proposition as it stands here. The only proposition upon which we are to vote, viz., "That the law itself should, so far as possible, be reduced to a statute." It will be observed that it does not affirm that all law should be reduced to statutory form. It is careful not to say that, and no man who votes for this proposition votes in favor of a proposition that it is expedient to put all possible law into the form of a statute, only so far, as the resolution reads-" so far as possible," that is, reasonable, expedient or practicable to do it.

The President:

Your time has expired, Mr. Dillon.

Charles A. Peabody, of New York:

I move that Judge Dillon's time be extended ten minutes.

Rufus King, of Ohio:

I second the motion.

Carried.

John F. Dillon, of New York:

The modern tendency is in this way. Every lawyer who is familiar with recent legislation of Great Britain knows that for the last fifteen or twenty years it has been the practice of Parliament to bring together in one statute great and important topics of legislation. One of the most notable recent instances is the codification of the law of bills and notes.

Nor does this resolution say anything in terms in relation to a code, and wisely so, in my judgment, since there is no word known to the law which has more varying meanings than this word "code." One meaning which is attached to the word is that all law, that is, all statute law extant and all of the case or judiciary law extant, should be formulated and put into a code, with a view to render useless thereafter all preceding judicial reports and all preceding statutes. There are many who attach this idea to a code, and perhaps it is the popular idea. It is not in my judgment the proper idea, nor are these

propositions necessarily, nor even properly, involved in any idea of practicable codification. There are others who attach a more limited or restricted meaning to the word code, such, for example, as one of the most eminent writers and judges of our day, Sir James Stephen, who says, "A code ought to be based upon the principle that it aims at nothing more than the reduction to a convenient and systematic shape of the results obtained and sanctioned by the experience of many centuries." As was remarked by the gentleman who delivered the address this morning, a code does not mean anything revolutionary in the law. So far from this, that idea is not embraced in the code. It relates more to form than to substance. To show the variety of meanings which are attached to this word "code," I turn to what might be called the dissenting report, or the minority report, of a very estimable and able member of this Association, Mr. Cortlandt Parker, which has been placed before the meeting. Mr. Parker says in that report, "If the resolution means only to express a preference for a statute over other forms of law, many will assent to it." That is precisely what it does mean. That is, in the present state of our law, when principles resting in the reports have to be sought through so many volumes, it is expedient that wherever these can be clearly formulated and stated that they should be put into the form of a statute. "But," he adds, "the danger is, and that especially in view of the direction from which the resolution comes, that such assent may be entirely misinterpreted"—as if you were not to interpret this language in and by itself. It then proceeds, "What, then, is a 'code' in the sense in which it is favored by the friends of this resolution? Richardson says, 'A digested body of law; Johnson carelessly says, 'A book of the civil law;' Worcester quotes from the Penny Cyclopedia, and says, 'A code may be either a mere compilation of existing laws (though this is more properly a digest), or a new system of laws founded on fundamental principles.' Webster substantially adopts this twofold definition." I therefore say that the word "code" is a word

which has no fixed and certain signification, and therefore this resolution has refrained from stating that it is expedient to reduce the law itself to the form of a code, because if put in that form it would be necessary to annex some particular meaning to the word "code." It may be that if this principle should be adopted in our legislation and applied to any given subject, such as it is in some statutes of the English law, it would be on that subject practically a codification of it. In the views of some that would be the proper idea of a code, and if this is a sound principle, as I think it is, as every man conversant practically with the administration of the law will feel it to be, that it is a great relief and advantage to have the law on any given subject, so far as practicable, reduced to the form of a statute. We all know what a great satisfaction it is to have a clear, adequate and well-framed statute provision in respect to matters which without such provision would be left in doubt and uncertainty, and therefore I ask, as a member of the committee, that we express by our vote our opinion upon this resolution as it stands, taking it in and by itself as expressing just what it means and just what the committee intended it should mean, viz., that wherever it is practicable to do so it is wise and expedient to put our law into the form of a statute, intending by this nothing more than the adoption of Judge Story's idea on this subject, who, when at the head of the Massachusetts commission, reported that it is expedient to reduce to a code those principles of the common law in civil cases which are of daily use and familiar application to the common business of life and to the present state of property and personal rights and contracts.

Henry Budd, of Pennsylvania:

Unless some one desires to make a motion to adjourn at this point, I have a few remarks to make.

Ignatius C. Grubb, of Delaware:

I move that we adjourn until this evening.

Henry Budd:

With the understanding that I have the floor when we reconvene, I will second that motion.

Carried.

Adjourned until 8 P. M.

The President:

Thursday Evening, 8 P. M.

The Association will come to order. The special order of the evening is the continuation of the discussion of the report of the committee, of which Mr. Field is chairman. At the close of the session this morning, Mr. Budd, of Pennsylvania, had the floor, and yielded to a motion to adjourn. He is therefore entitled to the floor now.

Henry Budd, of Pennsylvania:

It is, I think, a matter for decided regret that the language in which is couched the first resolution reported by the committee, and which we are now considering, is of so vague a character, being simply a limited statement: "Resolved, that the law itself should be reduced, so far as possible, to the form of a statute." If that were to be taken simply to mean what it was intimated by the gentleman who spoke this morning (Judge Dillon), could well be attributed to the words, namely, that where a legal principle had become so well established by decision or otherwise, that there was no further question about it, it should be written down, I take it that scarcely anybody would feel disposed to question the propriety of such a proceeding. If it be positively settled, though, what need of putting it in the form of a statute? We never will find it necessary to reduce to the form of statutes those cardinal principles of law which have come now to be regarded almost as axioms. To put them in the form of statutes would be simply a work of supererogation. But I take it, Mr. President, that

there is something more in this resolution than appears on the surface. If it be merely what has been suggested, why the nervousness exhibited this morning? Why the anxiety to advance and press through this resolution at this session? Why the throwing over and pushing aside of other important matters which of right have precedence of this subject? Why these two reports? Why the lengthy and able arguments, not only in this report, but in the one last year in favor of codification as such? Is it not because codification does lie behind this?—I mean codification in the ordinary common sense, the sense in which I take it the distinguished author of this report means it, namely, the creation of a body of law which will render useless, except for purposes of historical illustration and information, what has gone before. After which it might be desirable to know what legislation before was-but the code should mark an entire new era in the law of the land? am in error I hope I may be corrected.

David Dudley Field, of New York :

If I

If you please.

David Dudley Field:

You are utterly wrong. Not a word that you have stated is correct. The resolution means just exactly what it says, no more and no less-that wherever a rule of law can be stated in writing and put on the statute books, it should be. That is all.