a valid acceptance: Hindhaugh v. Blakey, 3 C. P. D. 136. Although in the Sec. 17. United States, under a similar statute, which required acceptance to be in writing and signed by the party making it, it was held, that the writing of his name, by the drawee, across the face of a bill of exchange, was a sufficient acceptance: Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith, (N. Y.) 1; s. p. Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 582. Thereupon by a declaratory clause in the "Bills of Exchange Act (Imp.) 1878," it was provided that the acceptance of a bill should not be deemed insufficient by reason only that the acceptance consists merely of the signature of the drawee written on such bill. The House of Lords in a case which came before it in 1880, held that the Act of 1878, was in effect a declaration that Hindhaugh v. Blakey, was wrongly decided: Steele v. McKinlay, 5 App. Cas. 754. In a case in Quebec, under C. S. L. C. c. 64, a firm in Montreal drew on a firm in Toronto on the faith of a telegram from the drawees that they might do so in order to retire a previous draft coming due. The plaintiffs discounted it; the first draft was retired, and the drawees then refused to accept; Held, that the drawees were liable: Molsons Bank v. Seymour, (1878), 21 L. C. J, 82, 23 L. C. J. 57; s. p. Bank of Montreal v. Thomas, 16 Ont. R. 503. Torrance v. Bank of British North America, L. R. 5 P. C. 246. The above clause of this Act, which is taken from the English Act, requiring an acceptance to be in writing, would seem to have the effect of assimilating the provisions respecting the acceptance of a bill of exchange to those of the Statute of Frauds, which require the signature of "the party to be charged" on a guarantee, to be in writing, and signed by such party, or his agent lawfully authorized. If such a view be correct, then the words of Lord Blackburn, referring to the Statute of Frauds, may be cited: "This enactment compels the Court to refuse to enforce a promise however clearly it may be proved, unless there be the statutable evidence:" Steele v. McKinlay, 5 App. Cas. 768.

3 ILLUSTRATIONS.

Every bill implies a command to the drawee to pay, and his acceptance is not only an admission of money or effects in his hands sufficient to pay, but is an undertaking by the acceptor as well with respect to the drawer, as the payee, to pay the bill: Parminter v. Symons, 2 Bro. P. C. 43; 1 Wils. 185.

In an action by a payee against the maker of a rote it was pleaded on equitable grounds, that the plaintiff was captain of a rifle company organized according to law; that defendant being a member of it and a tailor, was employed to make the uniforms, which it was agreed between plaintiff and defendant should be paid out of the moneys coming to the said company for their drills according to the statute: that in order to raise the necessary sum at once, it was also agreed that a note should be discounted, to be reduced from time to time by the moneys so received, and renewed until paid off; -Held, no defence: Vidal v. Ford, 19 U. C. Q. B. 88.

Where a man draws a bill to pay a debt, he cannot set up against the indorsee that the bill was given upon a prior verbal understanding between himself and the plaintiff, that the drawees would not pay unless they chose, and that in that event he was not to be liable as drawer : Adams v. Thomas, 7 U. C. Q. B. 249.

Sec. 17.

Acceptance of bill while incomplete. Imp. Act,s.18

In an action on a note an agreement was set up that when it became due plaintiffs would renew it for one half, and give three months for the other half; but that they claimed the whole instead of half, which the defendants were ready to pay: Held, no defence: Bank of Upper Canada v. Jones, 1 U. C. P. R. 185.

An instrument which orders any other act to be done, in addition to the payment of money, is not a bill: Re Boyse, 33 Ch. D. 612.

An acceptance of a bill must be to pay in money, an acceptance to pay by another bill is no acceptance: Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891.

See further notes 6 and 8 to s. 3.

4 There is no analogous clause respecting drawees in the English Act.. In s. 32 there is a similar provision respecting the payee or indorsee whose name has been misspelt.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

A bill addressed to W. B. was accepted by his wife, in her own name M. B.: Held, that if a principal authorizes his agent to accept a bill, such principal is liable as acceptor though wrongfully described by the agent in the acceptance: Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. 583; 12 Jur. 230.

A note stated that J. S. promised to pay A., or order, a sum certain, and was signed J. S. or else J. G.: Held, not a note of J. G. Ferris v. Bond, 4 B. & Ald. 679.

