Opinion of the court. grow out of it or arise from it as the result of some contract made by the exemptionist-the homestead, and not the proceeds of it in another form which is not exempt. If the exemptionist had sold his house, the debt due for it would not be exempt, because the statute does not declare that money shall be exempt which arises by contract from what is exempt. The money made by the use of the homestead is not exempt, and when exempt property is by act of the exemptionist converted into what is not exempt, the protection of the exemption laws cannot be claimed. But even if the proceeds of the homestead were exempt, the money due by the policy of insurance would not be, for it is not the proceeds of the house, but of the policy-an independent personal contract. The house was not insured. The owner was insured by the contract to pay him a sum of money as indemnity against loss. These principles are universally recognized, so as to deny to a mortgagee, who has no special contract right as to insurance, the right to claim the proceeds of a policy of insurance as appropriable to his mortgage on the insured property; and we have held. that a fraudulent grantee of land may hold the money due by a policy of insurance on a building on it against the claim of creditors entitled to subject the land and buildings to follow the insurance money. Bernheim v. Beer, 56 Miss. 149. It follows logically, from these settled principles, that the insurance money does not occupy the place of the destroyed building, and, if not, there is no legal ground on which to affirm that it is exempt because the building was. This view is fully sustained by the supreme court of New Hampshire, Wooster v. Page, 54 New Hamp. 125. Thompson on Homesteads and Exemptions § 750, says, "the insurance money is not liable to garnishment," and cites Houghton v. Lee, 50 Cal. 101, and Cooney v. Cooney, 65 Barb. 524, to support this view, and after stating the denial of this rule by the supreme court of New Hampshire, adds, "but the rule is founded on reasons too cogent to be shaken by the dissent even of that able court." What are the reasons? They are not given by Thompson, and Opinion of the court. the California court in the case cited did not state any reason, but simply affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The New York case is the decision of an inferior court, and, while the opinion in the case is longer than in the California case, it is as destitute of any satisfactory reason to sustain its conclusion as is the other which does not attempt to furnish any. Smyth on Homestead, § 102, follows Thompson citing the California case, above. The question was before the supreme court of Texas in Cameron v. Fay, 55 Texas 58, and it was held that the insurance money was not liable, citing Houghton v. Lee, 50 Cal. 101; Thompson on Homesteads 750; citing also Cooney v. Cooney, 55 Barb. 524. The Texas case so strikingly illustrates the illogical conclusion of the court, in deciding it, as to forbid our adoption of it as a precedent. In that case the mechanics, who erected the building insured, and had a lien on it, were denied the right to follow through the ashes the money arising from the insurance, on the universally accepted doctrine that this money resulted not from the building but from a personal contract of indemnity founded on an independent consideration, but when the mechanics sought to apply the money to their judgment as lien creditors, the court, which had said that the money did not represent the house but was the avails of contract, on this contention, held, that the money did occupy the place of the house! thus presenting a conspicuous example of reasoning to a just result on one question in the case, and leaping to a desired conclusion on another question in the same case, an example we shrink from imitating. In that case the court says: "We are of opinion that the proceeds of the policy of insurance upon the homestead, effected for its protection and preservation as such, should for a reasonable time at least, be exempt, etc." What is a reasonable time, and how is this to be determined? That view is not only unsupported by principle, but is full of practical difficulty. We too think, with the Texas court, that the proceeds of the policy should be exempt as the house was, but the statute has not made it so, and it is impossible to reason correctly from established Opinion of the court. rules to the conclusion in favor of exemption, and we do not think it allowable to jump to a desired result. We might have done so, and cited Thompson and Smyth as authority for the announcement, but it is not always safe to accept without question what is laid down in text-books or the opinions of the courts. Judgment reversed and the money directed to be applied to the judgment. 66 MISS.-44. APPENDIX. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND THE SUPREME COURT ON THE DEATH OF JUDGE H. T. ELLETT AND HON. R. O. REYNOLDS. SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI, MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1888. HENRY T. ELLETT. The following resolutions, adopted at a meeting of the bar of the supreme court of Mississippi, were presented to the court, and ordered to be entered on the minutes: The committee appointed to prepare suitable resolutions touching the life and character of the late Henry T. Ellett, report that; WHEREAS, The people of Mississippi, while claiming the honor reflected upon the state by the distinguished and useful life of their former fellow-citizen, the lamented Henry T. Ellett, acknowledge with gratitude the benefits which she received from his public labors in her behalf, from his instructive example, and his extraordinary talents exerted in many ways in improving and illustrating her laws and institutions, therefore, 1. Resolved, That we hold in grateful remembrance the public services of Henry T. Ellett rendered to the state of Mississippi as a legislator enlightened, thoughtful and judicious in the revision and adoption of her laws, and as a judge of her highest court; and that as members of the legal profession we cherish his memory as of one who fully illustrated its dignity and value by his talents and profound learning, his graceful accomplishments, the elevation and purity of his character, his genial temper, and his ready and helpful kindness. 2. Resolved, That we render to his memory the tribute of hearty admiration and gratitude for services so great and varied; for a |