Page images
PDF
EPUB

Objections to municipal improvements, see Municipal Corporations, § 318.

Want of capacity to sue, see Parties, § 96.
Of rights or remedies.

See Tender, § 15.

Conditions in insurance policy, see Insurance, § 558.

Forfeiture of insurance, see Insurance, §§ 388, 392.

Forfeiture of lease, see Landlord and Tenant, $76.

Lien on trespassing animals, see Animals, § 95. Motion for new trial, see New Trial, § 154. Notice of meetings of board of equalization, see Taxation, § 482.

Right to enforce vendor's lien, see Vendor and Purchaser, § 266.

Tender of payment by vendee, see Vendor and Purchaser, § 187.

WARDS.

See Guardian and Ward,

WAREHOUSEMEN.

Misjoinder of causes of action for loss of goods stored, see Actions, § 45.

$24. Warehousemen who stored goods in building less secure than that in which he contracted to place them held liable for their loss in a fire which did not destroy the latter building.-Locke v. Wiley (Kan.) 11.

§ 24. Care required of warehouseman, stated. -Locke v. Wiley (Kan.) 11.

§ 24. Warehouseman held not an insurer, but required to place the goods in a building reasonably safe against danger from within and without.-Locke v. Wiley (Kan.) 11.

WARNING.

of a prior riparian owner.-McEvoy v. Taylor (Wash.) 851.

§ 42. Each riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the waters as an incident to his ownership.-McEvoy v. Taylor (Wash.) 851. § 43. Evidence held to show that riparian owner made a reasonable use of water.-McEvoy v. Taylor (Wash.) 851.

(C) Pollution.

Liability of agent, see Principal and Agent, § 159.

§ 68. A landowner having appropriated the waters of a stream for irrigation held entitled to recover damages from a millowner who polluted the stream by poisonous substances from his concentrating mill.-Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank (Colo.) 1093.

§ 68. That defendant, in operating a concentrating mill, used waters not a part of a stream, did not authorize defendant to discharge such waters mixed with hurtful slimes into the stream, to the injury of lower prior appropriators.-Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank (Colo.) 1093.

§ 68. Defendant held not entitled to discharge the waste material of its concentrating mill into a stream on the ground that the operation of the mill was dependent on such right.Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank (Colo.) 1093.

§ 74. In an action for pollution of a stream, to the surplus and overflow of which plaintiff was entitled, it was no defense that prior appropriators had appropriated the full ordinary flow of the stream.-Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank (Colo.) 1093.

$77. In a suit for damages for the pollution of a stream, a complaint held not to base plaintiff's alleged rights solely on those acquired as a riparian proprietor, under Rev. St. 1908, §§ 3165, 3176.-Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co.

Servant of danger, see Master and Servant, § v. Frank (Colo.) 1093.

150.

WARRANT.

Bench warrants, see Criminal Law, § 263.

WARRANTY.

On sale of goods, see Sales, §§ 428, 440.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
See Drains; Navigable Waters.
Tide lands, see Public Lands, § 185.

I. APPROPRIATION OF RIGHTS IN
PUBLIC LANDS.

§ 4. Laws 1903, p. 88, c. 100, regulating the appropriation of water rights, must be liberally construed according to Comp. Laws 1907, § 2489.-Pool v. Utah County Light & Power Co. (Utah) 289.

§ 17. An extension of time for completing works required to perfect an appropriation of water under Laws 1903, pp. 88-100, c. 100, §§ 1-42, held within the power of the state engineer under the facts.-Pool v. Utah County Light & Power Co. (Utah) 289.

II. NATURAL WATER COURSES. (A) Riparian Rights in General.

Condemnation of rights for construction of dam, compensation, see Eminent Domain, § 134.

