1900. & W. 462. The solicitor knew the law and the duty to preserve fairness: Gresley v. Mousley, 4 D. G. & J. 98; Argument. Mearns v. Knapp, 37 W. R. 586; Morgan v. Higgins, 1 Giff. 270. Plaintiff claims he has shown fraud, pressure and overcharges; it is not necessary to do this: Re Frape, [1893] 2 Ch. 297. Under Earl of Aylesford v. Morris the Court can go behind agreements authorized by statute. That case was supported by Storer v. Johnson, 15 A. C. 206. As to opening settled accounts: Re McBrady and O'Connor, 19 P. R. 37; Re Pinkerton and Cooke, 18 P.R. 331. Watson v. Roblin, 47 L.J. Ch. 14, was decided eight years after the Imperial Solicitors' Act of 1881. As to duress and pressure: Ellis v. Barker, 41 L. J. Ch. 64, gives a definition. It must be borne in mind that under the assignment Nugent had the judgment and full control, and he could sell it if he wished. The motives were: 1. $5,000 to himself. 2. Interest. 3. One-third interest. 4. Nugent could make deductions from Preston's share. In Mearns v. Knapp the pressure was trifling: Disher v. Clarris, 25 O. R. 493;Slator v. Nolan, I. R. 11 Eq. 367; Coleman v. Mellersh, 2 Mac. & G. 309. See Howard v. Burrows, 7 M. R. 181, as to right to tax, when one amount is taxable. Where there is a doubt as to facts the solicitor should account: In re Attorney, 41 U.C.R. 372; Pittman v. Prudential Deposit Bank, 13 Times L. R. 110. II. M. Howell, Q. C., J. S. Ewart, Q. C., and C. P. Wilson for defendant. The plaintiff asks the Court to set aside only one clause of an agreement and leave the rest standing. The Court cannot make a new bargain for the parties. What the plaintiff really wants is a reformation of the deed, but for that there is no case. As to setting aside an agreement in part: Great Luxembourg Ry. Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 594; Sheffield Nickel Co. v. Unwin, 2 Q. B. D. 214; Urquhart v. Macpherson, 3 A. C. 831. There is no evidence that Mr. Macdonald was dissatisfied 1900. with the agreement. 'He does not ask to set it aside and Argument. the assignee of his interest cannot do so. An equity to set aside a transaction for fraud cannot be assigned: Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Hutley v. Hutley, L. R. 8 Q. B. 112; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Ha. 222; Mutchmore v. Davis, 14 Gr. 346; Little v. Hawkins, 19 Gr. 267; Wigle v. Setterington, 19 Gr. 512; Johnson v. Sovereign, 25 Gr. 434. Compare the English, Ontario and Manitoba statutes: Poley on Solicitors, 542, 596. Section 4 of the Act, 33 & 34 Vic., c. 28, (Imp.) authorizes an agreement in writing for certain purposes. Sections 8 and 9 refer to applications to the Court to set aside agreements. Section 11 contains a saving clause. Section 17 authorizes interest on disbursements. Section 2 of the Act 44 & 45 Vic., c. 44, (Imp.) allows general orders for fixing tariffs for general business. Section 8 gives power to make bargains with proviso. Special provisions as to impeaching same. The Ontario statutes are: R. S. O. (1887), c. 147, ss. 50, 1; (1897), c. 174. s. 54. Manitoba has not ss. 34, 35, 42 of the latter Act. This is not so wide as the English Act in the nature of business to which Rules may relate. This does not allow agreements as to non-contentious business. Storer v. Johnson, 15 A. C. 203, turned on the solicitor being an officer of the Court in regard to taxing bills for general business. Re McBrady and O'Connor, 19 P. R. 37, turned also on the solicitors being officers of the Court. The Manitoba Act, R. S. M., c. 83, is different. The Court only has the power to strike off the Law Society Rolls. The Court has no power to order a bill rendered when not within the power of the Court to frame a tariff for it: Ostrom v. Benjamin, 20 A. R. 336; O'Connor v. Gemmill, 26 A.R. 27. There is no provision. in the Manitoba Act for compelling delivery of a bill of costs. See Rules authorized by 48 Vic., c. 15; Queen's Bench Act, 1895, Rule 986. This Court had no power to fix fees to be allowed for work in Ontario Courts, in the Supreme Court, or before the Privy Council. Nugent 1900. could sue here without rendering a bill. When provision Argument. was made by the Manitoba Act for making agreements it was the law that a solicitor and his client could bargain as to fees for non-contentious business subject to their being impeached as fraudulent. This might be considered in construing section 68 of The Law Society Act. An agreement, such as that in question here, is authorized by the statute. It should not be open to prima facie suspicions. That would largely nullify the statute. Nugent swore that in his book there was entered more than $5,000 as charges against plaintiff. The value of the judgment was very problematical. One contention of Delap & Co. as to the bonds, if sustained, would have made the bonds valueless. Preston might have been actuated by gratitude. Nugent obtained for him a preferential position as to the