provision: "It will not be good for passage | so that he cannot complete his journey withafter nine (9) days from date of sale." The in the limitation of the ticket, then he is purchaser of the ticket took passage within entitled, notwithstanding such limitation, to the nine days, but did not reach Ogden until continue his journey to his destination." after that period of time had elapsed. The The author cites in support of the text Watopinion of the court is so brief that it is kins v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 21 D. C. 1; difficult to ascertain the reason for the Railroad Co. v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. court's conclusion; but there was evidence 463, 21 S. W. 399; Railroad Co. v. Dennis, showing such a traffic arrangement between 4 Tex. Civ. App. 90, 23 S. W. 400. We do the two roads that the court must have held not have access to the first of these cases. the ticket the joint contract of both roads, The case of Railroad Co. v. Wright deals otherwise the decision would not have any- with the question of the reasonableness of thing to support it. If this was the view the time limited in the ticket, and does not of the court, then we readily agree that un- support the text at all. In the Dennis Case der the terms of the ticket the purchaser it was held that where a railroad company was only required to begin his journey be- sells a special excursion ticket to enable a fore the ticket expired. The authorities patron to attend a public sale of town lots now generally support this holding. In 4 in a particular city, and limits the time for Elliott on Railroads, § 1598, the rule is stat- the return passage to such an extent that ed as follows: "When a ticket is required the passenger cannot make the trip, attend to be used on or before a specified day, it is the sale, and return within the time allowsufficient if the trip is begun upon the par- ed, he will be permitted to complete his ticular line and the ticket presented before journey over the road selling the ticket even midnight of such day, although the journey after the time limit has expired. We think is not completed upon such line until after this conclusion correct; but it does not that time." That this rule does not apply touch the proposition of law announced in to a ticket of the character of the one now the text. It is apparent, too, that the statebefore us we shall see hereafter. ment in the text must have been written Counsel for respondent further contend with some reservation; for, in apparent exthat the evidence shows that the limitation planation of it, it is said in a note accomin this ticket was unreasonable, and that panying the cases cited: "If the transportait was impossible for plaintiff to reach Og- tion is under a coupon ticket, each part den before the ticket expired, and they cite representing a separate contract with the 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 177, as different connecting lines, delay caused by follows: "If the time limit is less than is the default of the carrier on one line will sufficient to accomplish the trip, it would, not operate to extend the time limit as to of course, be unreasonable, and therefore of transportation on subsequent lines." The no effect." There cannot be any question doctrine of the text would apply if the conof the correctness of this rule; but we are tract for carrying the passenger the entire unable to agree with counsel that the facts distance was the individual contract of a are as they assume them to be. The evi- single carrier, for then, in addition to the dence shows that this ticket was procured terms expressed in the contract, there would in New York City on September 28, 1907, be implied (a) that the time allowed was but it is silent as to the time of the day sufficient to make a continuous passage in when plaintiff received it. The plaintiff the ordinary course of travel; and (b) that did not begin his journey until September the passenger would be carried over the en29th, was delayed 4 hours in Chicago, and tire journey in the ordinary course of travel, 18 hours in Denver. He reached Ogden 6 and therefore within the time limited, and, hours after his ticket expired; so that it if without fault of the passenger he was is manifest that but for these delays he not transported to his destination within would have reached defendant's road sev- the time allowed, the carrier would not be eral hours before the final limit prescribed heard to assert a right arising out of its in his ticket. A sister of plaintiff, who ac- own failure to carry out the terms of the companied him on his journey, testified to contract-express or implied. Such a case their stopping in New York, and in answer is presented in Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 to the question, "Tell us whether or not N. Y. 306, 72 Am. Dec. 469. Precisely the you and your brother made any effort to same result would follow if the contract leave earlier than you did?" answered: was the joint obligation of all the companies "Yes; we did." After telling of the time over whose lines the passenger was routed. lost at Chicago and Denver, the same wit- Lundy v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., above; 28 ness said: "We couldn't leave because we Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 178. The couldn't get a train." The plaintiff testi- case of Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. fied to substantially the same thing. Coun- Kinsley, 27 Ind. App. 135, 60 N. E. 169, 87 sel for respondent insist that it thus ap- Am. St. Rep. 245, cited by counsel for repears that the delays were not occasioned spondent, does not go further than to hold by the fault of the plaintiff, and then cite that, where the passenger commences his 6 Cyc. 575, to the effect: "That if, with- journey before the expiration of his ticket,

is responsible for injury suffered on its own line, and not otherwise." Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E. 217, 11 Am. St. Rep. 434, is sometimes cited as holding a contrary view. As we read the opinion, it does not do so, but does announce a doctrine, with respect to another matter, contrary to the decided weight of authority. Indeed, counsel for respondent do not question the correctness of the rule above. They plead in their complaint a contract with the defendant company, and in their brief cite Nichols v. Southern Pac. Co., above, and quote from it the following, said with reference to a coupon ticket like the one before us: "But in cases of coupon tickets, where the first carrier acts as agent for the succeeding carriers, the contract does not contemplate a continuous passage over connect

ets so stipulate on their face, or there are circumstances from which such stipulation will be implied; otherwise, the holders of them will be entitled to stop-off privileges at the end of each line represented by such tickets. This goes to show that such contracts or tickets as the above set out are not entire, but several as between the different roads. It is only entire as to a passage over the line of each, which, when begun, must be completed."

