Opinion of the court. and actions of trespass for injuries to land." Oliver v. Loye, 59 Miss. 323. For this reason the case of Wilson v. Rodewald, cited, does not apply. The petition and oath, required by § 1505 of the code, are not necessary in cases like this. Said section expressly excepts removal of suits commenced out of the county of defendant's residence. ARNOLD, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The proper court of a garnishee's residence, has jurisdiction of an attachment against a householder who resides in another county to whom the garnishee is indebted. Smith v. Mulhern, 57 Miss. 591. But when, as in this case, the jurisdiction depends on the indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant in attachment, if the garnishee owes nothing and has no effects of the defendant in his hands, or if he so answers, and his answer is not successfully controverted, the suit fails and should be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, unless this result is avoided by other process which may be issued under § 2421 of the code at the instance of the plaintiff in attachment. Smith v. Mulhern, supra; Ellison v. Lewis, 57 Miss. 588. The answer of a garnishee may be traversed at any time during the term at which it is filed, and assuming that the jurisdiction of the court in Lauderdale county may have been maintained by the answer of the garnishee being controverted, or by the issuance of other process through which property or debts of the defendants may have been found in that county, Smith v. Mulhern, supra, is conclusive against the change of venue to Smith county. The change of venue was not made to some convenient county, under § 1502 of the code, on account of undue influence, prejudice existing in the public mind, or other cause alleged which would have prevented the defendants from obtaining a fair and impartial trial in Lauderdale county, but it was made under § 1498 of the code, on the ground that the defendants were sued out of the county of their household and residence. Section 1502 of the code applies to all civil actions, but § 1498, only to ordinary civil actions, and it requires, that with the exception of local actions, and unless other Opinion of the court. wise provided, they shall be brought in the county of the defendant's household and residence, and that if brought in any other county, the venue may be changed on his application to the county of his household and residence. Suits by attachment, are governed by a different law. Under § 2418 of the code, they may be brought in any county in which the defendant may have property or debts, or in which he may be found, and there is no provision in such case, for a change of venue to the county of his household and residence. The only change of venue allowable to the defendant in an attachment suit, is that provided by § 1502 of the code. So that, according to our statutes, when a debtor is sued in an ordinary action, not local or otherwise provided for, his convenience is consulted as to where the suit shall be brought and conducted, but when he subjects himself to the extraordinary remedy by attachment, the rights of the creditor are placed above the convenience of the debtor. The affidavit and bond required of the attaching creditor, are then deemed sufficient safeguards for the protection of the debtor in any county in which he may have property or debts. The change of venue from Lauderdale to Smith county was without authority of law, and the court in the latter county acquired no jurisdiction, and its judgment is void. The judgment is reversed, and the cause dismissed as to Smith county. Brief for appellants. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HARRISON COUNTY v. R. SEAL. 1. HIGHWAY. Dedication. Acceptance. Duty to repair. Where the owner dedicates land for public use as a road or street, in order to constitute it such a highway as the public is under obligation to keep in repair, there must be an acceptance of the dedication by the constituted authorities. The acceptance may be by formal adoption, or by repairing, or probably by long public user with the assent of the authorities. 2. SAME. When acceptance not essential. Right of public. But the right to adopt to public use land that has been dedicated for a highway does not in all cases depend upon an acceptance by the local authorities. Although there may have never been an acceptance, so as to impose upon the public the duty to repair, yet, if in fact there has been a dedication, and in the estimation of the authorities the wants or convenience of the public require the land for a highway, they may appropriate it for that purpose, and thus cut off the owner from retraction. 