1900.

BAIN, J.

maceutical Society v. London Supply Association, 5 A. C. Judgment. 857, Lord Blackburn said: "I quite agree that a corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime—a corporation cannot be imprisoned, if imprisonment be the sentence for the crime; a corporation cannot be hanged or put to death, if that be the punishment for the crime; and so, in these senses, a corporation cannot commit a crime." Under the R. S. C., c. 162, s. 5, which was repealed by the Criminal Code, the punishment for manslaughter was imprisonment for life or "such fine as the Court awards in addition to or without any such imprisonment." But by section 236 of the Code "every one who commits manslaughter is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life;" and there is now no authority for the substitution of a fine for imprisonment for this offence. The provision in section 958, that " any person convicted of an indictable offence punishable with imprisonment for five years or less may be fined in lieu of or in addition to any punishment otherwise authorized," cannot apply where the imprisonment may be for life; and counsel for the Crown could only suggest that the Court might be able to impose the punishment of a fine under the general provision in section 639, that in case of the conviction of a corporation the Court" may award such judgment and take such other and subsequent proceedings to enforce the same as are applicable to convictions against corporations." This, however, could not be understood to affect or modify the positive enactment of section 236 that the punishment for manslaughter in all cases is imprisonment; and, besides, if a corporation cannot be convicted for manslaughter, there cannot, of course, be a judgment or sentence applicable to such a conviction.

I think the accused is entitled to have judgment on the demurrer.

1900.

IN RE ST. BONIFACE ELECTION.

Before KILLAM, C J., DUBUC and RICHARDS, JJ.

Election petition-Preliminary objections - Proof that security was duly given-Evidence that notes deposited were current money of Canada Statement of the purposes for which the security was given - Manitoba Controverted Elections Act, R.S.M., c. 29, ss. 21, 22.

The petitioners, intending to comply with sections 21 and 22 of The Manitoba Controverted Elections Act, R. S. M., c. 29, made a deposit with the Prothonotary, consisting of Dominion notes, one for $500, one for $100, and 150 for $1 each, and got a receipt stating that the sum of $750 had been deposited as security "for the payment of all costs, charges and expenses which the Court shall award to be payable by the petitioners on the final disposal of the petition."

On the hearing of preliminary objections it was shown that the notes had been handed out by one bank to the petitioners' solicitor as Dominion notes in payment of a cheque; and that, after receiving them, the Prothonotary deposited them in another bank, which received them as cash. The note for $500 was produced and identified at the hearing, but the others had been paid out in the course of business and could not be traced.

Held, (1) that it was not necessary to prove that the notes were genuine and signed by the proper officials with the same strictness as would be required in proving other documents before the Court, and that the evidence adduced was sufficient prima facie to establish compliance with the Act; and

(2) That the petitioners were not bound by the form of the receipt given by the Prothonotary as to the purposes for which the security given was intended, as no receipt is required by the statute to be given. The money was paid in as security for costs in the matter, and sections 21 and 22 of the Act make it security for all purposes therein referred to.

ARGUED: 9th May, 1900.

DECIDED: 2nd June, 1900.

APPLICATION to reverse a decision of Bain, J., over- Statement. ruling preliminary objections to an election petition under

1900. Statement.

The Manitoba Controverted Elections Act, R.S.M., c. 29. The only objection relied on before the Full Court was that the security for costs required by the statute had not been furnished. The argument was directed to two points: (1) The sufficiency of the proof of the deposit of the requisite sum in current money of Canada; (2) the terms and purpose of the deposit.

J. S. Ewart, Q. C., and C. P. Wilson for respondent. The money was not paid in for security required by the statute. The difficulty is that the statute in prescribing the method of giving security, has not covered that which the statute requires to be done. By section 21 a petitioner must give security for all "costs, charges and expenses." In complying with section 22 the security was given only for "costs." "Costs" does not necessarily include costs, charges and expenses of Judge, Sheriff and Prothonotary, not included in costs. They are spoken of as expenses. Referring to the sub-section of section 21, this becomes more clear. Section 21 includes any costs that may become payable at any station. Section 22 includes only costs to be awarded on the final disposition. Even if costs to be paid after final taxation, they may be previously awarded, and it is only those awarded on final disposal that are secured by section 22. Appeal costs are not included, or, if so, not those on the original disposal of petition. The next question is, whether the petitioners gave security under section 22. There is no evidence of it. It is necessary to show the precise language used. The certificate does not say the money was paid in under section 22, and its language does not so imply. It adds "charges and expenses." The next question is, whether $750 current money of Canada was paid in. no sufficient proof that the documents were notes. The Judge assumed that they were.