to his destination, even though the journey | been purchased by him from each, and each is not completed until after the ticket expires. But this is held in a case where the company selling the ticket operated the entire line of road over which the passenger traveled, and the decision is in harmony with practically all the authorities, but is not in point here, where the Erie Company acted only as agent in selling the ticket beyond its own line, and the passenger was compelled to travel over several distinct and independent lines, for each of which a separate coupon was issued. The plaintiff's contract does not purport to be the joint contract of the several roads over which he traveled-rather the contrary appears-and there was not any evidence offered showing any traffic or working agreement between the several lines from which a joint contract could be inferred. It does not even appear that the defendant company receiving lines when once begun, unless such ticked any portion of the purchase price of the ticket. The only evidence upon the subject is that Nash, from whom the ticket was purchased, sent the purchase money to the agent of the White Star Line at Minneapolis. In the absence of any evidence that this ticket was the entire contract of the road which furnished it, or the joint contract of the several roads, what is to be said of the ticket considered as a whole? So far as we are able to determine, the authorities are unanimous in holding that the body of the ticket and each coupon constitute a separate and distinct contract between the passenger and the particular line of road over which the coupon furnishes transportation. In other words, under the facts of this particular case as shown by this record, the plaintiff had one contract with the Erie Road to carry him from New York to Chicago; a separate contract with the Rock Island to carry him from Chicago to Denver; another separate contract with the Colorado Midland to carry him from Denver to Grand Junction; still another distinct contract with the Rio Grande Western to carry him from Grand Junction to Ogden; and, finally, a separate contract with the Oregon Short Line to carry him from Ogden to Butte. The following are some of the authorities announcing the rule: Boling v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 189 Mo. 219, 88 S. W. 35; Railway Co. v. Looney, 85 Tex. 158, 19 S. W. 1039; Auerbach v. Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill. 522, 44 N. E. 861, 35 L. R. A. 599; Young v. Railroad Co., 115 Pa. 112, 7 Atl. 741; Spencer v. Lovejoy, above; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, § 1049; 4 Elliott on Railroads, § 1596. The rule is announced in 6 Cyc. 571. In speaking of a ticket such as the one before us, it is said: "A ticket thus sold is not a through contract, and the right of the purchaser and the responsibility of the different companies

If, then, the plaintiff's contract with every road over which he traveled was his separate contract with that road only, it follows as a matter of course that this defendant cannot be held responsible for delays occasioned by any other road or roads. This rule is tersely stated in 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 178, as follows: "If the ticket is in coupon form, and expressly provides that the carrier selling it is merely the agent of the connecting roads, and is not responsible beyond its own line, the passenger is not entitled to be carried over the last road after the time has expired, although he is delayed by the fault of one of the other companies," and the authorities generally support the text. The evidence offered by plaintiff in explanation of his delays at New York City and while en route may tend to exculpate him from any charge of negligence or other fault, but it does not explain the delays after all. It does not explain whether the delay in Chicago was occasioned by the fault of the Erie Road in not getting him to Chicago on time, or of the Rock Island Road in not leaving on time; and the same thing is true with respect to the delay of 18 hours in Denver. The difficulty which confronts us is occasioned by the fact that the evidence on this point is so meager that we cannot tell where the blame should be placed; and we cannot assume from the mere fact that plaintiff did not reach Ogden in time that the selling agent in New York

in allowing six full days, not counting the| day upon which the ticket was issued, for plaintiff to make the journey from New York to Ogden; and, since plaintiff raises the question by relying upon a ticket which on its face had expired when offered for passage, the burden of proof is upon him to show that the limitation is unreasonable, and in this we think he failed. In the absence of such showing, the plaintiff's contract with the Oregon Short Line required him to present his ticket for passage between Ogden and Butte before midnight of October 4th, and, failing to do so, he was not entitled to be carried over defendant's road by virtue of that ticket, and defendant's conductor could properly refuse to permit him to board the train at Ogden, or could eject him from the train, if in doing so he used no more force than was necessary to accomplish the purpose.

1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1186*)-APPEAL-HARMLESS ERROR.

