Edward IV. recovered the crown, which had been long detained from his house by the line of Lancaster, treasons committed against Henry VI. were capitally punished; though Henry had been declared an usurper by parliament.

The oath or declaration of allegiance, or rather the allegiance itself, is applicable not only to the political capacity or regal office, but to the natural person and blood-royal of the sovereign: and for the misapplication of their allegiance, viz. to the regal capacity or crown, exclusive of the person of the king, were the Spensers banished in the reign of Edward II.(d). And hence arose that principle of personal attachment and affectionate loyalty which induced our forefathers (and, if occasion required, would doubtless induce their sons) to hazard everything dear to them, life, fortune, and family, in defence and support of their sovereign.

*Allegiance then, under the distinctions here laid down, of local [ *449] and temporary, or universal and perpetual, is the duty of all subjects of the crown. Their rights are also distinguishable by the same criterions of time and locality; natural-born subjects having a great variety of rights, which they acquire by being born within the ligeance, and can never forfeit by any distance of place or time, but only by their own misbehaviour: the explanation of which rights is the principal subject of the two first Books of these Commentaries.

The rights of aliens are more circumscribed than those of natural-born subjects. According to our customary law, if an alien born purchase land for his Disabilities and own use, the crown is thereupon entitled to it(e).(117) If an rights of aliens. alien could acquire a permanent property in land, he must owe an allegiance, equally permanent with that property, to the crown of England; which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes to his own natural liege lord: besides that thereby the nation might in time become subject to foreign influence, and feel many other inconveniences(f). Wherefore by the civil law also such contracts were made void (g): though the prince had no advantage of forfeiture thereby as with us in England. At common law, however, an alien might acquire a property in goods, money, and other personal estate, which is of a transitory and moveable nature, and under the statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66(h), s. 4, an alien ami may hold every species of personal property(i), except chattels real, and by s. 5, he "may by grant, lease, demise, *assign[* 450] ment, bequest, representation, or otherwise, take and hold any lands, houses, and other tenements for the purpose of residence, or of occupation," "or for the purpose of any business, trade, or manufacture," for any term not exceeding twenty-one years. An alien may also contract or maintain an action concerning personalty(k), may make a will, and dispose of his chattel property (1).

These rights however can be exercised by alien friends only, or such whose countries are at peace with ours; for alien enemies have no rights, no privileges(m), unless by the special favour of the sovereign during the time of war.(118)

The proposition that an alien is one born out of the queen's dominions, or allegiance, must be understood with some restrictions. The common law indeed stood absolutely so, with only very few exceptions; so that a particular act of parliament became necessary after the Restoration (n), "for the naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles." And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two masters at once. Yet the children of the king's ambassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects(o); for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by his father, the ambassador. To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute 25 Edw. 3, st. 2, that all children born abroad, provided both their *parents were at the time of birth in allegiance to the king, and the mother had passed the seas by [*451] her husband's consent, might inherit as if born in England; and these restrictions were afterwards still further taken off (p); so that all children, born out of the ligeance of the crown, whose fathers (or grandfathers by the father's side) were natural-born subjects, were to be deemed natural-born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes; unless their said ancestors were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or were at the birth of such children in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain. Also by stat. 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 6, explained by 25 Geo. 2, c. 39, any natural-born subject might inherit and be inheritable to land, although the ancestor through whom the title might be traced or derived, was born out of the allegiance. And further by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 3, every person born out of her majesty's dominions of a mother being a natural-born subject of the United Kingdom, "shall be capable of taking to him, his heirs, executors, or administrators, any estate, real or personal, by devise or purchase, or inheritance of succession."

The distinction between an alien and a natural-born subject being still, notwithstanding the statutory changes mentioned, exceedingly material, the legislature has deemed it expedient that a person should be enabled by formal procedure to establish his right to be deemed a natural-born subject of the crown, and has accordingly enacted that any natural-born subject of the queen, or any person whose right to be deemed a natural-born subject depends wholly or in part on his legitimacy, or on the validity of a marriage, being domiciled in England or Scotland, or claiming any real or personal estate situate in England, may apply by petition to the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, "for a decree declaratory of his right to be deemed a natural-born subject of her

(m) Co. Litt. 129 b.

(n) Stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 6.

(0) Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 18.

(p) 7 Ann. c. 5; 10 Ann. c. 5; 4 Geo. 2, c 21, and 13 Geo. 3, c. 21.

(118) See notes 90 and 115, ante.

majesty," and such decree will be thereupon made as to such court [ *452] may seem just(q). It will not, however, "prejudice any person unless he has been cited or made a party to the proceedings, or is the heir-at-law or next of kin, or other real or personal representative of, or derives title under or through a person so cited or made a party, nor shall such sentence or decree of the court prejudice any person if subsequently proved to have been obtained by fraud or collusion "(r).

