MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.-The annual meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association will be held at Cape May on July 1, 2 and 3. The following officers have been nominated and will come up for election at the meeting: President, Judge A. Hunter Boyd, of Cumberland; vice-presidents, James E. Ellegood, of Salisbury; Hope H. Barroll, of Chestertown; Osborne I. Yellott, of Towson; Clayton Purnell, of Frostburg; Guy W. Steele, of Westminster; John S. Newman, of Frederick; John B. Gray, of Prince Frederick; Robert P. Graham, of Baltimore; James U. Dennis, of Baltimore; secretary, James W. Chapman, Jr., of Baltimore; treasurer, R. Bennett Darnall, of Baltimore.

THE ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION held its fifteenth annual meeting at Little Rock, Ark., on June 3 and 4. The program announced for the session was as follows: President's address, by Ashley Cockrill, on "Our Constitution Under the Initiative Amendment"; address by Judge Stephen S. Gregory, president of the American Bar Association, on "Lord Mansfield"; paper by Judge Jacob Trieber, on the "New Judicial Code "; responses to toasts at the banquet by the following members: "Reminiscences of a Successful Practitioner," Judge James F. Reid of Fort Smith; "Great Expectations," Lamar Williamson; "Monticello, May it Please Your Ladyship," John T. Hicks of Little Rock; Humors of Criminal Practice," T. H. Caraway of Jonesboro; "Cases and Comment," Neill C. Marsh of El Dorado; "The Recall of After Dinner Speakers," Hal L. Norwood of Little Rock.

ALABAMA JUDICIAL COMMISSION. The committee on the reform and revision of the judicial system of the state of Alabama, appointed by Governor Emmett O'Neal, is composed of the following members: John R. Dowdell, chief justice of the supreme court; R. W. Walker, presiding judge of court of appeals; Ormond Somerville, associate justice of the supreme court; Thomas C. McClellan, associate justice of the supreme court; Edward DeGraffenried, associate judge of the court of appeals; Robert C. Brickell, attorney-general; John Pelham, president Alabama State Bar Association; Henry Upson Sims of Birmingham, chairman central council of the Alabama State Bar Association; Thomas M. Stevens of Mobile, chairman judiciary committee of the senate; W. L. Parks of Andalusia, chairman judiciary committee of the house of representatives; J. J. Willett of Anniston, Frank S. White, Sr., of Birmingham; A. O. Lane of Birmingham, Walker Percy of Birmingham, Alex. M. Garber of Birmingham, A. D. Pitts of Selma, W. W. Lavender of Centreville, A. G. Smith of Birmingham, N. D. Denson of Lafayette, H. C. Selheimer of Birmingham, Joseph H. Nathan of Sheffield, William C. Crumpton of Evergreen, John A. Lusk of Guntersville, W. B. Oliver of Tuscaloosa, B. G. Farmer of Dothan, Elliott G. Rickarby of Mobile, W. H. Thomas of Montgomery, W. W. Callahan of Decatur, E. W. Faith of Mobile, Phil H. Stern of Montgomery. GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION.-As announced in our last issue, the ninth annual convention of the Georgia Bar Association was held at Tybee Island, Ga., on May 30, May 31 and June 1. The President's address was delivered by Alexander W. Smith of Atlanta. Judge J. H. Merrill of Thomasville submitted the report of the Committee on Jurisprudence, Law Reform and Procedure. The annual address was delivered by Hon. Caruthers Ewing of Memphis, Tenn., his subject being the "Spirit of the Times." Other addresses were by Judge W. R. Hammond of Atlanta on "Evil and Cure of Monopolistic Business Tendency," and by Robert C. Alston of Atlanta, on "A State Within the State of Georgia." The principal topic of discussion was "Shall Women be Admitted to Practice in Georgia Courts?" At the banquet, Gen. P. W. Meldrim was toastmaster, and speeches were made by Andrew

J. Cobb, Atlanta; Hon. Caruthers Ewing, Memphis; Judge Joseph Henry Lumpkin, Atlanta; Hon. Joel Branham, Rome; Hon. Luther Z. Rosser, Atlanta; and Judge Walter G. Charlton. Officers elected for the ensuing year were as follows: President, Andrew J. Cobb, Atlanta; first vice-president, George W. Owens, Savannah; second vice-president, Robert C. Alston, Atlanta; third vice-president, Luther Z. Rosser, Sr., Atlanta; fourth vicepresident, E. T. Moon, LaGrange; fifth vice-president, P. L. Wade, Dublin; secretary, Orville A. Park, Macon; treasurer, Z. D. Harrison, Atlanta; executive committee, W. H. Barrett, Augusta, chairman; S. H. Sibley, Union Point; John J. Strickland, Athens; Brutus J. Clay, Atlanta.

