROWCLIFFE v. MURRAY. 1842. ROWCLIFFE v. MURRAY. sessing the damages, whether the defendants acted bonâ fide. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, 40s. Bompas, Serjt., Erle, and Taprell, for the plaintiff. Cockburn, for the defendant Petty. [Attornies for the plaintiff, H. W. Hall; for the defendants, Gamlen and Chilton.] NORTHERN CIRCUIT. LIVERPOOL SUMMER ASSIZES. (Crown Side.) BEFORE LORD DENMAN. Aug. 29th. The prisoner paid his addresses to the prosecutrix, and obtained a THE QUEEN (on the Prosecution of ANNE CRELLIN) v. FALSE PRETENCES.-It was agreed to rest the pro secution on the third count of the indictment, which charged the defendant with having falsely pretended to A. C., then being a single woman, that he was an unmarried man, and having thereby obtained a promise of marriage from the refused to ratify. said A. C.; that she refused to marry the defendant, and promise of marriage from her, which promise she afterwards He then threat ened her with an action, and by this means obtained money from her. During the whole of the transactions the prisoner had a wife. On an indictment against him for obtaining money under false pretences, the pretences laid were, first, that he was unmarried; secondly, that he was entitled to bring and maintain his action against her for a breach of promise of marriage:Held, (Lord Denman, C. J., and Maule, J.,) that the fact of the prisoner paying his addresses was sufficient evidence for the jury on which they might find the first pretence, that the prisoner was a single man and in a condition to marry; and per Maule, J., that there was sufficient evidence on which to find the falseness of the other pretence, that he was entitled to maintain his action for breach of promise of marriage, and that such latter false pretence was a sufficient false pretence within the statute. that he falsely pretended, at the time of such refusal, that he was an unmarried man, and entitled to bring an action against her for the breach of promise of marriage, by means of which he obtained from her 100%. Whereas, in truth, &c., he was not an unmarried man, and not entitled to maintain an action for the breach of promise of marriage against her (a). The fact that the prisoner was a married man was proved; and Anne Crellin, the prosecutrix, stated, that she being a single woman, and possessed of considerable property, the prisoner had paid his addresses to her, and that she had (a) The 3rd count was in the following form: "And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that the said Samuel Martin Copeland, otherwise called Samuel Martin, on the day and year, &c., unlawfully did falsely pretend to the said Ann Crellin, then and there being a single woman, that he was a single and unmarried man, and thereby then and there obtained a promise of marriage from the said Ann Crellin, to wit, a promise that in consideration that he would marry her she would marry him. And the jurors, &c., do further present that the said Ann Crellin afterwards, to wit, on the day and year, &c., wholly refused to marry the said Samuel Martin Copeland, otherwise called &c. And the jurors, &c., do further present that the said Samuel Martin Copeland, otherwise called &c., afterwards, to wit, on the day and year, &c., unlawfully did falsely pretend to the said Ann Crellin that he was, at the times of the said promise and refusal in this count mentioned, a single and unmarried man, and entitled to bring and maintain an action for breach of the said promise of marriage against her the said Ann Crellin; by means of which said last-mentioned false pretences in this count mentioned, the said S. M. Copeland, otherwise called &c., did then and there unlawfully obtain from the said Ann Crellin, one promissory note of the governor and company of the Bank of England, for the payment of £100, &c." (describing various kinds of money and securities), " of the property and moneys of the said Ann Crellin, with intent then and there to cheat and defraud her, the said Ann Crellin, of the same: whereas, in truth and in fact, the said S. M. Copeland, otherwise called &c., was not, at the time of the said promise of marriage in this count mentioned, or at the time of the said refusal in this count mentioned, a single man or an unmarried man, nor was he at either of those times, or at any other time entitled to bring or maintain an action for breach of the said promise of marriage against the said Ann Crellin," &c.; against the form of the statute, &c. 1842. REGINA v. COPELAND. 1842. REGINA v. COPELAND. consented to marry him, she being ignorant, at the time, that he was already married. She further stated, that, after promising to marry the prisoner, she changed her mind, and wished to "be off" the match; that she intimated as much to the prisoner, and that he, thereupon, threatened her with an action at law for breach of promise of marriage, and, he added, that, by means of such proceeding, he could take half her fortune from her; and that she, believing that he could and would carry his threat into effect, and in order to induce him to refrain from doing so, agreed to pay and did pay him a sum of money. The money was paid and received on a written stipulation (produced at the trial) that, in consideration of such payment, he (the prisoner) would forego proceedings at law against the prosecutrix, for promise of marriage broken by her. She stated, on cross-examination, that, but for the prisoner's threat of bringing an action, she would not have paid the money; and that she was induced by such threat to pay it: and, she added, that, had she known that the prisoner was a married man, she would not have paid the money. On behalf of the prisoner, it was submitted that there must be an acquittal, because the prosecutrix had disproved that the money was obtained from her by means of the false pretences laid. Admitting that false pretences might be by conduct and demeanour, and do not of necessity imply language, it appeared here, that the money was obtained, not by a pretence that the prisoner was single, or that he was entitled to sue, but by a threat that he would bring an action. This was either a mere menace and no false pretence at all, or if a false pretence, it was a pretence, not of any existing fact, but of something prospective; and for aught appearing it was not a false pretence, inasmuch as it may have been the prisoner's intention to take the proceedings threatened. Again, if it be said the prisoner pretended that he was entitled to sue, such pretence was rather a pretence of matter or |