§ 39. A non riparian owner held not entitled to enjoin an alleged unreasonable use of water

III. SUBTERRANEAN AND PERCOLATING WATERS. Artesian wells as nuisances, see Nuisance, §§ 72, 73.

$99. "Percolating waters" defined.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

§ 101. Where two or more own different tracts underlaid by porous material saturated with percolating water, each may use the water on his land to the full extent of his need if the supply is sufficient.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 101. Where water in an underground stratum is part of a stream, lands overlying the water are entitled to riparian rights therein.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 105. A landowner is entitled to the reasonable use of percolating waters, though it may impair the same right of his neighbor, whether they are percolating waters feeding a stream or not.--Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 105. A finding that defendant's artesian wells drew water which was the subterranean flow of a river, to all of which plaintiff was entitled, held proper.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

§ 106. Owners of land bordering a stream held not entitled to intercept percolating waters therein and apply the same to other than a reasonable use on the land.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

107. In a suit to restrain defendants' use of percolating waters, the burden held on plaintiff to show that defendants' use was unreasonable.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 107. Complainant held not entitled to an, injunction restraining the maintenance of a well in a stream, in the absence of testimony showing the quantity of water discharged from the well.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

VI. APPROPRIATION AND PRE

SCRIPTION.

§ 135. Where an irrigation ditch was completed within four years from the commencement thereof, it was within a sufficient time in view of the difficulties encountered in its construction.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 137. Plaintiff's right to object to defendants' use of certain wells sunk in the bed of a stream held barred by limitations.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 139. Where the construction of irrigation ditches was prosecuted with proper diligence, the rights acquired related back to the commencement of the work.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 140. Where the quantity allowed a particular owner for irrigation is not required, it becomes subject to use by others on the stream in the order of their rights.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 140. Where different persons have interests in different water rights, the order of their respective priorities depends on the dates of the initiation of each particular right.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 143. The capacity of an irrigation ditch is the utmost limit of the right of the appropriators. Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

143. The beneficial use and the needs of the appropriators of water for irrigation, and not the capacity of the ditches, or quantity first run through them, is the measure and limit of the right of the appropriators.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 143. The right to water claimed by prior appropriators for irrigation is limited in quantity by the use for which the appropriation is made and to which it may in reasonable time be applied.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 144. The owner of irrigated land is limited in the use of water under an appropriation to the lands under the ditch by which the appropriation was made.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396. § 145. The right of an appropriator of water for irrigation to change the point of diversion, the character or place of use, or enlarge the same stated.-Diez v. Hartbauer (Colo.) 868. $145. Where an appropriator of water has a decreed priority of the waters of a stream for use of his whole property, which abuts on both sides of the stream, he may use the whole amount of the water decreed on the property on one side of the river.-Diez v. Hartbauer (Colo.) 868.

$145. The building of a flume from the south side of an appropriator's property across the stream and connecting it with the main ditch at a point below the headgate held not a change of point of diversion.-Diez v. Hartbauer (Colo.) 868.

§ 145. A change in the point of diversion of water for irrigation and place of use may be made when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 146. Complainant's suit to restrain the maintenance of certain wells alleged to divert waters from a stream held barred by laches.Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 146. Limitations held to have started to run against plaintiff's right to object to the maintenance of certain wells in a water course which immediately diminished the flow at plain

tiff's point of diversion from the commencement of the operation of the wells.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

$146. Plaintiff's use of subterranean waters after they had become part of a stream was not adverse to the owners of land overlying such waters.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 151. Owners of land overlying subterranean waters which constituted part of a stream held not to have lost their right to use the same by disuse.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 152. In an action to determine water rights, it was error to adjudicate the relative rights of defendants as to each other, where no issue was made or attempted to be framed between them and all the parties were not ordered brought in.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396..

§ 152. An action to determine water rights may be maintained against any persons claiming adversely, or who are necessary to a complete determination of the controversy, though plaintiff is not injured by any interference by defendants.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

§ 152. A decree awarding plaintiff water rights to which he is not entitled will be modified on appeal as to nonanswering defendants. -Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

152. Under the evidence, held, that 10 second feet, or 400 inches, was ample for the irrigation of plaintiff's land having an area of 440 acres.-Whited v. Cavin (Or.) 396.

[blocks in formation]

§ 155. A subsequent conveyance by an original owner of riparian land, of a part not abutting on the creek, held not to confer riparian rights.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

§ 155. Where a tract of land was not contiguous to a stream and had never received water therefrom, that it was part of a ranch havcontinuous, would not preserve such right to ing riparian rights while the ownership was the severed tract.-Hudson v. Dailey (Cal.) 748.

$158. Notice by plaintiff forbidding the use of the water and demanding a certain sum for every day the notice was violated held not a proposition to sell water at that rate.-Wright V. Sonoma County (Cal.) 409.

