were hard, she needed money, thought she would help the girl out of her trouble, all of which constituted her reason for committing the act. She admitted that she had received $25 for the work. Mrs. McDonald was then induced to leave | worrying about her trouble, said that times the room, after being informed that the men who were with the doctors were the county solicitor, chief of police, and Lieut. Rhodes. She went into another room across the hall, followed by the chief of police and county solicitor, who went into the room with her. The defendant by her counsel objected to The two doctors, Efird and Stringer, were the reception in evidence of the statements left in the room with Mary Martin and made and admissions made by her to these witan examination of her with her consent. nesses, upon the grounds that they were imThey found that the "uterus of the womb material and irrelevant, that no sufficient had been dilated, a rubber catheter pushed predicate had been laid to justify the adup in the womb, and up against this catheter mission in evidence of the statements, and was a lot of cotton that had evidently been because at the time the statements were soaked," so that it could be packed tightly in made the woman was "surrounded by officers the vagina. The girl was pregnant, and the and by the county solicitor, and that she was substances found in the womb and vagina not warned that any statements she might were sufficient to produce an abortion, so Dr. make would be used against her, that she Efird testified both on direct and cross exam- was excited and crying, and was not warned ination. A miscarriage did in fact follow. A of her rights in the premises." These obbag of obstetrical instruments was found in jections were overruled, and form the basis the room occupied by the girl. Some of those of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and instruments were designed for the purpose of seventh assignments of error, all of which dilating the mouth of a womb. The mouth are argued together. of the girl's womb had been dilated in order The language used by this court in some to insert the catheter. Mrs. McDonald had opinions dealing with the admissibility in lived in Tampa for five years, and had prac-evidence of confessions made by an accused ticed midwifery since 1903. The instru- person under arrest seems to indicate that ments belonged to her. After the examination of the girl was completed, Mrs. McDonald made certain statements in the presence of the physicians, the solicitor, chief of police, and the police officer. In these statements, which were made voluntarily by her, without pressure or threats or promise of lenience, she admitted to the chief of police that the girl had come to her in trouble and wanted Mrs. McDonald "to do something for her"; that she charged the girl $75, $25 of which was paid, and some jewelry turned over to her. She admitted using the instruments, and asked the physicians if “it wasn't done properly." To Dr. Efird Mrs. McDonald admitted that she placed the catheter and the cotton in the girl's womb and vagina, and pleaded with the solicitor not to have her prosecuted for it. She also agreed that the catheter and cotton should be removed, and requested that it be done. To Dr. Stringer she admitted doing the act, and said that she had been taught to do things properly, when asked by the doctor if she had observed surgical cleanliness; that she was to receive $75 for producing the abortion, $25 of which had been paid, and some jewelry taken as collateral. Up to this time the woman had not been arrested. She seemed to have been excited and somewhat alarmed, and talked freely about the matter. was the view has obtained here that a confession of guilt, freely and voluntarily made by an accused person to an officer who has merely arrested such person, is not admissible in evidence at the trial of such person, unless it is clearly shown that the accused person was fully advised by the officer or some person in authority of such accused person's rights under the law. We think, however, that a careful review of the many decisions by this court upon the subject of the admissibility of confessions will show that no such view has been expressed. The distinction has been drawn between judicial and extrajudicial confessions, and this court has invariably held that in cases where the confession offered in evidence could be classed as a judicial confession it was necessary to its admissibility that it be preceded by a warning or caution that the accused need not incriminate himself, and that his words might be used against him at the trial. In a recent and most excellent work, entitled "Ruling Case Law," the subject is exhaustively discussed. 1 R. C. L. 569. In the case of McNish v. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 South. 176, the court, speaking through Justice Shackleford, said: "After a careful examination of the bill of exceptions, we fail to discover wherein the court committed an error in admitting this confession. It seems to us that the court exercised great caution in regard to the admission of said confession, and followed the rule laid down by us in the former opinion rendered in this case. Counsel for defendants strenuously * Officer Hill remained at the house when the others had gone, for the purpose of taking Mrs. McDonald to town with him, when her other daughter, who was away and expected soon to arrive, should come. AC contends that the confession should not have cording to the officer the woman was then been admitted in evidence for the reason that at the time it was made, or alleged to have been under arrest. While sitting on the porch made, the defendant, McNish, had a chain lockwaiting for the daughter to come, the woman, ed around his neck, with the other end of said chain fastened to a pole, and the officer to whom | 22 South. 