Denizens.

A denizen is an alien born, who has obtained ex donatione regis letters patent to make him an English subject: a high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative(s). A denizen is in a kind of middle state, between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of the privileges of each of them. He may take lands by purchase or devise, which an alien may not; but cannot take by inheritance(); for his parent, through whom he must claim, being an alien, had no inheritable blood, and therefore could convey none to the son. And, upon a like defect of hereditary blood, the issue of a denizen, born before denization, cannot inherit to him; though his issue born after may(u). No denizen can be of the privy council, or either house of parliament, or have any office of trust, civil or military, or be capable of any grant of lands, &c., from the crown(x).

Naturalized

Naturalization could formerly have been effected by act of parliament only; for by this an alien is put in the same state as if he had been born in the queen's ligeance; except only that he is incapable, as well as a denizen, of persons. being a member of the privy council or parliament, holding offices, grants, &c. (y). And no bill for naturalization *could by stat. [*453] 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 4, have been received in either house of parliament (unless in very special cases), without a disabling clause in it to such effect. An alien is now, however, enabled, on complying with the provisions of the recent statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66(a), to obtain from a principal secretary of state a certificate of naturalization conferring upon him all the rights and capacities of a natural-born British subject, except the capacity of being a member of the privy council, or of either house of parliament, and such rights and capacities, if any, as may be specially excepted in the certificate(b).

By the same statute (c), it is moreover enacted that "any woman married, or who shall be married to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized," and shall have "all the rights and privileges of a natural-born subject "(d).(119)

Such are the principal distinctions between natural-born subjects of the crown, aliens, and denizens, recognized by our law; distinctions upon which it would be useless further to enlarge, inasmuch as legislative intervention has been announced concerning them.

(q) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 93, ss. 1, 2. Under sect. 9 proceedings may be taken with a like object by a person domiciled in Scotland.

(r) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 93, s. 8.

The stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 20, applies similarly to Ireland.

(8) Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 25.

(t) Co. Litt. 8 a.

(u) Co. Litt. 8; Vaugh. 285.

(x) Stat. 12 & 13 Wm. 3, c. 2.
(y) Ib.

(a) By sect. 10, within sixty days of the date of the certificate, the applicant is required to make an oath which will now be in the form prescribed by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, s. 14. (b) Sect. 8.

(c) Sect. 16.

(d) See also s. 13.

(119) See notes 90 and 115, ante.

THE people, whether natural-born subjects, aliens, or denizens, are divisible into two kinds; the clergy and the laity: the clergy comprehending all persons in holy orders, and in ecclesiastical offices, will be the subject of the following chapter.(120)

(120) Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;" * * * U. S. Const. amendment, art. 1.

* But no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." U. S. Const., art. 6. The principles contained in the constitution above quoted have been adopted and are acted upon in every state of the Union. Free toleration in all matters of religion is the principle that governs the national and the state governments. Liberty to all, but preference to none, is our principle and our practice. Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 554, 555. No one is compelled by law to make any but voluntary contributions for the support of religion. As we shall see hereafter, parties may bind themselves by contract to pay money for such purposes, in the same manner that they may bind themselves by any other contracts.

While there is the largest liberty of conscience in matters of religion, there are acts which are so repugnant to the large mass of the people that they are prohibited. Thus, while the law allows each person to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, it does not permit him to interfere with the exercise of the like right by every other person. And, therefore, the unlawful disturbance of a religious meeting is punishable criminally. Cockreham v. State, 7 Humph. 11; State v. Swink, 4 Dev. & Batt. 358; State v. Ringer, 6 Black f. 109; State v. Jasper, 4 Dev. 323. But, to constitute the offense, the acts must have taken place when the congregation were assembled for worship. State v. Edwards, 32 Mo. 548.

A state may constitutionally enact laws which prohibit certain acts from being done on Sunday. People v. Hoym, 20 How. Pr. 76; Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548; 21 How. Pr. 156; Omit v. Commonwealth, 21 Penn. St. 426; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & R. 394; Shouer v. State of Arkansas, 5 Eng. (Ark.) 259; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387; Warner v. Smith, 8 Conn. 14; State v. Ambs, 20 Miss. 214; Commonwealth v. Sampson, 97 Mass. 407; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472; People v. Ball, 42 Barb. 324; Vogelsay v. State, 9 Ind. 112.

Blasphemy is an offense which is punishable at common law. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & R. 394; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553.