MISSISSIPPI BAR ASSOCIATION.-The annual meeting of the Mississippi Bar Association was held in Jackson, Miss., on May 8, 9 and 10. An address of welcome on behalf of the city of Jackson was delivered by Mayor A. C. Crowder. A welcome from the Jackson Bar Association was tendered by Judge R. H. Thompson, and a response on behalf of the State Association was made by Hon. A. W. Shands of Sardis. The president's address by Hon. A. F. Fox, of West Point, reviewed the legislation enacted at the 1912 session of the Mississippi Legislature. Papers were read by State Senator Clayton D. Pott, who discussed the subject of Equalization of Assessments and Taxation, and by J. S. Sexton, of Hazlehurst, former president of the Association, who reviewed the new Judicial Code. At the annual banquet President A. F. Fox presided as toastmaster and the following toasts were responded to: "The Justice of the Peace," by Senator Richard Reed, of Natchez; "The Lawyer," by Associate Justice Will C. McLean; "The Relation of Bench and Bar to Present Public Conditions," by J. S. Sexton, of Hazlehurst; "The Value of a Precedent," by Chancellor J. Q. Robbins, of Tupelo; and "The Bench of To-day," by Dr. Edward Mayes. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Hon. Robert N. Miller, Hazlehurst; vice-president, A. W. Shands, Sardis; secretary-treasurer, Judge Sidney M. Smith, Jackson; executive committee, F. N. West, Jackson, middle district; S. E. Travis, Hattiesburg, southern district; Judge W. C. McLean, Grenada, northern district.

DEATHS IN THE PROFESSION.-Among many recent deaths in the profession we note the following: John A. Bentley, Seattle, Wash., former district judge of Colorado; Judge Albert G. Brice, New Orleans, La.; Thomas Cherrington, Ironton, O., for twenty-six years judge of the Circuit Court of Ohio; Austin Lane Crothers, Elkton, Md., Governor of the State of Maryland from 1908 to 1912; Horatio Davis, Jacksonville, Fla., former county judge of Pittsylvania county; Judge John C. Ferriss, Nashville, Tenn.; James B. Gantt, Jefferson City, Mo., former Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which position he held for twentyfive years; T. J. Gillespie, Dayton, Tenn., master of the Tennessee court of chancery since 1873; Frank Goodwin, Portsmouth, N. H., professor emeritus of Boston University Law School; George T. Higley, Ashland, Mass., special justice of the First District Court of Southern Middlesex county; Edgar H. Hinman, Elyria, O., probate judge of Lorain county for more than thirty years; Ira Houghton, Hamilton, Mo., presiding judge of Caldwell County Court; Marvin L. Kimbrough, Birmingham, Ala.; Christopher M. Lee, Providence, R. I., Associate Justice of the Superior Court of Rhode Island; Judge J. C. Longstreet, Jackson, Miss.; Malcolm McLear, Newark, N. J., Judge of the First District Court of Newark; Forest J. Martin, Bangor, Me., member of the faculty of the University of Maine College of Law; Cyrus F. McNutt, Los Angeles, Cal., former superior court judge of Zign county; John C. Mitchell, Harrisburg, Ark., judge of Poinsett county court; Thomas J. Morris, Baltimore,

Md., United States District Judge of the District of Maryland; James A. Rose, Chicago, Ill., Secretary of State of Illinois; William Schofield, Malden, Mass., former associate judge of the Massachusetts superior court and appointed circuit judge of the United States in 1911; Warren D. Tarrant, Milwaukee, Wis., judge of the Wisconsin circuit court; Clifford S. Walton, Washington, D. C., international lawyer, author, and consul-general for Paraguay in the United States for several years.

English Notes.

INDIAN ELECTED MEMBER OF BAR.-Dr. Abdul Majid, Lecturer to the Colonial Office on Mahomedan Law, has been elected a member of the Old Bailey Bar, by a large majority, on the proposal of Sir Charles Mathews. He is an Indian Moslem, and is stated to be the first non-European admitted to the Old Bailey Bar.