§ 158. Where plaintiff notified defendant that he would demand a certain sum for every day the notice not to take water was violated, the subsequent taking of water was not an acceptance of a proposition to sell at a specified price.-Wright v. Sonoma County (Cal.) 409.

VIII. ARTIFICIAL PONDS, RESERVOIRS, AND CHANNELS, DAMS, AND FLOWAGE. Condemnation of rights for construction of dam, compensation, see Eminent Domain, § 134.

IX. PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY. (A) Domestic and Municipal Purposes. Estoppel to allege indivisibility of contract for municipal supply, see Estoppel, § 92.

§ 200. The general rule as to giving to ambiguous contracts the construction placed thereon by the parties applied to a contract between

[ocr errors]

a city and a waterworks company.-State v. Mountain Spring Co. (Wash.) 243.

§ 209. The city of Los Angeles, having paramount rights in the use of the water of the Los Angeles river, held entitled to restrain the abstraction of the waters from the San Fernando valley, by which the river is fed.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

§ 209. A complaint by a city to restrain the unlawful withdrawal of water from a stream held not required to aver the quantity of water used, the boundaries and location of the irrigable land, or the number and location of homes and business places for which water is required. City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

$ 18. On the question of negligence of one shooting on the assumption that bushes were being moved by a deer, held, a custom of hunters could not be shown.-Rudd v. Byrnes (Cal.) 957.

§ 18. If failure of one to comply with a custom was admissible on the question of his contributory negligence, he having been shot by a fellow hunter, held, it was necessary to show his knowledge of the custom.-Rudd v. Byrnes (Cal.) 957.

§ 18. Persons handling deadly weapons are required to exercise such care as ordinarily cautious persons would exercise under similar circumstances.-O'Barr v. United States (Okl. Cr. App.) 988.

WIDOWS.

§ 209. In a decree restraining the diversion of the waters of a stream to all of which a city was entitled held not necessary to define the Dower, see Dower. amount of water which may be required by the city from October 1st of each year to May 1st of the following year.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

§ 209. In a suit to quiet title to the waters of a stream, others similarly situated to those sued held not necessary parties.-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

(B) Irrigation and Other Agricultural Purposes.

§ 244. Rev. Codes, § 931, applies to highways across railroads on public lands, and not to highways crossing irrigation canals and ditches.-MacCammelly v. Pioneer Irr. Dist. (Idaho) 1076.

§ 244. Civ. Code, tit. 4, c. 5 (Rev. St. §§ 2710-2713), apply to water corporations furnishing water to cities and towns, and do not apply to corporations furnishing water for irrigation ditches.-MacCammelly v. Pioneer Irr. Dist. (Idaho) 1076.

§ 244. Rev. Codes, § 951, relating to bridging of ditches extended across public highways, does not apply to ditches constructed before the location of such highways.-MacCammelly v. Pioneer Irr. Dist. (Idaho) 1076.

§ 244. Under Rev. Codes, § 3310, the county must construct bridges on highways laid out over ditches or canals, but when the latter are constructed across an existing highway, the owner must construct the proper bridges.-MacCammelly v. Pioneer Irr. Dist. (Idaho) 1076.

§ 247. In an action by an administrator to recover a one-sixth interest in the waters of a ditch, evidence held to show that the estate had no interest therein.-Allen v. Swadley (Colo.)

1097.

§ 247. In an action to recover a one-sixth interest in a ditch, in which it is shown that for more than 30 years one-eighth had been used and claimed, evidence held to sustain a finding that plaintiff had only the one-eighth interest.-Allen v. Swadley (Colo.) 1100.

§ 263. Damages in the amount of the supposed diminution of the value of property sold, for failure to deliver certain amount of irrigating water, also sold, held erroneous.-Starbird v. Jacobs (Colo.) 872.

WAYS.

WILLS.

See Descent and Distribution; Executors and
Administrators.

Charitable bequests and devises, see Charities.
Construction and execution of trusts, see Trusts.
Courts of probate, see Courts, § 202.

I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF TESTA-
MENTARY POWER.

§ 1. Nature in general of the right to make a testamentary disposition of property stated.In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1013.

§ 11. A married man may, with the consent of his wife, given as prescribed by Gen. St. 1901, § 7972, dispose of his property by will as if unmarried.-Hanson v. Hanson (Kan.) 444.

II. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.

55. Evidence held insufficient to support a finding that testator at the time of executing his will was mentally incompetent.-In re Carithers' Estate (Cal.) 127.

IV. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Testamentary Dispositions.

§ 91. A transfer of certificates of bank stock held not invalid as testamentary in character.Cahlan v. Bank of Lassen County (Cal. App.) 765.

(B) Form and Contents of Instruments.

$97. Both of two distinct wills, one relating to property at testator's domicile and the other to property in another state or country, held valid if executed and attested in accordance with the law of the place where the property is. Thompson v. Parnell (Kan.) 502.

(C) Execution.

§ 108. The statutory formalities of execution of a will held to be of equal importance.In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1013.

(D) Holographic Wills.

$130. The requirement of Rev. Codes, § 4727, as to the date of a holographic will, is mandatory. In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1017.

Public ways, see Highways; Municipal Cor- be in any particular form, and a mistake in the porations, §§ 646-705, 771-821.

WEAPONS.

$130. Though a holographic will need not date will not invalidate it, the requirements of Rev. Codes, § 4727, must be substantially met. -In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1017.

§ 132. A writing intended for a holographic § 18. Question of contributory negligence of will held to be invalid, as being without date. one shot by a fellow hunter held for the jury.--In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1017. Rudd v. Byrnes (Cal.) 957.

§ 18. One held negligent in shooting a person on the assumption that brush was being moved by a deer.-Rudd v. Byrnes (Cal.) 957.

(F) Mistake, Undue Influence, and Fraud. § 155. In order to establish undue influence, there must be proof of a pressure which over

ated.

powered the mind and bore down the volition of | (E) Nature of Estates and Interests Cretestator when the will was made.-In re Carithers' Estate (Cal.) 127.

[blocks in formation]

V. PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT,
AND ANNULMENT.

Statutory rules of probate as obligatory on
courts, see Constitutional Law, § 67.

(A) Probate and Revocation in General.

$215. On application for probate, the sole inquiry is whether the technical requirements of the statute have been complied with.-In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1013.

(D) Probate or Record of Foreign Wills. § 242. The statute conferring jurisdiction on the probate court to admit to record authenticated copies of foreign wills held not intended to deny that court jurisdiction to probate an original will, executed in another state or for eign country, disposing of property in Kansas. -Thompson v. Parnell (Kan.) 502.

§ 242. Probate court held to have jurisdiction to probate original will executed in England, disposing of property in Kansas.-Thompson v. Parnell (Kan.) 502.

(K) Review.

§ 386. That the findings on conflicting evidence in a will contest are by the court held not to change the rule as to the conclusiveness of the verdict on such evidence in a case submitted to a jury under Rev. Codes, § 7397.-In re Noyes' Estate (Mont.) 1013.

VI. CONSTRUCTION.

(A) General Rules.

§ 602. A will construed, and held to vest the fee in devisees subject to be divested on the happening of a designated subsequent act made a "condition subsequent," defined by Civ. Code, § 1349.-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971.

VII. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
DEVISEES AND LEGATEES.

(A) Nature of Title and Rights in Gen-
eral.

§ 742. A devise in fee of an undivided inter

est in real estate, which vests immediately at testator's death, subject to termination on the happening of a designated subsequent act or event, is an interest in realty which is transferable by the devisee.-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971.

(D) Election.

St. 1901, § 7972, consented to the will of her 778. Where a wife has as provided by Gen. husband,' she need not be called upon after his death to elect under section 7979, though not named as a beneficiary in his will.-Hanson v. Hanson (Kan.) 444.

§ 782. A widow provided for by her husband's will may either take thereunder or the statute.-Ashelford v. Chapman (Kan.) 534.

§ 801. If a widow takes under the statute, there is no will as to her, and none of her rights can be abridged thereby.-Ashelford v. Chapman (Kan.) 534.

§ 801. The principle that where a widow takes under the statute there is no will as to her forbids that she should enlarge any of her rights under the statute by appeal to the will.Ashelford v. Chapman (Kan.) 534.

§ 801. A widow, electing to take in opposition to her husband's will, receives the share of his estate she would have had he died intestate.