3. SAME. Case in judgment. Public roads in this state are by statute thirty feet wide. In this case, at a prospective town site, a very much wider way was dedicated for a street about fifty years ago; only a village was built, and it was never incorporated, and there was no acceptance of the dedication as made; but most of the space was left open, and part of it has always been used and worked as an ordinary road leading to the court-house. In opening another road across this, a portion of the space was appropriated by the county, when the appellee, under a deed from the heir of the original owner, sued out an injunction on the ground that he was entitled to compensation for the excess of space over thirty feet in width, claiming that there was no power in the county to accept a dedication for a highway more than thirty feet wide. Held, that he was not entitled to relief. FROM the chancery court of Harrison county. HON. S. EVANS, Chancellor. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. W. G. Evans, Jr., for appellants. 1. The chancery court had no jurisdiction. The complainant had a complete remedy at law. Code 1880, §§ 826, 830; 54 Miss. 259. 2. This proceeding on the part of complainant, obtaining the deed from Soria, paying taxes, and claiming to be in possession of 66 Miss.-9 Brief for appellee. the land in controversy, was a mere device to get a portion of Railroad street, a public highway that has been such for many years. To close it up now would be to deprive the public of the highway enjoyed for many years, and at the same time to shut in by a strip of land all the lots fronting on this street, which lots were sold by Tegarden, the original owner, with reference to it. 1 How. (Miss.) 379; 39 Miss. 374; 48 Ib. 423; 50 Ib. 410; 52 Ib. 383; 55 Ib. 612. W. P. & J. B. Harris, for appellee. This case arises under the road law, code 1880, § 823. The county authorities assumed that the entire strip of land, a hundred and twenty feet wide, that was originally left for the Brandon railroad, was public property, whereas Seal claims that only thirty feet of the west side has been used as a public road, leaving a strip ninety feet wide, which he purchased from the heir of the original owner in 1879. He has claimed it since that time, and his vendors claimed it anterior to that date. This strip of ninety feet is not public property; it belongs to Seal, and he has exercised all acts of ownership. He was, therefore, entitled to notice of the proceedings to lay out the new road across it. Mills on Em. Domain, 95, 96 et seq. The statute requires notice, and that ends the case, so far as it has been adjudicated by the decree appealed from. But the proof relied on to constitute this strip of ninety feet public property by dedication fails altogether. There was not at the date of the grants relied on as dedication any public, as a town or village, in existence to accept a dedication, and there is no dedication to the county. In Tegarden v. McBean, 33 Miss. 283, it was held that an understanding or agreement by a neighborhood to have a neighborhood road, and arrangements between individuals creating easements by contracts, or covenants in deeds, do not create public highways. This view is borne out by cases elsewhere. Clements v. West Troy, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 251-283; Holmes v. Jersey City, 1 Beasley (N. J.) 299. The local public must accept what comes to be a charge on it. Opinion of the court. Where plats of projected cities or extensions are brought to bear on the subject, the rule is that only so much of the ground as is actually used can be regarded as accepted. 48 Conn. 416. Here only thirty feet has ever been used as a road, and that is conclusive against the assumptions of public property in the remainder. The strip of ninety feet is cut up by sinks and ravines, is overgrown with bushes, and is only vacant land in an overlanded country. The county has nothing to do with any rights of proprietors who have easements or outlets from their lots over this land. If these proprietors have easements which bind the owner, they must assert them when molested. Their existence and extent is no foundation for a claim by the county to the ninety feet as a dedication. Mississippi City is not a village or town. No dedication was made to the county, and there did not exist an organized local public to receive a dedication of streets. Appellee was not bound to apply for damages after the location had been made without notice to him. The remedy for wrongful appropriation of private property is by injunction. Mills Em. Domain, § 90, and note. COOPER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. About fifty years ago a company called "The Mississippi City Company" procured a body of land in Harrison county, lying on the Gulf of Mexico, and laid it off into streets, blocks, and public squares. According to the plan of the company this was to be the site of a great seaport city, and they gave to it the name of Mississippi City." A plat was made and filed in the office of the clerk of that county, as we infer from references made to it in certain conveyances found in the record of this cause. A copy of that plat is in the record, and from it we learn that there were nearly three hundred squares, bounded by streets numbered from one to seventeen running east and west, and by about an equal number named for different states running north and south. The prospective city was intersected by a street named on the map, "Rail |