Judge Wright desires to add the following for himself:

I do not agree to the crusade, if it may be so called, against the system of jury trials. I would preserve it in all its integrity and the greater this integrity the better. I agree that much more care should be exercised in the selection of the panel, and that only those of honesty, and if possible above the average education, should be chosen. In the rural districts, a state like ours for instance, we are not afflicted with incompetent or so-called "professional jurors," as in the cities, and yet even here at times the evil is not to be denied. In too many instances, however, this results from the easy manner or readiness with which judges excuse those regularly selected and returned, men of business and of intelligence, who interpose their engagements as excuses and are relieved, their places filled by those who are too lazy to do anything, and who are the last persons to well and intelligently settle even the commonest controversy. The truth is, our best citizens do not sufficiently realize their obligations in this respect and they ought to be held by the court, and required, under the severest penalties, to discharge these duties. If our best business men, the most intelligent and well known for their integrity, were selected, and compelled to serve, we would have much less complaint of the jury system, certainly less ground for just complaint. And yet after all, I doubt whether in the hands. of a good and careful court, you will find a much safer or better method for settling human controversies than that long in use, the much abused and yet well-tried jury system.

I would give to the judge the right to sum up the case, comment upon the evidence, give his opinion of its weight and what it proves, subject, of course, to the right of the jury to exercise its own judgment. I believe the federal practice in this respect much better than that followed in most of the states. Instructions, however, I would have in writing, to be

given after the argument, and prepared by the judge, unless the stenographer takes them down; and in either case where either party desired it they should go to the jury. The difference between instructions and depositions is, that in the latter case, as a rule, they constitute but a part of the evidence, and to permit them to go to the jury, since they can be reread in the jury room, while that delivered orally is heard but once, and may be forgotten, might be unfair; whereas, as to instructions, they all go and neither party has advantage from their re-reading. If parties agree that they should not go to the jury, of course, all right. The advantage of written instructions, or the exact language being preserved by the reporter, is not alone for appeal proceedings or settling the bill of exceptions, but that the jury may know in the quiet of their deliberations just what the law is. I think it is a great safeguard to intelligent action that the very words and opinion of the judge should be taken to the jury room. With an honest and able judge we would thus have few miss-trials and fewer unjust verdicts. Without these qualities in the presiding officer a trial is a farce anyhow, and the administration of the law and justice a burlesque. The great desideratum in securing speedy trials and just judgments is an able and honest judge: I only add, as to payment of the jury fee, I favor it, as a rule, but perhaps an exception might be permitted where, from a proper showing, the judge should be satisfied that the suitor was unable to pay.

As to "champertous engagements," I have to say that they should be discountenanced and prevented by all lawful means. The temptation to dishonest practices and the use of "unprofessional shifts and devices" are strong enough where the retainer and services are upon a contingency; and to allow the attorney, under any circumstances, to advance and become liable for costs and expenses, tends to pollute the whole fountain, and he becomes the interested practitioner and not the true and noble advocate. We have enough of contingent retainers-attorneys standing in the way of clients agreeing with

their adversaries, because of their struggle to make illegitimate gain. If the attorney will make a champertous agreement, since, of course, the client makes the retainer with full knowledge, I would have it, when disclosed, operate to dismiss and forever bar plaintiff's cause of action, or the claim if preferred by defendant. A large per cent. of our litigation is set on foot and continued by reason of those iniquitous champertous arrangements, to the detriment of the public interest and the reproach of the bar and of our judicial system. Discountenance and prevent these in all ways possible.

REPORT

OF

CORTLANDT PARKER,

One of the Committee on Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration.

Having had no opportunity, in consequence of the great distance between the residences of the various members of the committee, and of the fact that all of them are more or less busily engaged, of holding any conference, the suggestion has been made by the chairman that each member should, if he pleased, signify his views to the Association by making a separate report. The subscriber will proceed, as briefly as possible, to comply with that suggestion.

He begins with the remark that no one, as long as human nature is what it is, can EXPECT entire freedom from delay and uncertainty in judicial administration, that delay and uncertainty have not been, in his own experience, so EXCESSIVE as two of the committee at the last session would seem to admit. Indeed, the report almost absolves legal machinery of fault in this respect when it lays the blame so largely as it does upon legal practitioners themselves, and upon the individuals holding judicial positions. Were practitioners always able and willing to push their causes or defenses; were judges always as prompt, skillful, industrious and energetic-as fully possessed of that tact which is the product of forensic and judicial experience, as well as of that intellectual as well as moral integrity which is so needful to their great office; that fairness of mind which makes prejudice impossible and which convinces all litigants of the judge's complete trustworthiness -the hackneyed complaint of the law's delay would have, in