298, was one in which the prisoner the confession was made was alone with said shortly after his arrest, made a confession defendant at the time and had a pistol in his to another person. It was shown that the pocket, and that these facts of themselves were sufficient to render said confession inadmissible. The authorities do not support this contention." confession was freely and voluntarily made and no improper influences were exerted to induce it. The court held the confession to be admissible. The cases cited in that opinion go only to the question of whether the confession was freely and voluntarily made. In the Murray Case, 25 Fla. 528, 6 South. The McNish Case referred to, reported in 45 Fla. 83, 34 South. 219, 110 Am. St. Rep. 65, dealt with the admission in evidence of a judicial confession, in which the committing magistrate, before whom the proceedings 498, the statements made by the accused were were held which were offered in evidence, had not only failed to caution the accused that his statements may be used against him, and inform him of his rights, but it also appeared that a confession previously made to a constable in charge of the prisoner had been illegally obtained. The court said on this point that, where a confession has once been obtained through illegal influence, it must be clearly shown that such influence has been removed before a subsequent confession may be received. In the Daniels Case, 57 Fla. 1, 48 South. 747, the confessions introduced in evidence consisted of statements "given and signed by Silas Daniels and Luther Russ at the coroner's inquest while in the custody of the sheriff." This was not an extrajudicial confession, but a judicial one, and the court held that the prisoners should have been fully advised of their rights, and that after being so advised it should appear that the state ments were voluntarily made. In the Jenkins Case, 35 Fla. 737, 18 South. 182, 48 Am. St. Rep. 267, referred to in the Daniels Case, the court held that the testimony of the accused before the grand jury, where he was neither charged with the offense, nor in custody, was admissible, where it appeared that he was advised that he need not incriminate himself, nor testify unless he was willing to do so. But here was a judicial investigation, where the witness before the grand jury was suspected, though not charged with the crime. The court referred favorably to cases holding that testimony given in a judicial investigation, although under oath, may be admitted if at the time it was given the prisoner was not resting under any charge or suspicion of having committed the crime. The Green Case, 40 Fla. 474, 24 South. 537, also referred to, was one in which was involved the admissibility of a judicial confession. The Daniels Case is authority for the principle that the statements before a magistrate of an accused person under arrest charged with crime are in general not admissible, unless it appears that the prisoner was advised of his rights. The references made by the court in the Howell Case, 66 Fla. 210, 63 South. 421, were only to those cases in which the admissibility of judicial confessions was considered. But the Howell Case does not purport to discuss the question. It is stated that the point was not properly presented before the court. made to the deputy sheriff, afterwards to the sheriff and county solicitor. The first confession was excluded because the trial court had not inquired whether the confession was voluntary or whether it was induced by undue influences held out to the accused. The second confessions were excluded on the theory that, where improper means are resorted to, to induce a confession, all subsequent confessions are presumed to have been made under the influences which induced the first. In the Dixon Case, 13 Fla. 636, the court used the following language: "The presumption is that, when an accused person makes statements in respect to the crime of which he is aware he is suspected, he will not make evidence against himself unless he intends to speak the truth." In the case of Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38, 52 South. 198, the language of the court is: "A confession made while under arrest or in custody is admissible, if it was voluntarily made and was not influenced by any induce ment." We think that the weight of authority sustains the view that a confession voluntarily made, and not influenced by any inducement, is not rendered inadmissible because made to an officer by the accused while under arrest and in custody. See 1 R. C. L. p. 565; Hammons v. State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S. W. 718, 68 L. R. A. 234, 108 Am. St. Rep. 66, 3 Ann. Cas. 912; People v. Owen, 154 Mich. 571, 118 N. W. 590, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520; 1 Wigmore on Ev. § 851, and authorities cited; 8 Greenleaf on Ev. 360. See 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, note. In the case of Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 South. 