ERECTION OF STATUE OF FRANCIS BACON.-The statue of Francis Bacon, which Mr. F. W. Pomeroy, A.R.A., executed in bronze for the Benchers of Gray's-inn, was unveiled by Mr. Balfour on June 27. It was erected in Southsquare, Gray's-inn, close to the hall of the society-the famous Elizabethan building in which the tercentenary of Bacon's election to the office of Treasurer was celebrated three years ago. Bacon was admitted to Gray'sinn as a student on June 27, 1576, and was called on June 27, 1582-hence the choice of date.

EXEMPTION FROM JURY SERVICE FOR JOURNALISTS.-An attempt is being made by a group of members of the House of Commons to secure exemption from jury service in favor of journalists. The scope of the bill to give effect to this scheme is defined in a clause so as to cover editors, writers of leading, special, or other articles, correspondents, artists, literary managers, assistant editors, sub-editors or reporters, and those persons who supply journals with articles, illustrations, correspondence, or reports. As affecting all these requirements, there is the further necessity of showing that the journalists must have been for three years professionally, habitually, solely, or chiefly engaged upon the staff of a journal or news agency in the capacities already mentioned. On coming within these requirements, the bill would exempt the journalist from being returned and from serving on any jury, inquest, or inquiry whatsoever, and his name is not to be inserted in the list of those qualified and liable to serve.

ENTERTAINING GUESTS AS NUISANCE.-Numbers of people will have sympathy with the complaint made by the plaintiffs in the case decided by Mr. Justice Barton in the Chancery Court in Ireland a few days ago the New Imperial Hotel Company Limited v. William Johnston. The defendants resided next door to the plaintiffs' hotel, and during a great portion of the year used their premises for dancing and social entertainments which annoyed guests at the hotel, and kept them from obtaining sleep or rest until an early hour in the morning. It was argued that this user of the premises constituted a nuisance, and an injunction was sought. Mr. Justice Barton in a considered judgment said there must be a certain amount of give and take between neighbors in a big city, and he could not see his way to stop the defendants' establishment, but there would be a limited injunction against keeping the windows open while the noise was going on, and against permitting noise while the visitors were entering or leaving the defendants' premises.

"KILLING NO MURDER."-The phrase killing no murder," to whose use in a political pamphlet by Mr. Chiozza Money,

M.P., strong exception has been taken by his political opponents, is of historic origin, and has made its mark in constitutional history. The Irish originally stipulated with Henry II for the use of their own laws. They were consequently held beyond the pale of English justice and regarded as aliens at the least, sometimes as enemies, in English courts. Thus, as by the Brehon customs murder was only punished by a fine, it was not held felony to kill one of the Irish race unless he had conformed to the English law (see Hallam's Constitutional History of England, iii., p. 352). In 1657 an attempt was made on Cromwell's life by a man named Syndercombe. The assassination of the Protector was incited by a tract immediately afterwards published in Holland, entitled "Killing No Murder," which, from the powerful manner in which it was written, made a deeper impression on the public mind than any other literary production of the age. It was widely disseminated by Saxby, an agent of Spain. Saxby was seized, and escaped execution only by dying in the Tower. Clarendon assures us that Saxby was an illiterate person, which is a sufficient proof that he was not the real author of the tract, though he acknowledged it for his own in the Tower, probably to deceive Cromwell. The writer, whoever he was, kept his secret, at least at first, for Clarendon says he could not imagine who could write it. By many historians its authorship has been attributed to Colonel Titus, who was in Holland at the time, and constantly in the company of Saxby till his departure for England.

66

SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT.-The Right Hon. Sir Robert Finlay, K.C., the Attorney-General of the late Government, speaking in debate recently in the House of Commons, enunciated tersely in colloquial language the cardinal constitutional doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. "Parliament," he said, "has a right to commit any act of folly or malevolence." Blackstone supplies the classical passage on this subject. The power and jurisdiction of Parliament," says Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst., p. 36) "is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined for causes or persons within any bounds. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, marine, or criminal, this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies that transcend the ordinary course of the laws are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession of the Crown, as was done in the reign of Henry VIII and of William III. It can alter the established religion of the land, as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom, as was done by the Act of Union and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible, and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament." De Lolme has summed up the matter in the grotesque expression: "It is a fundamental principle with English lawyers that Parliament can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman."

