STEVENS v. CLARK, Esq. TRESPASS.—For false imprisonment. Samuel Noble, and Anne his wife, came before the defendant, who was a justice of the peace for the county of Wilts, and complained against the plaintiff for a nuisance. The defendant then issued a summons to the plaintiff to appear and answer the complaint at the petty sessions on a certain day. But before that day the defendant was informed that the plaintiff was going out of the jurisdiction of the defendant, and he thereupon sent for the superintendent of the police, and told him he was wanted to take the plaintiff into custody. The complainant and his wife were present, and the defendant read over an information which was concerning the plaintiff leaving the town, and then a warrant to take him into custody was signed by the defendant, and delivered to the constable. 1842. Aug. 15th. After a summons issued, information was given before the magistrate that the party against whom the sum mons had been granted was going out of the magistrate's jurisdiction, who thereupon issued his war rant, and the person was taken into custody, and after his action against the magistrate for false At the trial the imprisonment. summons was put in evidence, On the part of the defendant the information was not and the warput in, but the summons and warrant only. CRESSWELL, J., to Erle, who was of counsel for the defendant. Have you any authority that the warrant itself is evidence of an information? If not, you must give evidence of the information upon which the warrant was issued; and in the absence of such evidence, I think that the warrant does not prove that there was an information on oath which to found it. upon I Erle. There is a difficulty about the information, and do not put it in. The question therefore will be one of damages only. CRESSWELL, J., (in summing up).—If a magistrate issues a warrant, he must be able to shew his information, else there is no foundation for the warrant. There is a summons in this case, and as the plaintiff, it appears, was going off, the * L L VOL. I. N. P. rant, but not the information:- Held, that the evi dence was not sufficient, and that the magis trate must put in the information to justify his warrant for apprehension, as, without a proper information, the magistrate would not be justified in issuing his warrant. 1842. STEVENS v. CLARK. constable takes him on a warrant from the defendant. There is, therefore, here a warrant without information on oath upon which to ground it. The warrant is executed, and therefore the whole imprisonment is illegal. The verdict must be for the plaintiff. Verdict for the plaintiff. Crowder, Bere, and Merewether, for the plaintiff. Erle and Moody, for the defendant. [Attornies-Brent, and Webber.] BRISTOL ASSIZES. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE WIGHTMAN, Aug. 24th. The defendant's father owed the plaintiff money for goods sold; and for the price of these goods, the defendant made his promissory note in his own name, and gave it to the plaintiff, who was cognizant of all the facts, and that the defendant had received no that the above DEBT Cook v. W. LONG. EBT by the indorsee of a promissory note against the maker. Plea, No consideration, and that the defendant made the note for the accommodation of R. Long, and that the plaintiff received the note with notice to that effect, that there was no consideration for the delivery of the note to the plaintiff, and that he held it without value. The defendant's father bought sheep of the plaintiff, and for the payment for them the defendant gave the plaintiff promissory note in his own name. There was not any consideration to the defendant for the note, nor was the defendant in partnership with his father in any manner. It was submitted for the defendant, that the note in circumstances could not be given in evidence under a plea of "accommodation bill," and that there was in this case an original liability on the part of the defendant, and that for a good consideration, viz. family affection. question was for the accommodation of another person, and that the plaintiff taking it with notice took it as described in the plea, with all the consequent disabilities attaching to it as an accommodation note. WIGHTMAN, J.