851, the statements were made by the prisoner while in prison, and to a deputy sheriff. The court said the law does not exclude confessions made to an officer, even though the party making them be at the time in prison. Williams v. State, 48 Fla. 65, 37 South. 521. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the defendant in this case was influenced in the slightest degree by the officers or any one present to make the statement, or that they were involuntarily made, or that she was induced to believe from anything done or said that she would benefit her condition by admitting the facts constituting the offense. We think that the confessions were properly admitted. [2] The name of the person upon whom the alleged attempt to produce a miscarriage Mary Martin. This was shown to be an assumed name; her real name was never disclosed. However, it was shown that she was known by those with whom she came in contact in Tampa as Mary Martin, and by no other name; that she called herself by that name. The defendant requested a charge to the effect that before the jury could convict the defendant it was necessary for the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the name of the woman on whom the abortion was alleged to have been committed was Mary Martin. The request was refused, and the court instructed the jury that, if the woman upon whom the abortion was alleged to have been committed was known by the name of Mary Martin, it was sufficient to support the allegation as to her name. We think this charge was correct, and that no error was committed in refusing the requested instruction. See Reddick v. State, 25 Fla. 112, 433, 5 South. 704; 3 Bishop's Crim. Proc. § 636. [3] It is contended that the record does not show that the defendant was present in the court throughout the trial. This constitutes the eleventh and last assignment argued. While the minutes of the court are not models of form, and the transcript here offers some confusion, yet we think there is sufficient upon which to deduce legitimately the personal presence of the accused at all the necessary stages of the trial. We do this upon the original transcript, and not from the supplemental addition thereto filed here showing a nunc pro tunc order correcting the minutes, entered without notice to the plaintiff in error when the cause was before this court under a supersedeas. The judgment is affirmed. TAYLOR, C. J., and SHACKLEFORD, COCKRELL, and WHITFIELD, JJ., concur. (138 La. 32) No. 21069. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PUBLIC (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. PUBLIC LANDS 51-SCHOOL LANDS. [ligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary for good government and the happiness of mankind, and ordained that 'schools, as a means of education, should be forever encouraged."" [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 138, 146; Dec. Dig. 51.] 2. PUBLIC LANDS 53-SCHOOL LANDSSALE OF SECTION 16. Another provision of law is to the effect that for section No. 16 in every township which has been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto and most contiguous of the township for the use of schools. to the same shall be granted to the inhabitants [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 143-145; Dec. Dig. 53.] 3. PUBLIC LANDS 51-SCHOOL LANDSTITLE-PROVINCE OF COURTS. "Until the survey of the township and the designation of the specific section, the right of the state rests in compact-binding, it is true, the public faith, and dependent for execution upon the political authorities. Courts of justice have no authority to mark out and define the land * subject to the grant. But when the political authorities have performed this duty, the compact has an object, upon impediment the title of the state becomes a lewhich it can attach, and if there is no legal gal title. The jus ad rem by the performance of that executive act becomes a jus in re, judicial in its nature, and under the cognizance and protection of the judicial authorities, as well as the others." Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 179, 15 L. Ed. 338. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 138, 146; Dec. Dig. 51.] 4. PUBLIC LANDS 25, 51-SCHOOL LANDS -TITLE-GOVERNMENT SURVEY. held conclusive against any collateral attack in A survey made by the government must be controversies between individuals. After a survey of the township has been made by the proper United States authorities and section 16 of a named township has been made and placed, the said section becomes the property of the state for school purposes from the date of such survey. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 33, 34, 138, 146; Dec. Dig. 25, 51.1 GRANT OF LAND. A grant or concession of land made by an officer duly authorized carries with it prima facie evidence that the grant was within his power. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. 83.] 6. PUBLIC LANDS 198-TRANSFER OF TITLE-TREATY. Where land was not severed from the public domain by the French or Spanish authorities, and set apart as private property, it passed to the United States by the treaty which ceded to them all the public and appropriated land. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, Dec. Dig. 198.] 7. PUBLIC LANDS 199-GRANT-VALIDITY. By the treaty of Fontainebleau, of the 3d day of November, 1762, the King of France ceded to the King of Spain the province of Louisiana, and a grant of land in that province made by the French authorities after that date was void. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 625–633, 638; Dec. Dig. 199.1 For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 8. DRAINS 70-TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS- found the fractional part of the sixteenth LIENS-PUBLIC PROPERTY. section, in place, claimed by plaintiff. The law which granted liens and privileges upon property for drainage assessments and taxes in New Orleans did not refer to public property. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. 74; Dec. Dig. 70.] 9. PUBLIC LANDS RIGHT TO SELL. 54-SCHOOL LANDS School lands in the state of Louisiana cannot be sold without the consent of the inhabitants of the township or district. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. 88 152-164, 166-169; Dec. Dig. 54.] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 314-322; Dec. Dig. 114.] Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge. [1-4] The survey referred to is attacked by defendant as being not authorized and incorrect, and as not binding upon any one. A survey made by the government must be held conclusive against any collateral attacks in controversies between individuals. There must be some tribunal to which final jurisdiction is given in respect to the matter of survey, and no other tribunal is so competent to deal with the matter as the Land Department. Whether a survey as originally made is correct or not is a matter submitted exclusively to the Land Department, and over which the courts have no jurisdiction otherwise than by original proceedings in equity. 10 Encyc. of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 80. The United States government has provided for two methods of surveying lands in Louisiana. One is known as the rectangular system of surveying, and is provided for by the Act of Congress of May 18, 1796, c. 29, 1 Stat. 464, which provides that each township shall be six miles square, subdivided into thirty-six sections, each one mile square. The sections are to be numbered respectively, beginning with No. 1, in the northeast corner, and proceeding west and east alternately through the township with progressive numbers, until 36 sections are surveyed. Action by the Board of Directors of the Public Schools of the Parish of Orleans against the New Orleans Land Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and dismissed on rehearing. If, in making this survey of the public lands in a township, a complete, or an apCharles Louque and Dinkelspiel, Hart & proved, grant is found that overlaps a part Davey, all of New Orleans, for appellant. I. of any section, the surveyor places this comD. Moore, City Atty., and Chandler C. Luzen-plete or approved grant on his map, and only berg, Dist. Atty., both of New Orleans (James the remainder of the section not covered by Clark Henriques and Wm. Winans Wall, both the grant is public land. of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellee. SOMMERVILLE, J. The board of directors of the public schools of the parish of Orleans sues defendant to recover possession of a fractional part of section 16, township 12 south, range 11 east, comprising 258.42 acres, situated in the second district of the city of New Orleans, and reserved by the United States government for school purposes. The defendant resists the suit of plaintiff on various grounds, which will be noted in their order. There was judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals. The plan of subdividing the public lands of the states of the Union was adopted by act of the Congress, May 18, 1796. The other method of surveying the lands in Louisiana is the survey of lots or tracts along water courses, etc. The United States government, by the Act of March 3, 1811, c. 46, § 2, 2 Stats. 662, authorizes the public lands on water courses, etc., to be surveyed and subdivided into tracts of 58 poles in front and 465 poles in depth. The Act of May 24, 1824, c. 141, 4 Stat. 34, authorizes the President to direct the survey of lands fronting rivers, water courses, etc., by lots, 2 acres front by 40 acres in depth. The tracts surveyed along water courses in accordance with the acts of 1811 and 1824 are commonly known as "lots" or "radiating sections" or "fractional sections." The Department of the Interior of the United States has ruled that sections 16 when they are "radiating sections" or "fractional sections" or "lots," as they are indiscriminately called, which front on water courses, do not belong to the state for the benefit of the township for school purposes, but that only the sections or parts of sections that are In accordance with that act, township 12 south, range 11 east, was surveyed by Ross and Sulakowski, deputy United States surveyors; and that survey was approved by E. W. Foster, Surveyor General for Louisiana, June 22, 1872, as appears by a certified copy of a plat of township 12, range 11 east, South-rectangularly surveyed and are "in place” east land district, east of Mississippi river, St. Helena Meridian, La., found in the record. In the copy of the plat of said township is belong to the state for school purposes. In the case of Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691, 9 Sup. Ct. 203, 32 L. Ed. 565, the court held "that the power to make and correct sur- | Bres v. Louviere, 37 La. Ann. 736, and Lauve veys of the public lands belongs to the political department of the government," and: "When lands are granted, according to an official survey, the plat, with all its notes, descriptions, and landmarks, becomes as much a part of the grant and controls, so far as the limits are concerned, as if such descriptive features were written out on the face of the deed. "The description and plat of the original government survey made by a Surveyor General from the field notes and filed in the Land Office are conclusive. The section lines and corners as laid down in the description and the plat are binding upon all parties.' And we say in Boatner v. Scott, 1 Rob. 546: "A survey of a portion of the public lands, under an order from the land office, approved by the Surveyor General, is conclusive, unless it be shown that it deviates from the order." The laws of the United States are clear to the effect that every sixteenth section in place, or part of a sixteenth section in place, belongs to the state of Louisiana, for school purposes, and the parish school board having the administration of the schools and the property intended for their benefit are entitled to institute suits for recovery of such sections of land found in the possession of third persons. v. Wilson, 114 La. 699, 38 South. 522, where- that the section there referred to was "the The section in controversy was not separated from the public domain until June 22, 1872. It appears that at the latter date the state of Louisiana made claim for the land in question, together with other lands in the vicinity, under the Swamp Land Grant, and that the selection was presented to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval or disapproval; and he disapproved this selection because of its being a sixteenth section rectangularly surveyed; and, being such, it went to the state of Louisiana under the acts of Congress of 1806 and 1811 for school purposes. The grant of sections 16 in place for the use of schools is a part of the land system of the United States, and such section belongs to the state if the defendant has not a title by adverse possession. As the property was public property, and prescription does not run against the United States or the state of Louisiana, the plea of prescription filed by defendant should have been overruled. Plaintiff is claiming only a fraction of the sixteenth section, comprising 258 acres, for the reason that the balance of the section was disposed of prior to the acquisition of the land by the United States government Defendant contends that the land in quesunder the treaty with France in 1803. Never- tion did not belong to the United States govtheless it is a fraction of a sixteenth section ernment at the date of the passage of the in township 12 south, and it has been sur- act reserving sixteenth sections for schools. veyed by the United States and given to the It sets up title in itself and its ancestors, state of Louisiana for school purposes. It claiming that France or Spain, it is not clear therefore belongs to the state of Louisiana; which, made a grant or concession of the and it is, and will remain, public property land to Carlos Terascon through or by a until it has been properly disposed of, and French officer, Gov. Aubry, in 1766, while the proceeds thereof devoted to school pur- Louisiana was under the dominion of Spain; poses. and that said title was a complete title. The evidence in the record shows that the United States government issued indemnity scrip to the state for that part of the section covered by a prior grant to Milne, and which could not be delivered to the state. The claim of defendant that there is a navigable stream through township 12 south, namely, the Bayou St. John, and that under the United States statutes of 1811 and 1824 the sections in the township are what are known as radiating sections, cannot be considered for the reasons given above. The survey made by the government is conclusive upon the court and the parties to this litigation. The official survey shows the section to be in place as the sixteenth section, or fractional part of said section, and not a radiating section. The court has always followed the ruling of the Secretary of the Interior to the effect that radiating sections are not reserved for school purposes, and that they may be acquired by the state and others under the laws of the United States. Reference is made by defendant to the opinions of the court in The legal title thus set up by defendant is not in the record; and the only evidence of this concession is a declaration made by Terascon in an act of sale made to Andre Jung, in 1773, wherein he declared that the property is "the same held by me by concession made to be by Monsieur Aubry, French governor, at the time of his domination, before Stans. Foucault, commissary, as appears in the titles he delivered to the purchaser.' The concession or grant, or a copy thereof, was not offered in evidence. Defendant asks the court to presume upon the strength of the declaration made by Terascon, and copied above, that such a concession or grant was made, and that it is in full force and effect. Under the present law, the patent is the instrument which passes title from the United States. It is the governmental conveyance. If defendant and its ancestors in title possessed a title superior to that of the plaintiff, a court of equity would, under proper pleadings, enforce said equity by compelling a transfer of the legal title. But defendant has set forth merely a legal title, and it |