fencing contract. The following are cases under the English Act: Re Thompson, [1894] 1 Q. B. 462; Re Baylis, [1896] 2 Ch. 118; Hitchcock v. Stretton, [1892] 2 Ch. 343; Bell v. Cochrane, 5 B.C.R. 213. The agreement of 1893 gave interest against Preston, which is not now objected to. This helps to make the $5,000 referred to in the agreement of 1897 a fair transaction. Moreover, there is no pretence that Mrs. Macdonald was misled. There is nothing to show that Mrs. Macdonald was affected by the letters written by Nugent to Preston, or that she even saw them. Forbearance to sue, accompanied by circumstances implying agreement not to sue, is a sufficient consideration: Crears v. Hunter, 19 Q. B. D. 342. It cannot be inferred that the agreement was at all unreasonable: Mumma's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 474; Frink v. McComb, 60 Fed. Rep. 486; Bell v. Cochrane, 5 B.C.R. 211. Preston never repudiated the contract until Nugent had done all he had to do and received the money. Preston took all chances of success, and cannot now claim rescission. When the money was received Preston settled on 1900. the basis of the agreement and took the money under it. Argument. He did not repudiate even after he consulted his present solicitor. G. A. Elliott in reply. As to power to tax costs, the English Act, 6 & 7 Vic., c. 73, is applicable here: Howard v. Burrows, 7 M. R. 181, settles that question; Re McBrady and O'Connor, 19 O. R. 37. The position of trustee imposed the onus on him of showing propriety. Macdonald & Preston's judgment had great value in 1897. Nugent had offers of considerable sums. The Commercial Bank had seen fit to advance large sums in the litigation. Preston received nothing for the one-third given Nugent. He and Nugent both agreed he was still liable for the costs. Preston probably did not know his rights when he was attempting to settle under the agreement. KILLAM, C. J.-By the law of England an agreement to compensate an attorney or solicitor for his services in conducting litigation by allowing him a share of the property to be recovered was illegal and wholly void: Simpson v. Lamb, 7 E. & B. 84; Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B. N.S. 566; Thomas v. Lloyd, 3 Jur. N. S. 288; Pittman v. Prudential Dep. Bank, 13 Times L. R. 110; In re Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1870, 1 Ch. D. 573; Strange v. Brennan, 15 Sim. 346. Courts of equity have always regarded with suspicion contracts between solicitors and clients other than those for remuneration of the solicitors at ordinary rates. Gifts from a client to his solicitor pending the exist ence of the relation were, and, I conceive, still are, invalid: Newman v. Payne, 2 Ves. 199; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 302; Welles v. Middleton, 1 Cox, 112; Liles v. Terry, [1895] 2 Q. B. 679. In cases of purchases by a solicitor of the client's property, the onus is usually upon the solicitor to show that the transaction is fair and equitable: Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266; Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Ha. 60; Prees v. Coke, 1900. Judgment. Agreements to allow remuneration for the solicitor's KILLAM, C.J. services at higher rates than those legally chargeable were formerly invalid: Strange v. Brennan, 15 L. J. Ch. 389; Pince v. Beattie, 32 L. J. Ch. 734. A client might settle with his solicitor an account for past costs, although the Courts would scrutinize such a transaction narrowly: In re Whitcombe, 8 Beav. 140; Stedman v. Collett, 17 Beav. 608; Crossley v. Parker, 1 J. & W. 460; Blagrave v. Routh, 2 K. & J. 509; Morgan v. Higgins, 1 Giff. 270; Mearns v. Knapp, 37 W. R. 585; Watson v. Rodwell, 47 L. J. Ch. 418; Lawless v. Mansfield, 1 Dr. & War. 557. These cases show that, while the mere fact that the account is between solicitor and client does not warrant its being opened up without evidence of circumstances or of error, yet the onus of preserving evidence of the propriety of the transaction is usually to be thrown upon the solicitor. Under Lyddon v. Moss, 4 De G. & J. 104, it would appear that an agreement to pay interest on past costs would not ordinarily be binding upon the client, unless he made. it under independent advice, or knew or was advised by the solicitor, before entering into the agreement, that the law did not give the solicitor the right to charge interest. The case related to an agreement for compound interest, but the language of the Lords Justices seems to apply also to simple interest. In Morgan v. Higgins, 1 Giff. 270, Sir John Stuart, V. C., said that "interest on bills of costs could not be allowed. But where the transaction was held by the Court to amount to this-that the deed was to be a valid security for whatever should be found due he thought the right to the interest should follow as a matter of course." A case of this latter kind was Thomas v. Lloyd, 3 Jur. N. S. 288, where the mortgage |