A person suing upon a note which purports to be payable to a person of a different name, may give evidence that he was the person intended : Willis v. Barrett, 2 Stark. 29. But see Boiles v. Sterns, 11 Cush. 320.

A bill drawn on A. & Co., a prior firm, but the proper style of the then firm was A. & R., by whom it was accepted in their proper name: Held, that the firm of A. & R. was liable: Lloyd v. Ashby, 2 B. & Ad. 23.

A bill drawn upon a firm as M. & McQ., their proper name being M. McQ. & Co.. was accepted by their manager in the name of M. & McQ.: Held, that the firm of M. McQ. & Co. were not liable: Quebec Bank v. Miller, 3 Man. R. 17.

Where a partner who was accustomed to issue notes on behalf of a firm indorsed a particular note in a name different from that of the partnership and not previously used by it. In an action on such note by an indorsee, the proper question for the jury is whether the name used though inaccurate, substantially describes the firm, or whether it so far varies, that the partner must be taken to have issued it on his own account Faith v. Richmond, 11 A. & E. 339.

A bill addressed to a firm was accepted by one of the partners in his own name: Held, that the firm were liable: Mason v. Ramsey, 1 Camp. 384.

A bill addressed to a firm was accepted by one of the partners in his own name : Held, that he was individually liable: Owen v. Von Uster, 10 C. B. 318.

See further the cases to s. 23.

18. A bill may be accepted

(a) Before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete ; 1

(b) When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored Sec. 18. by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment: 2

When over

due.

honored bill

accepted.

2. When a bill payable after sight is dishonored by non- Date of disacceptance, and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the subsequently holder, in the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance. 3

1 This section may be read with s. 20 as to inchoate bills, or signatures on blank paper "in order that it may be converted into a bill." The law reports contain many instances where the authority thus given has resulted in greater damages to the person giving his signature in blank, than his original risk. Such an acceptance in blank, authorizes the person to whom it is given to make a contract for the proposed acceptor for any amount, and in the terms of s. 54.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

Where the defendant signed, as maker, a printed form of a note, and handed it to A., by whom it was filled up for $855, and the plaintiffs afterwards became indorsees of it for value without notice: Held, that the defendant was liable, though it might have been fraudulently or improperly filled up or indorsed: McInnes v. Milton, 30 U. C. Q. B. 489. See Sanford v. Ross, 6 U. C. O. S. 104.

If a man write his name across the back of a blank bill stamp, and part with it, and the paper afterwards is improperly filled up, he is liable as an indorser. If he write his name across the face of a bill, he is liable as an acceptor, when the instrument has once passed into the hands of an innocent indorsee for value, before maturity: Per Byles, J., in Foster v. Mackinnon, L. R. 4 C. P. 712.

A form of a bill of exchange may be accepted by the drawee, and indorsed by a stranger to the acceptor, before the bill is extended : Shultz v. Astley, 2 Bing. N. C. 544.

A blank acceptance for £60 in figures, was sent to plaintiff by defendant, but he filled it up for £46, and altered the figures written in the margin; Held, not a satisfaction of the debt of £60: Baker v. Jubber, 1 M. & Gr. 212.

A firm accepted a bill to which no drawer's name was affixed, and afterwards made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. After the assignment, the bill was completed by the insertion of a drawer's name, and it then passed into the hands of a holder for value :-Held, that it did not create a debt until it had issued, which was after the bankruptcy : Ex parte Hayward, L. R. 6 Ch. 547.

A bill of exchange accepted for valuable consideration, with the drawer's name left blank, may be completed by the drawer's name being added after the death of the acceptor: Carter v. White, 20 Ch. D. 225.

Where value is given for a blank acceptance, authority to fill up the bill is not revoked by death, but where there is no such value or interest, the authority to fill up and negotiate the bill, is revoked by the death of the acceptor: Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G. 147; 24 L.J. Ch. 22.

Sec. 18.

A form of bill of exchange which contained the sum of £14, in figures in the margin, but no words in the body to denote the amount, was accepted by the defendant and returned to the drawer to be filled in. The drawer fraudulently inserted the words "one hundred and sixty-four" in the body, and altered the marginal figures to that amount and issued the bill;-Held, that the defendant was liable on the bill to the plaintiff, an innocent holder for value: Garrard v. Lewis, 10 Q. B. D. 30.

A partner has no implied authority to bind his firm by issuing acceptances of the firm in blank: Hogarth v. Latham, 3 Q. B. D. 643.

