1901. a verbal agreement that it would be renewed if the acJudgment. ceptor wished it, it was held that the evidence of the BAIN, J. verbal agreement was not admissible. agreement was not admissible. It was pointed out that under The Bills of Exchange Act evidence might still be given to show that a party signing a bill had signed it on some condition that remained unfulfilled, but that nothing in the Act had changed the general rule against the admissibility of parol evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written document.

I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

REX V. TODD.

Before Dubuc, BAIN and RICHARDS, JJ.

Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions.

The prisoner being suspected of having been guilty of the murder of one John Gordon but not under arrest, detectives were employed who associated with him, worked themselves into his confidence and, by representing to him that they were members of an organized gang of criminals engaged in profitable operations, induced him to seek for admission to their ranks. They then intimated to him that he must satisfy them that he was qualified for such admission by showing that he had committed some crime of a serious nature, whereupon, according to their evidence, he claimed that he had killed Gordon as the result of an altercation. The detectives were not peace officers, no charge was then pending against the prisoner, nor did he know that the detectives were such.

Held, that an inducement held out to an accused person in consequence of which he makes a confession must be one having relation to the charge against him, and must be held out by a person

in authority, in order to render evidence of the confession inadmissible; that both these grounds of objection were wanting in this case, and that, therefore, the evidence of the confession was rightly received.

ARGUED: 13th May, 1901.

DECIDED: 1st June, 1901.

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CROWN case reserved. Prisoner was tried for murder, Statement. when a question was raised as to the admissibility of certain admissions and confessions by the prisoner.

The following is a copy of the case submitted for the consideration of the Full Court by Killam, C. J.—

"At a sitting of His Majesty's Court of King's Bench for Manitoba, held at Winnipeg for the trial of criminal matters and proceedings for the Eastern Judicial District, commencing on the 19th day of March, 1901, Donald Todd was indicted and tried before me on a charge of having, on the 17th day of October, 1899, at the City of Winnipeg, killed and murdered one John Gordon.

The evidence showed that the dead body of John Gordon was found upon a public street in Winnipeg on the evening of the 17th day of October, 1899, and that his death had resulted from a wound caused by a pistol ball.

There being ground to suspect that Gordon had been murdered, it was the duty of the police force of the City of Winnipeg to undertake and they did undertake the work of ascertaining by whom Gordon was killed and the circumstances thereof.

In the course of their inquiries the said police force came to suspect the above named Donald Todd of the murder of Gordon, and for the purpose of learning whether their suspicions were correct and, if so, of procuring evidence against Todd, the chief officer employed two parties named William McBean and David Yeddeau to act as detectives.

The evidence for the Crown was that both McBean and Yeddeau falsely pretended and represented to Todd that they were criminals who had been guilty of crimes of violence and other crimes, and were members of a gang or body of criminals organized for the purpose of committing crimes. They offered to take Todd into and make him a member of the said gang of criminals if he would satisfy them that he had committed some serious crime, and they represented to him that large profits were likely to result to members of the said gang from its proposed criminal operations.

The evidence for the Crown was that Todd, by the influence of the said pretences and representations, was led and induced to

1901.

Statement.

admit and confess to the said Yeddeau, both orally and in writing, that he (Todd) had shot and killed John Gordon.

In their said acts, pretences and representations the said McBean and Yeddeau acted under the authority and by the direction of the chief officer of the said police force, but they were not members of the force or otherwise in authority in respect of the said matters except by virtue of their special employment aforesaid.

The said Todd made the aforesaid admissions and confessions without any notice or knowledge that McBean and Yeddeau or either of them, were or was employed as aforesaid, and without notice or knowledge of any facts constituting either McBean or Yeddeau a person in authority with respect to him (Todd) or to the death of Gordon.

Objection was taken on the part of the defence to the reception of evidence of the said admissions and confessions on the ground that they were not voluntary, but I received such evidence subject to a case to be reserved upon the point.

Apart from the said admissions and confessions to Yeddeau there was evidence warranting the conviction of Todd, but the said admissions and confessions were, in my opinion, calculated materially to influence the verdict of the jury.

The said Todd was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment to two years.

