to serve in Parliament for the city of Bath. The rioters were of the yellow party, and the house which they were charged with beginning to demolish was a public-house frequented by the supporters of the other interest. The house had been forcibly entered by the mob, and many of them said to the landlord, "Turn out the bloody blues, or we will have the house down." They destroyed every movable thing which they could find, and some fixtures, glasses, plates and chairs, windows and window frames; and they wrenched away the iron bars from one window, and with them some of the surrounding brickwork. On a cry raised that the police were coming, they quitted the premises.

One witness, the daughter of the landlord, said, "As far as I saw, the rioters had done all they wanted to do, and were going away. I did not suppose that they were going to pull down the very walls of the house."

Stone, for the prosecution, said, he could not carry the case further.

COLERIDGE, J., (in summing up).—We must take the words of the statute in their common sense. The words are, "if any persons shall begin to demolish, pull down, or destroy." Do you think that these men wanted to do any of these three things to the house? No intention to do injury, however great, to the movables, will bring the offence within this act. The three words, "demolish," "pull down," and "destroy," are strong terms, and hard of proof. Before you can find the prisoners guilty, you must be of opinion that they meant to leave the house no house at all in fact. If they intended to leave it still a house, though in a state however dilapidated, they are not guilty under this highly penal statute. If a man were to say, "I have pulled down my house," we should understand what he meant; the state of that house must be the state to which these people intended to reduce this inn. To have left

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N. P.

1842.

REGINA

v.

ADAMS.

1842.

REGINA

v.

ADAMS.

off the work of devastation without interruption would lead to the inference that they did not intend to destroy the house. But, even if they were interrupted, the question is open, What was their ultimate intention? If they had been some time at their work of ruin before they were interrupted, it is for you to say, looking to the nature of the things which they have destroyed, whether their purpose was to demolish the house itself.

Verdict-Not guilty.

Stone and Phinn, for the prosecution.

Prideaux and T. W. Saunders, for the prisoners.

[Attornies-Cruttwell & Sons, and Barette.]

Respecting the construction of this statute see the charge of Tindal, C. J., to the Grand Jury at

Bristol. Reg. v. Pinney, 5 C. & P. 261, n.; Rex v. Batt and Others, 6 C. & P. 329.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE COLERIDGE.

April 4th.

If a defendant

is bound by re

cognisance to appear and try

his traverse, he

may not by sur

render to the officer avoid the payment of the fees customary on the

REGINA V. BISHOP.

PERJURY.—The bill was found at the Summer Assizes, held at Bridgewater, 1841. It was traversed; and the defendant was admitted to bail more than twenty days before the Spring Assizes at Taunton, 1842; and he now offered to surrender himself both to the officer of the Court and to the gaoler, and to take his trial, but he was refused, be

entering of a traverse.

Where perjury was charged to have been committed in that which was in effect the affidavit on an interpleader rule; and the indictment set out the circumstances of the previous trial, the verdict, the judgment, the writ of fieri facias, the levy, the notice by the prisoner to the sheriff not to sell, and the prisoner's affidavit that the goods were his property, but omitted to state that any rule was obtained according to the provisions of the Interpleader Act:-Held, that the indictment was bad, as the affidavit did not appear to have been made in a judicial proceeding.

cause he could not pay the Court fees customary on entering and trying his traverse according to the terms of his recognisance.

Bere and Prideaux, for the defendant, submitted that he was ready in Court to take his trial; that the indictment was upon the record, and that, under the enactments 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 4, ss. 3, 5 (a), the trial must proceed. That the statute merely insisted on the defendant pleading to the indictment, and then directed that the trial should proceed, but required no condition precedent

60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 4, s. 5. -"Where any person shall be prosecuted for any misdemeanor, by indictment at any session of the peace, session of oyer and terminer, or session of gaol delivery within 1838. that part of Great Britain called

1842.

REGINA

v.

BISHOP.

1842.

REGINA

v.

BISHOP.

to the entry of his plea; such, for instance, as the payment of the Court fees.

COLERIDGE, J.-I can only take the words of his recognisance as I find them (b); and I understand the practice is to require payment of the fees before the traverse can be entered. On the Oxford circuit, the clerk of the Crown receives a salary, and is accountable for all the fees, so that it is impossible for him to remit any of them; and I think it far better that their payment should be insisted upon in all cases, and that the legislature should interfere to direct a compensation to the officers, if that be thought advisable.

The fees were afterwards paid.

The indictment was for perjury committed in a proceeding under the Interpleader Act; and it set out the issues found in the Court of Exchequer between A. B. and C. D., the trial at Westminster, the verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment, the writ of fieri facias consequent thereupon to the sheriff of Somersetshire, dated 5th June, 1841, the warrant, the seizure of the goods and chattels of C. D., and the notice on the part of Thomas Bishop (the now defendant) to the sheriff not to sell the goods so seized, but to deliver

(b) Form of a recognisance to
try a traverse:-A. B., you acknow-
ledge to our Sovereign Lady the
Queen the sum of
; and you,
C. D. and E. F., severally ac-
knowledge to &c. the respective
sums of
and
to be re-
spectively levied off your goods and
chattels, lands and tenements, to
her Majesty's use by way of re-
cognisance, upon condition that
you A. B. shall appear at the next
session of the peace, to be holden
for this county (or at the next Court
of oyer and terminer and general
gaol delivery), to try your traverse
upon this indictment, to which you
have now pleaded not guilty, and

not depart without leave of the Court. Dickenson's Quarter Sessions, by Talfourd, Serjt., 4th edit., 1838.

Before he enters his traverse, the defendant, if he is not in custody, must get from the clerk of the peace at the sessions or clerk of the Crown at the assizes a record of the proceedings, and a writ of venire facias, which latter must be returned by the sheriff, and he must then enter his traverse and pay his fees. If he is bound by recognisance to appear and try, he cannot surrender into custody, and so avoid the payment of his fees. Reg. v. Fry, 1 Leach, 111.

them up to him, Thomas Bishop, the same being his property, and to which A. B. had no claim. The indictment then charged that the said Thomas Bishop, contriving and intending to injure C. D., did, in his proper person, come before Christopher Moresby, gentleman, a commissioner, &c., and produce an affidavit in writing, and swear to the truth of the matter contained in it. The affidavit, in fact, was, that the deponent having heard that the defendant C. D. had certain goods, (those seized under the fieri facias of the 5th of June), bought them and paid for them on the 1st of June. The sale and purchase were then negatived, and this was the perjury charged.

Bere and Prideaux, for the prisoner, submitted that it did not appear that the affidavit was made in a judicial proceeding; there was no allegation that any application had been made under the Interpleader Act, and therefore there was not any proceeding under which perjury could have been committed (c).

Stone and Edwards, for the prosecution, admitted, that if the Court was of opinion that it should either be averred in terms that the affidavit was made in a judicial proceeding, or that the judicial proceeding did not already sufficiently appear on the face of the indictment, the indictment could not be supported, inasmuch as it omitted to set out the interpleader rule.

COLERIDGE, J.-The objection is fatal. For anything that appears, this was a voluntary oath, and not made in any judicial proceeding.

Verdict-Not guilty.

Stone and Edwards, for the prosecution.

Bere and Prideaax, for the prisoner.

[Attornies-Miller, and Hawkes.]

(c) 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58.

1842.

REGINA

v.

BISHOP.