A defendant intending to become surety to the plaintiffs for money to be advanced by them to B., wrote his name on the back of a blank bill stamp; after which B. wrote his name across it as acceptor, and then handed it to the plaintiffs, who filled it up as a bill of exchange, payable to their own order;-Held, that although the defendant could not be sued as indorser, he was nevertheless liable as drawer of a bill payable to bearer, or according to the tenor and effect thereof, of a bill payable to the plaintiff's order: Matthews v. Bloxsome, 33 L. J. Q. B. 209; 10 L. T. N. S. 415. See also cases in notes to s. 23, post.

A bill accepted in blank was filled up twelve years after it was given, and dated in the year it was filled up, is binding on such acceptor in the hands of a holder for value: Montague v. Perkins, 17 Jur. 577; 22 L. J. C. P. 187. But see Re Bethell, 34 Ch. D. 561.

2 As to overdue notes see ss. 10 and 36. Where a bill has been presented and accepted after the period at which it is made payable has elapsed, the acceptor will then be liable to pay it on demand: Byles on Bills, 146. There cannot be a series of successive acceptors upon the same bill. It must be accepted by the original drawer, or by the drawee au besoin, or by a third person for honor, or where the bill states no drawee, by a person in that character: Story on Bills, 254. An acceptance for honor is allowable only when the bill has been refused acceptance by the drawee, and has been protested therefor: Ibid, s. 256. See s. 64. The absence from his home of the drawee of a bill where the holder calls with it for acceptance, is not a refusal to accept: Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Peters, U. S. 25. If after a refusal and a protest for non-acceptance of a bill payable so many days after sight, the drawee accepts the next day, but becomes insolvent before the day of payment, the drawer is not liable if he had no notice of the original non-acceptance: Mitchell v. DeGrand, 1 Mason 176.

3 This sub-section was intended to secure that, apart from special agreement, the holder should be put as far as possible in the same position as if the bill had not been dishonored: Chaimers on Bills, 41. The following case was decided before that Act: Where a bill of exchange, payable after sight, was presented for acceptance and refused, and protested; but eight days afterwards was accepted by a third person for the honor of the drawer, and at maturity was presented for payment according to that acceptance, it was held to have been presented at the proper time: Williams v. Germaine, 7 B. & C. 468.

19. An acceptance is either (a) general, or (b) qualified: Sec. 19. a general acceptance assents without qualification to the General and order of the drawer; a qualified acceptance in express . Act,s.19 terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn: 1

2. In particular, an acceptance is qualified which is

qualified acceptances.

Ind. Act,s.86

Qualified is

(a) Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by Conditional. the acceptor dependent on the fulfilment of a condition therein stated; but an acceptance to pay at a particular specified place is not conditional or qualified ; 2

(b) Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only Partial. of the amount for which the bill is drawn ; 3

(c) Qualified as to time;

4

Qualified as to time.

(d) The acceptance of some one or more of the drawees, All drawers but not of all. 5

1 In all cases the holder is entitled to have an absolute, unconditional, and unqualified acceptance of the bill as drawn. Though an acceptance varying from the tenor of the bill will bind the person making it, the holder is entitled, from the undertaking of the drawer and indorsers, to expect an absolute acceptance by the drawer (or, if there be several not -connected in partnership, by each) for the payment of the full sum of money mentioned therein, according to its tenor; specifying if none be mentioned for the purpose, a place for its payment, and expressing, if the bill be payable within a limited time after sight, the time for its presentment for acceptance, and he may reject any other. Still however the holder may, at his peril and risk, take a conditional or qualified acceptance; and if he does the acceptor will, if the condition is complied with, be bound thereby. If the holder means to assent to a conditional offer of acceptance he must do so at the time of the offer, for if he then declines it, it will be a waiver of all right to hold the drawee to the offer. And if the holder should take an acceptance varying in any respect from the tenor of the bill, whether conditional or qualified, or otherwise, in such a case, he must give notice thereof to the antecedent parties; and if he does not they will not be bound by it, but will be absolved from all responsibility upon the bill. Indeed it would seem that notice would not of itself be sufficient without a protest of the bill for the non-acceptance according to the tenor of the bill; nor unless after notice such parties adopted or acquiesced in the conditional or qualified acceptance, for it may materally change their whole relations to, and responsibilities on, the bill; and each of them has a right to say,

not accepting.