The question for the opinion of the Court is:

Was the evidence of the prisoner's admissions and confessions to David Yeddeau properly admitted?"

H. M. Howell, K. C., and E. L. Howell for the prisoner. We admit that Todd did not know that Yeddeau was a person in authority or that he was connected with the Crown or the police: Great Fire of London Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 807. As to the principle of confessions being received: Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach, 299. The influences brought to bear on Todd were such as to make it appear to be to his interest to say he had committed a crime. Reg. v. Baldry, 2 Den. C. C. 432. There is a difference in practice as to the admissibility of evidence in civil and criminal cases. A confession obtained by pressure can be received for what it is worth in civil cases, but it is not receivable at all in criminal cases. Confessions are rejected when obtained by pressure, not because the Court presumes the statement is untrue, but because of the prin

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ciple that the truth of the statement becomes uncertain: Reg. v. Baldry, 2 Den. C. C. 432. The Crown must Argument. show affirmatively that the confession is voluntary: Reg. v. Thompson, [1893] 2 Q. B. 12. A bought confession is not free and voluntary. The reward promised here was a monetary one. There was everything here to induce Todd to lie. We attack the proposition laid down in Taylor on Evidence, § 880, that a promise of a merely collateral favor is not an inducement to prevent the admission. All the cases cited in Taylor on Evidence are Nisi Prius ones: Rex v. Green, 6 C. & P. 655; Rex v. Lloyd, 6 C. & P. 393. Reg. v. Cain, 1 Craw. & D. 36, turned on the duty of the witness: see foot note to § 880 in Taylor on Evidence; under precisely the same circumstances two English Judges declined to admit the evidence. As to the promise being a temporal and not a spiritual one: Rex v. Gilham, 1 Moo. C. C. 186. Other cases on the point are: Reg. v. Blackburn, 6 Cox C. C. 333; Reg. v. Drew, 8 C. & P. 140; Reg. v. Macdonald, 2 Can. C. C. 221.

R. A. Bonnar for the Crown. The case submitted shows there was sufficient other evidence to warrant conviction. For the purposes of this case, the Crown is willing to concede Mr. Howell's argument and simply ask for a new trial, as the Crown is not desirous of availing itself in any way of what might possibly be considered objectionable evidence.

By the Court.-Are you willing to concede on behalf of the Crown that Mr. Howell's contention as to the law is correct?

Mr. Bonnar. I cannot do that.

DUBUC, J.-After Mr. Howell, the prisoner's counsel, had closed his argument, Mr. Bonnar, on behalf of the Crown, said that had not the learned Chief Justice, who

1901. tried the case, stated that, apart from the admission of Judgment. Yeddeau, there was evidence warranting the conviction DUBUC, J. of the prisoner, he would concede Mr. Howell's argument and ask for a new trial. He would not, however, take the responsibility of admitting that the confession of the prisoner made to Yeddeau was not admissible in evidence. He added that, at the new trial, if one is ordered, the Crown will not tender the evidence of Yeddeau.

This leaves it to the Court to decide whether the confession of the prisoner to Yeddeau was properly admitted at the trial.

The well known rule as to the admission or rejection of a confession made by a prisoner is to the effect that no confession by the prisoner is admissible which is made in consequence of any threat or inducement of a temporal nature, having reference to the charge against the prisoner, made or held out by a person in authority; and, as stated by Roscoe in his work on Criminal Evidence, the tendency of the present decisions seems to be to admit any confessions which do not come within this proposition. But the strict application of that rule is more or less influenced by the peculiar circumances of each case; and in each instance a good deal is left to the discretion of the Judge trying the cause: Taylor on Evidence, § 796; Russell on Crimes, (4th ed.) vol. 3, p. 368.

It is claimed that in this case there was an inducement of a temporal nature held out to the prisoner. It may be questioned whether an inducement of such a vile and base kind could influence even a man of the prisoner's character to falsely confess that he had committed murder; but the question we have to determine is whether the inducement was such as to come within the rule, and the statement to be held inadmissible in evidence.

It is clear that, in two particulars, the alleged induce ment failed to come within the proposition above laid