NECESSITY AS EXCUSE FOR CRIMINAL ACT.-Some of the evidence adduced in reference to the circumstances attending the Titanic disaster directs attention irresistibly to the doctrine that necessity will excuse acts which would otherwise be crimes. The law as to compulsion by necessity is thus enunciated by Sir Fitzjames Stephen: "An act which might otherwise be a crime may

be excused if the person accused can show that it was done only to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which if they had followed would have inflicted upon him and upon others inevitable and irreparable evil; that no more was done than was reasonably necessary for the purpose, and that the evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided." Lord Bacon gives the instance of two shipwrecked persons clinging to the same plank and one of them thrusting the other from it, finding that it will not support both, and says that this homicide is excusable through unavoidable necessity, upon the great universal principle of self-preservation which prompts every man to save his own life in preference to that of another, when one of them must inevitably perish" (Bacon's Maxims, No. 5). Sir Fitzjames Stephen expresses the opinion that in such a case the survivor could be subjected to no legal punishment. "The case," he writes, "has actually occurred in the United States (see Commonwealth v. Holmes, 1 Wallace, Jun., p. 25, quoted at length in Wharton on Homicide, s. 560). In this case, the shipwrecked sailors and passengers escaping in a boat which would not hold all, the sailors threw some of the passengers overboard. The court held that the passengers ought to have been preferred to the sailors, unless the presence of all the sailors was required for the common safety, but 'under any circumstances it was held the proper method of determining who was to be the first victim out of the particular class was by ballot.' I doubt whether an English court would take this view. It would be odd to say that the two men on the raft were bound to toss up as to who should go." It is, moreover, not a crime to cause death or bodily injury, even intentionally, by any omission (such as the omission by men in command of lifeboats to row to the scene of the wreck in order to rescue persons from drowning), except an omission to discharge a legal duty. Sir Fitzjames Stephen thus illustrates this position: 66 A. sees B. drowning and is able to save him by holding out his hand. A. abstains from doing so in order that B. may be drowned, and B. is drowned. A. has committed no offense."

RESUMPTION OF COHABITATION AND ALIMONY.-The actual decision of the important question whether the resumption of cohabitation by a husband and wife, after desertion by the husband, automatically annuls an order for payment of a weekly sum as alimony to the wife became unnecessary in the recent case of Matthews v. Matthews, because the same was determined on another point. But enough is to be gathered from what was said by the Lord Chief Justice (Lord'Alverstone), in which Mr. Justice Pickford concurred, to permit of a clear notion being obtained of the view of the majority of the court. Mr. Justice Avory, it is true, dissented from the view so expressed. But although his Lordship had something in the nature of a guide for his opinion in the shape of the decision of the Divisional Court in Williams v. Williams (90 L. T. Rep. 174; (1904) P. 145, yet that decision does not appear to satisfy the language of sect. 7 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39). Moreover, no argument was heard on behalf of the wife in that case, inasmuch as she was not represented by counsel. It was there laid down that where an offense has been committed which prima facie entitles a married woman to an order under sect. 4 of the Act of 1895, and the offense has been condoned by the wife, the effect of such condonation depends upon the common law and not upon any section of that Act. At common law condona

contrary, if proper effect be given to the express provision at the end of sect. 7 of the Act of 1895-"If any married woman . . . shall voluntarily resume cohabitation with her husband" an order against him "shall upon proof thereof be discharged "such an application founded upon such resumption is an essential course. The resumption, in other words, has to be a condition precedent to the application; by itself it is ineffectual. Mr. Justice Avory, in relying upon the authority of the decision in Williams v. Williams (ubi sup.) apparently ignored the remark there of Sir Francis Jeune, P., that that case did "not come exactly within the terms of sect. 7 of the Act of 1875, because it took place during the course of the litigation and before the date of the order." In Matthews v. Matthews (ubi sup.) no such nonapplicability of the section could possibly be seized hold of. The suggestion in the course of the argument that the Act of 1895 was framed for the very purpose of getting rid of the decision in Haddon v. Haddon, 56 L. T. Rep. 716; 18 Q. B. Div. 778, may seem somewhat far-fetched. That case was decided under sect. 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 19), which corresponds to sects. 4 and 5 of the Act of 1895. The introduction of the words with which sect. 7 of the latter Act concludes nevertheless certainly do give some color to that suggestion. In Haddon v. Haddon (ubi sup.) an order under sect. 4 of the Act of 1878 was held to be absolutely put an end to by a reconciliation and resumed cohabitation of the husband and wife. But even so, the requirement that an application to discharge an order for payment of a weekly sum, or any other order under sect. 5 of the Act of 1895, shall succeed that reconciliation has excellent grounds for its existence. The point on which Matthews v. Matthews (ubi sup.) was really decided is likewise of considerable interest-namely, as to the invalidity of a committal order which deals with a period of arrears exceeding six months.-Law Times (London).