§ 439. In the construction of wills, the in--Ashelford v. Chapman (Kan.) 534. tention of the testator governs, and rules to determine the intention are but advisory.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

§ 462. The court held authorized to supply by intendment words omitted from a will.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

§ 462. A will held to give to testator's wife only the property not otherwise disposed of.Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

§ 470. The courts in the interpretation of wills will look to the whole instrument.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

§ 471. The rule that where clauses in a will are repugnant the latter prevails held to apply only where other rules fail in arriving at testator's intention.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082. § 477. Where a will refers to a deed of real estate as explanatory and as a reason for dispositions made in the will, the deed may, if necessary, be read into the will as a part thereof to ascertain the intention of testator.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

477. A deed referred to in a will held admissible to throw light on the property which testator thought he was disposing of.-Bacon v. Nichols (Colo.) 1082.

(D) Description of Property.

§ 560. A conveyance by a vendor to the executors of the deceased purchaser held to vest the legal title to the property as if the deed had been executed prior to the purchaser's death and to be a part of his property disposed of by his will.-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971.

§ 801. Widow held bound by her election to take under the statute to disregard her husband's will, and could not invoke to her advantage a certain provision therein.-Ashelford v. Chapman (Kan.) 534.

WITHDRAWAL.

Of offer of judgment, see Judgment, § 80.
Of pleas in criminal prosecutions, see Criminal
Law, § 270.

WITNESSES.

See Depositions; Evidence.
Absence ground for continuance, see Continu-
ance, 22; Criminal Law. § 594.
Indorsement on indictment, see Criminal Law,
Experts, see Evidence, §§ 471-553.
§ 628.

Opinions, see Evidence, §§ 471-553.
Perjury, see Perjury.
Testimony of accomplices, see Criminal Law,
§ 507.

I. ATTENDANCE, PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS, AND COM-

PENSATION.

Law prohibiting recovery of fees by particular
officers as denial of equal protection of law,
see Constitutional Law, § 211.
Special or local laws as to compensation of of-
ficers, see Statutes, § 72.

§ 21. A witness who is present in court and refuses, when ordered, to answer a pertinent question concerning the matter being investigat

(Or.) 401.

"Cruel and unusual punishment."-Ex parte | "Public good."-Abraham v. City of Roseburg O'Shea (Cal. App.) 776. "Dedication."-Shultz v. Redondo Improvement "Purchasers or incumbrancers in good faith."Co. (Cal.) 118.

"De facto officer."-Reclamation Dist. No. 70 v. Sherman (Cal. App.) 277. "Deliberation."-State v. Arata (Wash.) 227. "Dirty slut."-Cooper v. Seaverns (Kan.) 509. "Doing business."-Verdigris River Land Co. v. Stanfield (Okl.) 337; General Conference of Free Baptists v. Berkey (Cal.) 411. "Dollars."-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971.

"Due and owing."-Treis v. Berlin Dye Works & Laundry Co. (Cal. App.) 275. "Duty."-Bankers' Deposit Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Barnes (Kan.) 697. "Enactment."-Norris v. Cross (Okl.) 1000. "Equitable estoppel."-Carruthers v. Whitney (Wash.) 831.

"Fellow servants."-Hale v. Crown Columbia Pulp & Paper Co. (Wash.) 480. "File."-O'Connor v. Board of Com'rs of Bear Lake County (Idaho) 560.

"Final order."-Anderson v. Englehart (Wyo.)

571.

"Fixture."-Gasaway v. Thomas (Wash.) 168. "Foreclosure."-Murray v. O'Brien (Wash.) 840. "Former jeopardy."-State v. Kinghorn (Wash.)

234.

"Forthwith."-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971.

"Fugitive from justice."-Roberts v. Board of Com'rs of Custer County (Idaho) 797. "Fundamental error."-Rea v. State (Okl. Cr. App.) 386.

"Given."-Beakey v. Schwitzgebel (Kan.) 42. "Good and marketable title."Roberts V. Tuttle v. (Utah) 916.

"Half."-Gunn v. Brower (Kan.) 702.

"Immediate."-Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco (Cal.) 971. "Imposed duties."-Edson v. City of Olathe (Kan.) 521.

"Incumbrancers in good faith and for a valuable consideration."-Fulkerson v. Stiles (Cal.)

966.