Under Rev. Codes, §§ 9415, 9548, requiring the court on appeal to give judgment without regard to technical errors not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, etc., error in permitting the prosecuting attorney to ask accused on cross-examination as to whether or not he had not been in trouble of a similar character is not ground for reversal, where he answered in the negative.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1186.*]

2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 693*)-EVIDENCE-OBJECTIONS-TIME TO MAKE.

An objection to a question asked a witness, not made until after the answer, comes too late, unless the answer was made before there was an opportunity to object.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1630; Dec. Dig. § 693.*] 3. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 11702*)-HARMLESS ER

ROR OBJECTIONS-REVIEW.

Error cannot be predicated on the overruling of objections to questions asked accused on cross-examination, where they were not answered.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3131; Dec. Dig. § 11702.*] 4. WITNESSES (§ 277*)-CROSS-EXAMINATION

3. Complaint is made that the verdict for $750 is excessive. The trial court instructed the jury that, if they found for the plaintiff, they should not consider the question of loss of time or the value of the ticket from Ogden to Butte, and further informed the jury that there was not any evidence that plaintiff received any personal or bodily injury. These charges withdrew from the consideration of the jury the principal elements of damages in most cases of this character, and left the jury to assess damages for the plaintiff's wounded feelings and the discomfort which he suffered from hunger and cold, if any appeared, as the prox-Cent. Dig. §§ 925, 979-984; Dec. Dig. § 277.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, imate consequence of his delay in Ogden.

EXTENT.

Where accused testifies on his own behalf, and denies the commission of the crime charged, a cross-examination, extending, not only to the facts stated by him on his direct examination, but to all other facts connected with them directly or indirectly, is permissible.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.

Where accused on trial for forgery testified on his behalf, questions on cross-examination as to why he quit an employment, or why he was discharged therefrom, or whether it was not and questions put to the wife of accused as to his duty then to write out the body of checks, whether she knew of a transaction had between accused and others, were not so far improper as to justify the inference of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in asking the questions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1661; Dec. Dig. § 706.*]

The evidence shows that he was compelled 5. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 706*) - MISCONDUCT OF from lack of means to stop at the defendant's depot over night; that he had no means with which to procure food, but that on the day after his arrival he was furnished food by some one who interested himself in plaintiff's behalf. Under the evidence disclosed by this record, we think the plaintiff showed himself entitled to little more than nominal damages. Certainly the amount awarded was altogether out of proportion to the injury, if any, received (Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dennis, above); but, since there must be anoth-6. er trial of the case, it will not be necessary to consider this question further.

There are other assignments of error; but, since they are not argued in the brief, they will be treated as waived.

We think the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict or judgment upon the theory of the case as we have outlined it, which manifestly was not the theory upon which the trial court proceeded.

CRIMINAL LAW (§ 706*) - MISCONDUCT OF

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.

To constitute misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney on the examination of witnesses, the questions must be so far improper that they would amount to an impeachment of the legal learning of the attorney to say he did not know they were manifestly improper and wholly unjustifiable.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1661; Dec. Dig. § 706.*1

7. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 730*) - MISCONDUCT OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY-INSTRUCTIONS. Where a prosecuting attorney asked accus

The judgment and order are reversed, and ed questions which the court on objection susthe cause is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

BRANTLY, C. J., concurs. concurs in the reversal.

tained, and the prosecuting attorney requested the court to instruct the jury not to pay any attention to what they had heard with reference to the questions, an instruction that any SMITH, J., statement of counsel as to any fact, the proof of which was not admitted or which was stricken,

must be disregarded sufficiently guarded the properly so. Counsel cannot sit by until a rights of accused. question has been answered, and then, if he [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, deems the answer inimical to his client's inCent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. § 730.*]

Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Michael Donlan, Judge.

terest, object to it. Of course, if it appeared that the answer had been made before counsel had an opportunity to object, he could not J. H. Rhys was convicted of forgery, and But there is not any showing made here that be held to have waived his right to object.

he appeals. Affirmed.

Mackel & Meyer and John F. Davies, for appellant. Albert J. Galen, Atty. Gen., and E. M. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HOLLOWAY, J. The defendant was convicted of forgery, and appeals from the judgment and from an order denying him a new trial. The specifications of error relate to the rulings of the trial court in admitting evidence, and to the alleged misconduct of the county attorney.

such was the case, and under the rule this objection came too late. Poindexter & Orr L. S. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 Mont. 338, 83 Pac. 886; Martin v. Corscadden, 34 Mont. 308, 86 Pac. 33.

