1900. Marie Nault was in the service of a stranger. The Act Argument. respecting the Action of Seduction, 55 Vic., c. 43, (M. 1892), does not apply to a case like this, as the mother is alive and the putative father is also alive but in a foreign country. There was no refusal to provide or retain as an inmate, which might bring the case within section 2 of that Act. Where the female seduced is illegitimate the statute does not apply: Hicks v. Ross, 25 U. C. R. 50. Our statute is different from the Ontario Act; it refers to the mother being a widow or re-marrying. The mother of the girl seduced cannot become a widow or re-marry if she never was married previously. Plaintiff is not a stepfather, and so the case of Waters v. Powers, 29 U. C. R. 336, does not apply; nor is he a person entitled to bring this action: Hogan v. Aikman, 30 U. C. R. 19; Meyer v. Bell, 13 O.R. 35; Harrison v. Prentice, 24 A.R. 677; McKersey v. McLean, 6 O. R. 428; Tweedlie v. Bogie, 27 U. C. C. P. 561; Cromie v. Skene, 19 U. C. C. P. 328. The C. P. Wilson and G. A. Elliott for plaintiff. Seduction Act was passed owing to the decision in Hebb v. Lawrence, 7 M. R. 222. The object was to prevent the seducer escaping liability because of the female being in his employ at the time of the seduction. It is consonant with the intention of the Act that it should apply to illegitimate children. In reality the action is for the benefit of the child, although by fiction loss of service is the foundation of the action. In Maxwell on Statutes, p. 82, it is said, "Although the word 'children' is confined technically to legitimate children, it would be construed as including illegitimate children when such seemed to be more consonant with the intention." In Rex v. Hodnett, 1 T. R. 96, it was held that where an Act of Parliament required the consent of the father where a minor was married without the publication of banns, this included the father of an illegitimate child. Butler, J., stated in that case "The rule that a bastard is nullius filius applies only 1900. to the case of inheritances." The Ontario cases which Argument. decide that the Ontario Act does not apply to illegitimate children are not applicable, because at the time those cases were decided the Ontario Act contained other clauses not in our Act, which referred specifically to illegitimate children, from which it could be inferred that the clauses similar to ours were only intended to apply to legitimate children. The words in section 1, giving the action to a mother, whether she remains a widow or re-marries, are intended only to preserve the action notwithstanding remarriage. BAIN, J.-I non-suit the plaintiff, with costs. It is conceded that, as the girl seduced was in the service of and living with the defendant when she alleges she was seduced, the plaintiff cannot maintain the action, unless the Act respecting the Action of Seduction, 55 Vic., c. 43 (M. 1892) gives him a right to sue. But the plaintiff cannot bring the action unless the father or mother could have brought it under section 1 of the Act. It seems clear, however, that section 1 does not apply to the case of an illegitimate woman, and so the present action is not maintainable. I express no opinion on the question, whether, even if the girl were legitimate, the present plaintiff could sue. 1900. Statement. REGINA V. GREAT WEST LAUNDRY COMPANY. Before BAIN, J. Criminal law Criminal Code, ss. 3, s-s (t), 213, 220, 639 and 958 The defendant company was indicted, under sections 213 and 220 of There was also a count for manslaughter. Defendant demurred to the indectment. Held, that, notwithstanding s-s (t) of s. 3, of the Code, by virtue of which sections 213 and 220 generally apply to corporations as well as individuals, an indictment would not lie against a corporation for manslaughter, and even if a corporation were indicted and convicted of such an offence, there was no provision of law under which any punishment could be imposed. The punishment for manslaughter being imprisonment for life under section 236 of the Code, section 958 did not apply and a fine could not be imposed in lieu of imprisonment. The general provision of section 639 that in case of the conviction of a corporation, the Court "may award such judgment and take such other and subsequent proceedings to enforce the same as are applicable to convictions against corporations," could not be interpreted so as to affect or modify the positive enactment of section 236. ARGUED : 19th March, 1900. DECIDED: 9th April, 1900. DEMURRER to an indictment. The first count alleged that The Great West Laundry Company, Limited, was a corporation, incorporated under the provisions of The Manitoba Joint Stock Companies Act; that on 31st of January, 1900, said company was carrying on a laundry business by means of a steam engine, shafting and other machinery maintained by it, with the assistance of persons employed by the company, and it became and was the duty of the company to take reasonable precautions against and to use reasonable care to avoid danger to the lives of said employees from said shafting and machinery coming in contact with said employees while the same was 1900. in rapid motion, yet the said company on the date last Statement. aforesaid and for a long time prior thereto unlawfully and negligently omitted to take such reasonable precautions and to use such reasonable care; but, on the contrary, had erected and was maintaining a rapidly revolving shaft at a distance of about sixteen inches above the floor and two or three feet from the side wall of the room where a number of female employees were working, which shaft was then, and had for a long time been entirely uncovered and unprotected, in consequence whereof one Gudrun Johansson, a female in the employment of said company, on the date aforesaid, while doing her usual work as such employee, and in the act of stepping over said shaft, was caught therein by her skirts, and thrown with violence to the floor and so wounded and injured that she died on the same day. The second count alleged that the Great West Laundry Company, Limited, a corporation duly incorporated, on 31st of January, 1900, unlawfully did kill and slay one Gudrun Johansson. The accused corporation demurred to the first count on the ground that it did not charge any indictable offence, and to the second count on the ground that an indictment for manslaughter would not lie against a corporation. In support of the demurrer it was argued that a corporation, as such, is not in law capable of committing manslaughter, and that even if it were convicted of such an offence the law has made no provision for punishing it therefor. H. M. Howell, Q. C., for the Great West Laundry Company. The first count does not set forth any crime. A corporation cannot be found guilty of manslaughter, for there is no punishment applicable to a corporation. Section 958 of the Criminal Code, 1892, does not enable a Court to punish a corporation for manslaughter, because 1900. The as to this crime there is no option of fine. That section Argument. was taken from R. S. C., c. 181, s. 31, s-s. 2, which applied only to misdemeanors. In England there is not this special provision, but in most legislation relating to punishment of misdemeanors there is an option to fine. In England there may be a fine for manslaughter. Archbold's Criminal Pleading, 735. Section 230 of the Code defines manslaughter, and section 236 states the punishment; there is no discretion to inflict a fine under section 958. Even if a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter there would be a trial without result. Code does not apply to corporations so far as manslaughter is concerned. Section 3, sub-section (t), defines “ person." "Everyone," in section 236, does not apply to corporations. The Crown cannot indict for any act for which the accused cannot be punished: Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 7, p. 842; Commonwealth v. Pulaski, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. Rep. 442. This is a demurrer to an indictment: Reg v. Pocock, 17 Q. B. 38. But, aside from the question of punishment, a corporation cannot be indicted for offences such as manslaughter, involving personal violence. It can be indicted only for a breach of its statutory duties, and for a breach of its duty to the public, as for nuisance and other similar offences to the general public: Brice on Ultra Vires, cap. 13; Pharmaceutical Society v. London Supply Association, 5 A. C. 869; Reg. v. Birmingham Ry. Co., 3 Q. B. 231. The Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 7, p. 842, gathers cases in which corporations can be indicted. A corporation cannot sue for libel affecting personal reputation: Mayor of Manchester v. Williams, [1891] 1 Q. B. 94; but may sue for a libel affecting property: Met. Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 90; see remarks of Pollock, C. B., in latter The old law was that a corporation could not be held criminally liable because it could have no criminal. intent, and at the most now it can only be punished for case. |