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ALDERSON, B.-Must not this plea of autrefois acquit fail, because the defendants, on the former indictment, were never in jeopardy as to the misdemeanor?

PARKE, B.-Suppose that this indictment for false pretences does, as the law at present stands, charge two offences in the alternative, that is, the stealing of the mare, or the obtaining the mare by false pretences-this plea at the most answers one of the alternatives only; for if the obtaining of the mare was not a felony, the plea is certainly no answer to that.

Pashley.-If then the defendants had been convicted of horse-stealing on the first indictment, and had been transported for ten years, they might at the end of that time be indicted for the same offence, as a false pretence by an indictment in the same form as the present, and yet could not plead autrefois acquit if the present plea cannot be sustained.

ALDERSON, B.-That is the difficulty.

ROLFE, B.-And that difficulty occurred to me at York.

ERSKINE, J.-There is in this plea no allegation that the defendants did in fact steal this mare.

Pashley. The plea only need shew that the party is twice put in jeopardy.

ALDERSON, B.-How does it shew that they have before been in jeopardy for this misdemeanor?

PATTESON, J.-Probably the first acquittal was on the ground, that the offence did not amount to a felony.

Pashley.-I submit that these defendants were in jeo

1841.

REGINA

v.

HENDERSON.

1841.

REGINA

บ.

HENDERSON.

pardy for the felony on the first indictment, and that in one state of circumstances they would be in jeopardy for the felony on the present indictment. I submit further, that the present indictment is bad, because it does not shew a sufficient false pretence. With the exception of the statement that Barlow was possessed of £12, the pretence does not relate to any fact at all.

PARKE, B.-There is a false representation of an existing fact.

Pashley.-If your Lordships should decide, that a false representation of an existing fact is a false pretence within this act of Parliament, a very large class of cases would come within the scope of that decision.

PARKE, B.—In the case of Reg. v. Parker (a) I left it to the jury to say, whether the defendant had falsely represented that he had an account at the bank of Stuckey & Co. The jury found the representation to be false, and the Judges held the conviction right, as it was the false representation of an existing fact.

Pashley. In the case of Rex v. Wheatley (b) it is laid down that the selling an unsound horse, affirming him to be sound, is not a criminal offence; and in Rex v. Codring ton (c), where a party had professed to sell a reversionary interest in property, and the vendee took the usual covenant for title, it was held that the party could not be convicted of obtaining the purchase-money by false pretences, although he had in fact previously sold his interest in the property to another person, and yet, in each of those cases, there must have been a misrepresentation of an existing fact. Another objection to the present indict

(a) 7 C. & P. 825.

(b) 2 Burr. 1128.

(c) 1 C. & P. 661.

ment is, that there is no averment of any scienter. The indictment does not charge that the defendants, or either of them, knew that the defendant Barlow had not the money, nor does it even charge that the defendants did knowingly falsely pretend that the defendant Barlow had not this sum of £12.

ERSKINE, J.-He might have had the money five minutes before, and have got his pocket picked.

Pashley. The prosecutor himself might have picked the pocket of Barlow five minutes before. In the case of Wickham v. The Queen (a) which was a case of false pretences, in which the indictment charged that the defendant was a captain in the East India Company's service, and that "a certain promissory note" produced by the defendant, was a good and valuable security, it appears to have been conceded by Sir F. Pollock, who was counsel for the Crown, that it was essential with respect to that part of the pretence which related to the note, to aver that the defendant knew that it was not a good and valuable security, and in that case Lord Denman says, "I am of opinion that the two pretences in this indictment must be taken together, and as the pretence charged with respect to the promissory note, which it is not even stated that the prisoner knew to be worthless, is insufficient, the indictment is not sustainable."

Lord ABINGER, C. B.-This is clearly a good objection.

PARKE, B.-All that we can say is, that the Judge who goes the next northern circuit will give judgment for the defendants, on the ground that this indictment is bad.

(a) 2 P. & D. 333.

1841.

REGINA

v.

HENDERSON.

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1841.

REGINA V. HANSON.

H. employed J. FORGERY.-The prisoner was indicted for forging, and

L. to do work

for him. J. L. uttering a bill of exchange with intent to defraud John Leadbitter.

had a partner

named S., who took no active

part in the bu

siness, of which

H. was aware.

J. L. asked for payment for the

work, and H. paid him by a forged bill of exchange, knowing it to be so. J. L. indorsed the bill in his own

name only, and

The forgery and the uttering of the bill were clearly proved; but, with respect to the intent to defraud, it appeared that John Leadbitter had been employed by the prisoner, then the owner of a mill, to make a mill-dam, and that Leadbitter had a partner named Stansfield, who, however, took no active part in the business, although he was known to be a partner by the prisoner. It was proved that Leadbitter, who had superintended the work, applied to the prisoner for payment: that the prisoner paid Leadbitter money on account; and afterwards, instead of making a further money payment, gave him the bill in question indorsed by himself, he (Hanson) being the payee. away. H. was The partner, Stansfield, was not present when the bill was so given. It was further proved, that Leadbitter indorsed the bill in his own name only, and afterwards delivered it to Stansfield, asking him if he could make any use of it, Judges held the and that Stansfield afterwards paid it away, indorsing it also with his own name.

gave it to his

partner S., who

afterwards indorsed it with his own name, and paid it

convicted of the uttering on a count which laid an intent

to defraud J. L., and the

conviction

right.

Wilkins, for the prisoner, submitted, that Messrs. Leadbitter and Stansfield being shewn to be partners, and it being shewn, also, the prisoner knew that they were so, the intent of the prisoner must be taken to be the legal consequence of his own act, which was the defrauding of the two partners, and that there was, therefore, a variance between the intent proved, and the intent laid in the indictment.

Pashley, for the prosecution.-The intent of the prisoner is a question for the jury, and on the facts proved the jury may infer that the prisoner intended to defraud Mr. Lead

bitter alone, with whom alone he had dealings, and even if he did also intend to defraud both the partners, he might be not the less guilty of intending to defraud the one only to whom he actually uttered the forged instrument (a).

WIGHTMAN, J., left it to the jury to say, whether the prisoner intended to defraud Leadbitter alone.

Verdict-Guilty, the jury finding that the pri-
soner did intend to defraud Leadbitter
alone.

WIGHTMAN, J.-I shall reserve the point for the consideration of the fifteen Judges.

Pashley, for the prosecution.

Wilkins, for the prisoner.

[Attornies-Floyd and Sykes.]

In the ensuing term the case was considered by the Judges, who held the conviction right.

(a) See the cases of Regina v. Bowen, ante, p. 149, and Regina v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499, and the

cases then cited, and the case of
Rex v. Mazagora, R. & R., C. C.
291.

1841.

REGINA

บ.

HANSON.

REGINA V. Sarah Goldthorpe.

MURDER.—The prisoner was charged with the murder If a woman en

of her new-born illegitimate child.

It appeared that the prisoner had been suspected of being with child, but had always denied it, and that after her delivery she persisted in denying that she had had a child, but upon Mr. Parker, a surgeon, who examined her, discovering all the symptoms of recent delivery, and asking

deavour to conceal the birth of

her child, by placing the dead body of tween a bed

the child be

and a mattrass,

this is a sufficient disposing of

the dead body to constitute an

offence within the stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 14, and it is not essential to such an offence that the dead body should either be put in some place intended for its final deposit, or be buried or destroyed.

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