"Inferior court."-Chinn v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (Cal.) 580; Inglin v. Hoppin (Cal.) 582. "Judicial proceeding."-State V. McCafferty (Okl.) 992. "Knowingly."-State V. McCormick (Wash.) 1037.

"Law day."-Murray v. O'Brien (Wash.) 840. "Manslaughter."-Rhea v. Territory (Okl. Cr. App.) 314; State v. Quinn (Wash.) 818. "May."-State v. Gault (Wash.) 242. "Mitigation of damages.' of damages."-Swank v. Elwert

(Or.) 901. "Monopoly."-Grogan v. Chaffee (Cal.) 745. "Murder."-Rhea v. Territory (Okl. Cr. App.) 314.

"Offense."-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Territory of Oklahoma (Okl.) 677. "Option."-Frese v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York (Cal. App.) 265. "Outlays."-Cooley v. Miller & Lux (Cal.) 981. "Owner."-Steele v. Dye (Kan.) 700.

"Partnership."-Weiss v. Hamilton (Mont.) 74. "Percolating waters."-City of Los Angeles v. Hunter (Cal.) 755.

"Police power."-State v. Sherman (Wyo.) 299.

v.

Fulkerson v. Stiles (Cal.) 966. "Railroad."-Portland Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Oregon (Or.) 709. "Reasonable doubt."-Vance v. Territory (Okl. Cr. App.) 307; Chandler v. State, Id. 375. "Rebate."-Savage-Scofield Co. v. City of Tacoma (Wash.) 1032. "Record."-Chandler v. State (Okl. Cr. App.)

[blocks in formation]

"Slut."-Cooper v. Seaverns (Kan.) 509. "Sold."-Christensen v. Cram (Cal.) 950. "Southwest quarter."-Gunn v. Brower (Kan.) 702. "Special proceeding."-Anderson v. Englehart (Wyo.) 571. "Suit."-State v. McCafferty (Okl.) 992. "To."-Boise Valley Const. Co. v. Kroeger (Idaho) 1070. "Transacting business."-General Conference of "Transcribe."-Wilmoth v. Wheaton (Kan.) 39. Free Baptists v. Berkey (Cal.) 411. Transferred."-Shepherd v. Kansas City (Kan.) y.

531.

"Trespass."-Welch v. Seattle & M. R. Co. (Wash.) 166. "Undue influence."-In re Carithers' Estate (Cal.) 127.

"Unilateral contract."-Friendly v. Elwert (Or.) 404.

"Unsecured solvent debts."-First Nat. Bank v. Washington County (Idaho) 1053. "Use."-Greenwood v. State (Okl. Cr. App.) 371. "Vice principal."-Wolk v.. Smith (Wash.) 138. "Vacancy."-People v. De Guelle (Colo.) 1110. "Vote_cast."-Incorporated Town of Westville v. Incorporated Town of Stilwell (Okl.) 664. "Was unpaid."-Treis v. Berlin Dye Works & "Willfully."-O'Barr v. United States (Okl. Cr. Laundry Co. (Cal. App.) 27. "Writ of review."-Elmore v. Tillamook County App.) 988. (Or.) 900.

WORK AND LABOR.

Effect of reliance on express contract on right to recover on quantum meruit, see Contracts, § 346.

§ 22. Plaintiff can set up an express contract to pay specified wages for work done, and that the work was reasonably worth the amount claimed.--Mery wethers v. Youmans (Kan.) 545.

See Frocess.

WRITS.

Particular writs.

See Certiorari; Execution; Habeas Corpus; Inunction: Mandamus; Prohibition; Quo Warranto; Replevin.

yrit of error, see Appeal and Error.

WRONGFUL INJUNCTION.

"Premeditation."-State v. Arata (Wash.) 227. See Injunction, § 261.
"Prevail."-Steele v. Dye (Kan.) 700.
"Principals."-Greenwood v. State (Okl. Cr.
App.) 371.

"Privileged communications."-Madsen v. Utah
Light & Ry. Co. (Utah) 799.

"Probable cause."-Michael v. Matson (Kan.) 537.

"Proceedings."-State v. McCafferty (Okl.) 992.

See Taxation, § 608.

WRONGFUL SEIZURE.

YEAR.

"Proprietor."-Eldridge v. Finnegar (Okl.) 334. Estates for years, see Landlord and Tenant.

« PreviousContinue »