3. Upon his direct examination the defendthe Butte Miner. On cross-examination he ant testified that he had been employed by was asked by the county attorney: "What was the reason you quit?" This was objected to, and the objection overruled, but, without waiting for an answer, the county attorney immediately asked another question: "What was the cause of your discharge from the Miner?" The question was objected to, the objection overruled, but again there was not any answer to the question asked, but the witness proceeded to testify about other matters. The witness was also asked: "Among your duties there [in the Miner office] was it not your duty to write out the body of the checks for the people employed there?" An objection to this question was overruled, and apparently without waiting for an answer, the county attorney asked the question con

1. Upon cross-examination of the defendant while a witness in his own behalf, he was asked by the county attorney: "Were you not in trouble of a similar character in May or June, having cashed a check taken from a letter sent from the Miner building to the United States post office at Butte, Mont., mailed in June, 1908?" Conceding that the evidence was incompetent for the purpose offered, and that the ruling of the trial court was erroneous, it is manifest that defendant was not prejudiced thereby. He answered: "No; I am absolutely certain of it." Sections 9415 and 9548, Rev. Codes, deal-sidered in paragraph 2 above. ing with proceedings in this court on appeals in criminal cases, provide:

"Sec. 9415. After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions, which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."

"Sec. 9548. Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor any error or mistake therein, renders it invalid. unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right."

This court will not reverse a judgment for error in the trial proceedings, unless it has prejudiced, or tended to prejudice, the defendant in respect to a substantial right. State v. Gordon, 35 Mont. 458, 90 Pac. 173; State v. De Lea, 36 Mont. 531, 93 Pac. 814.

2. In rebuttal the county attorney called the defendant and asked him this question: "Was it not your duty, also, after the checks had been written by you and signed by Mr. Devine, general manager of the company, and countersigned by J. K. Heslet, its secretary, to deliver these checks to the persons in whose favor they had been drawn?" to which the witness replied, "Yes." After the answer was made, counsel for appellant interposed an objection, which was overruled, and

The wife of

the defendant was asked by the county attorney the following questions: "I would like to ask you at this time, what, if anything, you know of a transaction had between your husband and C. C. Curtis and C. T. Douglas, doing business in the name of Curtis & Douglas, and your father during the month of May, 1908?" And again: "At this time I will ask you if you know about his signing his time that month?" The objection to each of these questions was sustained. The defendant was asked by the county attorney to identify a certain check, and gave some evidence with reference to it, when he was interrupted by his counsel with an objection to any further cross-examination upon the matThe objection was sustained, and the county attorney then said: "I will ask the court to instruct the jury not to pay any attention to what they have heard with reference to this particular check, and not to be in any way prejudiced by it-to eliminate it from their minds." By the court: "Very well. The jury are instructed and admonisned to pay no attention to this evidence on this check." In one of the written instructions the court said: "Any statements of counsel as to what they expect to prove or offer to prove, or any attempt to prove a fact, the proof of which is not admitted by the court, or which has been ordered stricken

from the record by the court, must be entire- | that misconduct on the part of the proseculy disregarded and dismissed from your ting officer in asking them can be fairly inminds, and it must in no wise affect your ferred. It will not do to draw the inference verdict." of misconduct on the part of the county atThere cannot be error predicated upon the torney from the mere fact that he has asked rulings of the trial court with reference to questions which ought not to have been the first three questions above, for not one asked. asked. In order to constitute such misconof them was answered. Neither can error be duct the questions must be so far improper urged by appellant to the three subsequent that it would amount to an impeachment of rulings, for each was in his favor. But it is the legal learning of the attorney to say contended that the mere asking of these sev- that he did not know that they were manieral questions shows such misconduct on the festly improper and wholly unjustifiable. We part of the county attorney that there should agree fully with the doctrine announced in be a reversal of the judgment. We are not the cases cited by counsel for appellant; and, prepared to say that each of the first three if the facts in this case warranted it, we questions was not proper, though the pur- would not have any hesitation in reversing pose in asking them is not clear. When a de- this judgment, but certainly a very broad disfendant goes upon the witness stand in his tinction is to be made between the facts of own behalf, and denies the commission of this case and the facts as they appeared in the crime with which he is charged, a very State v. Rogers, above, and in State v. Gleim, wide latitude of cross-examination is allowed. 17 Mont. 17, 41 Pac. 998, 31 L. R. A. 294, 52 State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 77 Pac. 293. In Am. St. Rep. 655, State v. Trueman, 34 State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, 77 Pac. 50, Mont. 249, 85 Pac. 1024, and in State v. this court said: "The right of cross-exam- Crowe, 39 Mont. 102 Pac. 279. We think, ination extends, not only to all facts stated however, that the court exercised its discreby the witness in his original examination, tion wisely in giving the instructions quoted but to all other facts connected with them, above, and in so doing fully guarded the whether directly or indirectly, which tend to rights of the accused. enlighten the jury upon the question in controversy, and this right should not be restricted unduly." But, however this may be, we do not think that the questions asked of defendant or his wife are so far improper

We do not find any error in the record. The judgment and order are affirmed. Affirmed.

BRANTLY, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.