There was

Dominion There was

no sufficient foundation to admit secondary evidence:

Rev. Denio, 7 B. & C., 620; Rex v. Castleton, 6 T. R.

1900.

286; Grover v. Clarke, 5 O. S. 208; in Re Cypress Elec- Argument. tion, 8 M. R. 581, it was held a bank note was only a promissory note, so is a Government note. As to an action on a lost note: McDonnell v. Murray, 9 Ir. C. L. 495. A person can sue for conversion of a bank note: Burn v. Morris, 2 C. & M. 579. As to the method of proving a lost note: Blackie v. Pidding, 6 C. B. 196. The Prothonotary's acceptance does not bind the parties: Re Cypress Election, 8 M. R. 581. Notes are not money: Gray v. Worden, 29 U. C. R. 535; Bond's Case, 1 Den. 517.

A. J. Andrews and J. Bernier for petitioners. The petitioners claim to have done the identical thing the Act required. The Prothonotary says that what was given to him was $750 in Dominion notes; he believed them to be genuine; the tellers of the Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Hochelaga also believed them to be genuine. Such strict proof is not required of what passes as money. If coin is used it should not be required to prove its genuineness: Miller v. Race, 1 Sm. L. C. 452; Guardians of Lichfield Union v. Greene, 1 H. & N. 889. Dominion notes are money, not securities for money: McLaren on Bills of Exchange, 41. Third Nat. Bank v. Cosby, 41 U. C. R. 402, practically overruled Gray v. Worden. As to method of proving notes: Gady v. The State, 3 So. Rep. 429; Lawton v. Sweeny, 8 Jur. 964. The Court will take judicial notice of the currency of the country: Best on Evidence, 255. The term "current money" implies that it passes about. As to Bond's Case, there was no real evidence as to the nature of any piece. No sufficient evidence of the kind of money given.

The one dollar bills were

wholly lost and cannot be traced. Destruction not necessary, loss and continued existence sufficient to admit secondary evidence. As to the admission of secondary evidence, it would be sufficient to examine the officials of the

1900. bank where the bills went: Queen v. Kenilworth, 7 Q.B. Argument. 642; Rex v. Morton, 4 M. & S. 48; McGahey v. Alston, 2

M. & W. 213; Sutor v. McLean, 18 U.C.R. 490; Hart v. Hart, 1 Ha. 1. The finding of the trial Judge as to the sufficiency of the search should not be disturbed: Russell v. Fraser, 15 U. C. C. P. 375. The receipt was in the words of section 22, except in adding words "charges and expenses," and omitting the manner of payment. If the money was paid in with petition, that was sufficient. The Court could then deal with it as the Act requires: Queen's County Election Case, 20 S. C. R. 26.

KILLAM, C.J.-It was claimed that the onus of proving that the required security was given was upon the petitioners. Following the analogy of the decisions upon the question of the status of the petitioners, this view appears

correct.

The deposit was said to have been made in Dominion notes, one for $500, one for $100, and 150 for $1 each. Only that for $500 was produced at the hearing. That for $100 could not be found, and no attempt had been made to keep track of those for $1 by noting the numbers or otherwise. The alleged notes were paid as such to the petitioners' solicitor, who deposited them with the Prothonotary. This official satisfied himself that they were Dominion notes of the requisite denominations to make up $750, accepted them as such, gave his receipt for the amount and deposited them to his credit at a bank. The officials of the latter bank received and accepted them as such Dominion notes, and placed the $750 to the credit of the Prothonotary. The Prothonotary swore that he counted them and that they were Dominion notes of the denominations mentioned. The bank officer who received his deposit swore that they were Dominion of Canada notes of these denominations, and that he believed them genuine.