-It is not properly a note for the accommodation of any one; it is a note given and a sum of money due for a bygone debt; but it is an original liability on the part of the defendant, and the consideration of the debt is family affection. I think that on these facts the plaintiff is entitled to his verdict. Verdict for the plaintiff. Stone, for the plaintiff. Erle, for the defendant. [Attornies-Woodford, and Shattock.] REGINA V. LUCY. INDICTMENT on the 58th sect. of the Reform Act, 2 & Aug. 25th. A voter having changed his residence since the last registration, cannot be in dicted under the 3 Will. 4, c. 45, for giving a false answer at the time of voting for members of Parliament. The first count stated, that there had been an election of members to serve in Parliament for the city of Bristol, and that the defendant 2 W. 4, c. 45, claimed to be entitled to vote at such election in respect that he has still for swearing of the occupation of a certain house in Lodge-street; that the same quali the defendant tendered his vote, and the sheriff's put the following question to him (2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 58):"Have you the same qualification for which originally inserted in the register of voters now in force for the city and county of Bristol?" To which he made answer, "I have;" whereas the said defendant had not, &c. deputy your name was The sheriff's deputy stated, that, on the defendant tendering his vote, he had asked him the question as set out fication, if the sheriff's deputy should omit, at the time the voter tenders his vote, to read over to him the specific qualifi cation from the register. 1842. REGINA v. LUCY. in the first count; but that he did not, at the end of that question, read from the register the line in which Mr. Lucy's name and qualification were inserted.“ Lucy, William, House, Lodge-street." WIGHTMAN, J.-The particular qualification ought to have been read over. As it is, the defendant could not be indicted for wilfully, knowingly, and falsely giving a wrong answer (a). His Lordship directed an acquittal. Verdict-Not Guilty. 58. Butt and Stone, for the prosecution. Bompas. Serjt., and J. G. Smith, for the defendant. [Attornies-King, and H. W. Hall.] (a) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, ss. 27, 28, The third question in s. 58 is in these words, "Have you the same Qualification for which your name was originally inserted in the Register of Voters now in force for the County of &c., [or, for the Riding &c., or for the City &c.? as the case may be, specifying in each case the particulars of the qualification as described in the register."] See the case of Reg. v. Dodsworth, 8 C. & P. 218; and the cases of Reg. v. Bowler, Reg. v. Ellis, and Reg. v. Spalding, post. ROWCLIFFE v. MURRAY, LARKIN, and PETTY. TRESPASS for assaulting the plaintiff and taking him from the council-house in Bristol to a police-station there, and to the Great Western Railway Terminus, and from there to Oxford, and there detaining him in prison for twenty-five days. All the circumstances of the trespass were laid, severally, to have been "without reasonable or probable cause." Plea by Murray and Larkin, Not guilty. Petty pleaded specially, that a gelding of his had been stolen in Oxfordshire, and that, suspecting the plaintiff to have stolen it, he went from that county with the other two defendants, constables in the county of Oxford, to Bristol, where the plaintiff lived, and found the horse in his possession, wherefore he, Petty, requested the other two defendants, being then constables, to carry the plaintiff before the mayor of Bristol to be examined touching the premises, the said mayor then being the nearest justice, &c.; that the mayor said he had not any jurisdiction in the matter, as the horse had been stolen in the county of Oxford; and that the defendant Petty did then request the other defendants, being constables, &c., to take the plaintiff to Oxford; and that the magistrate at Oxford made out his warrant of committal and delivered it to the constables Murray and Larkin. The defendants Murray and Larkin were police-constables, but not of Bristol. Petty was a private individual whose horse was alleged to have been stolen, and the plaintiff was suspected of the theft. behalf No application was made to the Bristol magistrates by the defendants Murray or Larkin for a warrant before they took the plaintiff; and it was not proved on of the defendant Petty that any horse of his had been stolen, or that the horse found upon the plaintiff was that of this defendant. The circumstances of the plaintiff's trial at Oxford on and taken the plaintiff at Bristol (thus committing the assault) on sus picion of his having stolen a horse belonging to the other defendant in Oxfordshire. The declaration set out all the trespasses to have been done without rea sonable or pro bable cause. The two constables pleaded not guilty only: -Held, that they might give the special matter in evidence in mitigation of damages, to show that there was reasonable and probable cause; but, semble, having acted out of their jurisdiction, they were not entitled as constables un der 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5, to give the special matter in evi dence under the general issue as a defence of the trespasses. |