The organization of religious societies is generally provided for by the statutes of the several states. And there must be some diversity in the details of the various acts. It would be difficult, therefore, to lay down general rules which would be applicable to every state. But there are some general principles which will be generally recognized, and a statement of some of them may be useful. Again, to state the rules settled by some of the states will be convenient as showing the course of adjudication upon questions submitted to the courts. A religious corporation created under the general statutes of New York consists not of the trustees alone, but of the members of the society. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 243; Graw v. Prussia, etc., German Society, 36 N. Y. (9 Tiff.) 761; 3 Trans. App. 939.

The relation of the trustees to the society is not that of a private trustee to the cestui que trust; they are trustees only in the same sense in which the directors of a civil corporation are such. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 243.

The legal title and possession of a church are in the corporation or the trustees thereof, and not in the pew-holders as joint tenants or tenants in common. Cooper v. Trustees of First Presb. Church of Sandy Hill, 32 Barb. 222.

All the church property of a religious corporation, whether real or personal, is vested in

The clergy have large privileges allowed them by our municipal laws: and had formerly much greater, which were abridged at the time of the Reformation on account of the ill use which the popish priests had endeavoured to make of

the trustees, and they have the entire control over it. German Reformed Church v. Busche, 5 Sandf. 666; People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147; Green v. Cady, 9 Wend. 414; Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. (7 Smith) 267; Beckett v. Lawrence, 7 Abb. N. S. 403.

The court will not, upon a mere motion, decide who are the rightful trustees of the society, or determine the question who is entitled to the office. North Baptist Church on Staten Island v. Parker, 36 Barb. 171.

Where a religious association is organized upon the basis of community of property, and a member has been excluded from membership, and from the enjoyment of the property in common with the others, a court of equity may entertain a bill for an accounting and a payment to the injured party of his share of the assets. Nachtrieb v. Harmony Settlement, 3 Wall. Jr. 66.

Persons otherwise qualified do not lose their right to vote at elections for officers, in consequence of their having individually or collectively renounced the doctrine and ecclesiastical government professed and recognized by the religious body in whose worship and services the corporate property had always been employed. Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. (7 Smith) 267. To qualify one as a voter he must have been a regular attendant at the church for one year previous to the election, and must have contributed to the support of the church. People v. Tuthill, 31 N. Y. (4 Tiff.) 550.

Trustees regularly elected, under the statute, for one year, cannot be removed by the election of others until the year has elapsed. Den v. Pilling, 4 Zabr. 653.

An election of trustees is valid, although the requirements of the statute as to notice of election have not been complied with, provided the election was fairly conducted, and there is no complaint of want of notice. People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604.

A majority of a church congregation may direct and control in church matters consistently with the particular and general laws of the organization or denomination to which it belongs, but not in violation of them. Sutter v. First Reformed Dutch Church, 42 Penn. St. 503; Presbyterian Congregation v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 37; Den v. Bolton, 7 Halst. 206; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492; Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. (7 Smith) 267; 29 Barb. 256; Den v. Hay, 1 Zabr. 174; Graw v. Prussia, etc., German Society, 36 N. Y. (9 Tiff.) 161; 3 Trans. App. 339.

In case of a disruption or division of a religious corporation, the title to the church prop erty will remain with those who retain their connection with and continue to conform to the usages and discipline of the organization, even though a minority of the society; and the seceders will not be entitled to any part of it. Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 456; McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Penn. St. 9; M. E. Church of Cincinnati v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 283; The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459; Harper v. Straws, 14 B. Monr. (Ky.) 39; Page v. Crosby, 24 Pick. 211.

A tax assessed upon a pew by a religious corporation in part for purposes not specifically named in a deed of the pew, which alone gives the power to make such assessment, and which strictly defines and limits such power, is invalid, in toto. First Methodist, etc., Society v. Brayton, 9 Allen (Mass.), 248. Taxes and assessments cannot be enforced by a forfeiture of the shares of members, unless the constitution or by-laws so provide. Perrin, Adm'r, v. Granger, 30 Vt. 595. Taxes and assessments cannot be legally assessed or levied, if they exceed the amount specified in the act of incorporation. Second Universalist Society v. Cooke, 7 R. I. 69. A religious society may purchase and hold land in trust for any use within the general objects of its incorporation. Tucker v. St. Clement's Church, 3 Sandf. Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 242; 8 N. Y. (4 Seld.) 558, note.

But a deed of land to trustees de facto of an unincorporated religious society conveys no title to the society. Bundy v. Birdsall, 29 Barb. 31.

A religious corporation which has purchased land may execute a mortgage for the purchase-money without an order from a court. South Baptist Society of Albany v. Clapp, 18

Barb. 35.

Religious corporations have inherent power to alien their property, though where a statute requires leave of a court before sale, such leave must be obtained before the sale