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the particles of lime are combined, it is highly probable that denser kinds of wood, in which the pores are very small, might leave, after combustion, a residue in which the lime exists in a much more attenuated state than that which I used, and therefore the same intensity of light might be evolved at a temperature still lower than that which exists at the edge of a common flame. If this should turn out to be the case, the light of the lime and the magnesia might be developed at a temperature lower than that which discharges the phosphorescent light of minerals, and it might have a most extensive and useful application, both in the arts and in domestic economy. Even in the present state of the fact, the subject deserves farther investigation. D. B.

"EDINBURGH, July 29, 1820.”

No. III.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CROWN-SOLICITORS IN IRELAND, REFERRED TO ON PAGE 283, AS HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN 1839 BY THE RIGHT HON. MAZIERE BRADY, THEN ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR IRELAND.

SIR, Finding that the instructions given to the CrownSolicitor, by some of my predecessors in office, on the subject of challenging jurors, have been occasionally misunderstood, I have felt it my duty to consider those instructions, as furnished to me in pursuance of my letter of the 10th April last, and, in consequence, to make this communication, with the view of explaining somewhat in detail what I conceive to be the duty, in regard to this branch of the proceedings, of those who conduct the Crown prosecutions.

The main points of those instructions appear to me to be— first, that no person should be set aside by the Crown on account of his religious or political opinions; and, secondly, that the Crown-Solicitor should be able, in every case in which the privilege is exercised, to state the grounds on which he thought proper so to exercise it.

In the propriety of those directions I entirely concur. The first appears to me to be founded on the most obvious principles of policy and justice, and the second is consistent with all the rules which govern the responsibility of public officers.

But those instructions were not intended to have the effect, and, rightly understood, they cannot be interpreted to mean, that the Crown should altogether abandon the privilege of setting jurors aside, or challenging them on fair and legitimate grounds. The Crown, it is true, has not, as many persons. erroneously suppose, the right of peremptorily challenging. This right, though given to the prisoner in certain cases, and to a limited extent, has been expressly prohibited by statute in the case of the Crown; and the Crown, therefore, cannot absolutely and in all events prevent a juror from being sworn on any trial, unless for some especial legal cause stated in court, and admitted by the judge to be sufficient. In practice, however, the privilege of setting jurors aside at the instance of the Crown has been admitted as consistent with the true construction of the statute, which abolished the right of peremptory challenge; but this setting aside, it is to be recollected, is, or may be, but temporary; for should the pannel of jurors be exhausted by the challenging of the prisoner, or by the setting aside of jurors on the part of the Crown, those so set aside must again be called, and will be sworn on the jury, unless the Crown can then assign a legal cause of challenge.

When such legal cause exists it will be your duty to act upon it. The ordinary books of practice on the subject point out the various grounds, whether arising from affinity or connexion with the prisoner, personal infirmity, legal incompetence, supposed bias, actual partiality, undue influence, or other causes on which such challenges can be sustained; and in any case of doubt or difficulty you can have the assistance and advice of the Crown counsel in attendance at the trial. I do not mean that, in cases where such challenge for causes can properly be taken, this should be formally put forward in the first instance. The persons to whom such objections apply may be set aside according to the usual practice, reserving, of

course, the assignment of the legal cause of challenge in case it shall be found necessary, from the exhaustion of the pannel, again to call the jurors who may have been at first set aside. In cases, however, where the cause of objection is apparent, it may generally be convenient, and prevent misconstruction, that it should be openly stated, at the time of asking that the juror should be ordered to stand aside.

In regard, therefore, to cases in which you may, if necessary, be thus able to assign a just and legally sufficient cause of challenge, I do not apprehend that much difficulty can arise in the practical performance of your duty, which is, as to this subject, to prevent any person so liable to objection from being sworn on the jury.