Obiter Dicta.

MOSTLY." Deceased was found lying mostly in an adjoining room with her head in the door between the rooms." Per Hobson, J., in Marshall v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 222.

ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION.-Can it be that homestead matters come within the jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts? The following cases may be cited relative to the homestead laws of California: Lord v. Lord, 65 Cal. 84; Estate of Noah, 73 Cal. 590; Estate of Adam, 128 Cal. 380.

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Esp. 41). Notwithstanding that a wife may have put an end to her original cause of complaint against her husband by resuming cohabitation with him, it does not follow that no application to discharge an order made under the Act is obligatory. On the

ADMITTED.-The facts that he is a city judge and dispenses gas entitle the following card of Mr. Melancon to admission to our lawyers' roster of fame:

"A. M. Melancon, Lutcher, Louisiana: Livery stable, undertaker, scientific horseshoer, notary public, city judge, chief of police, tax collector, photographer, manager of Victory and Dreamland theatres, professional music teacher, dealer in second hand furniture, gasolene, wholesale and retail."

NEW JERSEY SAUSAGES.-"In Ryerson v. Bathgate, 67 N.J.L. 337, 57 L.R.A. 307, 51 Atl. 708, plaintiff was the possessor of a cat of which she desired to be rid. Thereupon the plaintiff arranged to give the cat to the defendants, who ran a meat shop." Per Robb, J., in Coberth v. Great Atlantic, etc., Tea Co., 36 App. Cas. (D.C.) 574.

REFERRING TO CAMPAIGN ARGUMENTS?" In this illimitable field for the exercise of their talents they have only to avoid untruthful accusations of crime or untruthful insinuations of criminal conduct and such untruthful, scandalous, and defamatory expressions as would subject the person written of to public ridicule, hatred, or contempt." Per Timlin, J., in Ruhland v. Cole, 143 Wis. 373.

BIASED.-At a recent meeting of the Louisville Bar Association, Cleves Kinkead, a prominent young attorney of Louisville, caused considerable amusement by his speech on the resolution against the recall of judges sent out for adoption by the American Bar Association. Mr. Kinkead said that if the association adopted the resolution the public would insist on reading between the lines such sentiments as the following: "Whereas some of the members of this bar association will later be judges, and still others of us would like to be judges, we view with alarm any proposition teeming with such possibilities of embarrassment as does the recall of the judiciary, and we therefore deem it our duty to declare that the people who are qualified to put their judges in office are not qualified to remove them from office; and we trust that since we have spoken, the people will drop it and not attempt further to grope in the darkness without the aid of our guiding hands."

AND YET HE FELT BLUE!—An esteemed correspondent vouches for the accuracy in all things of the following letter received by him some years ago while practising in Arkansas:

heded, har lipped, has a glass i and crooked in her off laig, you'll no her when you see her. Tell her she kin have the gote. I'm feelin purty blew over losin ov her

Hopin you are enjoyn the same gods blessin i am trooly BILL TOADVINE TURNING A DEAF EAR TO THE EVIDENCE.-Judge A- - of one of the mountain counties of California was recently preparing to impanel a grand jury in his court. He propounded the usual question to those who had been summoned, as to whether they had any excuses to offer why they should not serve.

An elderly man arose and said: "Judge, I don't believe I am qualified to serve on this jury."

"Why not?" inquired the judge.

"Well, your honor," replied he, "my left ear is affected and I can only hear on one side."

"Shucks!" exclaimed the judge. "That renders you peculiarly fit for grand jury service, for a grand juror is expected to hear only one side anyway."

A ROAST FOR THE OBITER EDITOR.-A former valued contributor to this column writes as follows: "I enclose a clipping from this morning's 'Sun' which may have escaped your attention. As a means of wiping out liabilities it seems to have bankruptcy beaten a mile. I thought, perhaps, it might be available for 'Obiter Dicta,' unless you have adopted a hard and fast rule of not printing humorous paragraphs in that column."