Cases, however, may not unfrequently occur in which it will, I admit, be expedient, for the security of the due administration of justice, that persons should be put aside on being first called, against whom such legally sufficient cause of challenge could not eventually be sustained. And it is with reference to this class of cases that the instructions of preceding Law officers have been conveyed to you, and which I entirely concur in and adopt—that no person should be thus set aside in any case merely by reason of his professing particular religious or political opinions.—I do not feel at liberty to say, as an officer of the Crown, that such profession can disqualify any individual, otherwise legally competent to serve on a jury, from doing justice between the Crown and the subject; and, speaking as a private member of society, I do not believe that any grounds exist which would justify the making such a distinction the basis of an opposite rule of conduct.

But, with this limitation, I wish it to be understood that the setting aside of jurors by the Crown is not to be confined to cases in which an actual legal cause of challenge could ultimately be established, and I will mention some instances in which it appears to me that the privilege may be exercised with justice and propriety.

I consider that members of secret and exclusive religious or political societies, to whatever sect or party they may belong, or whatever be the objects of such societies, are objectionable

as jurors, more especially in cases where it is known or supposed that the individual on trial is himself a member of such a society. When the indictment is directly for belonging to such a society as being an illegal body, or participating in some act or demonstration connected with it, the objection, I apprehend, might, if necessary, be put forward as a legal cause of challenge; but even in other cases, I think it will be a proper exercise of the discretion vested in you to put aside any juror who is liable to such objection. I wish it, however, distinctly to be understood that I confine this observation expressly to societies whose proceedings, so far as is known of them, are both secret and exclusive. In cases, too, arising out of or connected with trade combinations or other confederations of a like character, it will obviously be improper to have on the jury any person who may be known to be himself engaged in the same or a similar association, or to have given countenance or encouragement to it.

There is a description of individuals not, generally speaking, in themselves personally objectionable, but whose vocations render them peculiarly liable to be influenced by apprehension of injury or hope of benefit, in their business, from those classes to which the prisoners, their friends, and associates more commonly belong. I allude to the ordinary publicans, especially those residing in the country in remote or unprotected situations, or those whose houses of business in the towns are the common resort of such classes; and in any case of moment, especially in capital cases, I am prepared to say that you should on the part of the Crown have such individuals put aside when called upon the jury.

I think persons, if any such should be summoned, who are not acquainted with the English language, may very properly be put aside. I, of course, exclude from this observation cases of foreigners summoned on juries de medietate linguæ.

Cases may occur attended with such peculiar local excitement in a particular town or district, as to render it very desirable that the jury should not comprise any persons from that locality, and in such cases I think the privilege of the Crown may be properly exercised in putting aside such persons.

In thus mentioning the above as instances of fit occasions. for the exercise of your discretion, I do not mean to convey to you that they are the only cases in which it should so be exercised; others perhaps your own experience may suggest to you, and I will give the best consideration in my power to any communication you may think fit to make on that subject, as circumstances may require.

In the practical exercise of this privilege I cannot lay down any other rule for your guidance, as to the degree of evidence you are to require of the fact of any particular juror being liable to objection, than that which is implied in the second branch of the instructions to which I have already referred, namely, that you must consider yourself responsible for the propriety of the act in each case; and, accordingly, be prepared to show that it was founded on information, either within your personal knowledge, or that of some of your assistants, or derived from authentic and trustworthy sources on the accuracy of which you can reasonably rely. You will not refuse to receive the communications of parties who may be personally interested or engaged in the prosecution; but, in judging of the weight due to such information, you will take into consideration the probable bias of the party by whom it is given, and endeavour, as far as may be, to test its accuracy by other and impartial testimony.

In receiving such information from any magistrate, chief constable, or other public officer, you should make a note of the name of the person giving it, in order that, if found to be inaccurate, due inquiry may be made into the conduct of the individual making the communication; and should any instance occur in which it may come to your knowledge that a public officer has knowingly misled you by false information respecting a juror, I need scarcely remind you that it will be your duty without delay to report such conduct to the Government.

I have thus endeavoured to convey to you my opinion of the course to be pursued by those who conduct the Crown prosecutions in this important particular. In those prosecutions the discovery of truth and the attainment of justice are the

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