purpose of charging the property in the district with the expense of the construction of the sewer system, which could not have been done had the entire city been included in the system, as in that instance the cost thereof would have been paid by the city by taxation based upon values. The city authorities were authorized by the law under which they were acting to create a sanitary sewer district. The authority thus vested was discretionary. The judgment of municipal officers, when acting within the general scope of their authority, is conclusive, unless it clearly appears their action was fraudulent or unreasonable. City of Denver v. Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80, 80 Pac. 122, 467; City of Denver v. Campbell, 33 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142. No testimony is called to our attention from which it is made to appear that the action of the city council in excluding 20 blocks was done in bad faith, or that their action was fraudulent or unreasonable on this account. The burden was upon plaintiffs to prove the facts which would make it appear that the authorities had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in designating and establishing as a district sewer that which, in fact, was a public sewer, before the court would be justified in interfering with their action in establishing the sewer district in question.

Considerable of the property of plaintiffs consists of vacant lots in the suburbs of the city, and it is claimed that the benefits to their property resulting from the construction of the sewer system are not equal to the amount they are required to pay therefor. This was one of the issues of fact in the

The testimony on the subject was conflicting, and the issue determined in favor of the defendants. Generally speaking, only such benefits are to be assessed as it is reasonably apparent the property will receive other than the general benefit to the community, and nothing is to be considered a benefit which does not enhance the value of the property. Vacant lots may have no present use for a sewerage system; but it adds to their value by giving them a sanitary advantage which renders them salable at a price which otherwise they could not command, because of their desirability as compared with lots not having such advantage. In our judgment the evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the finding of the court to the effect that the special benefits accruing to the property of plaintiffs by reason of the construction of the sewer equal the assessments to be made against it.

It is urged that, if the public parks had been included in the assessments made for the construction of the sewer system, some $3,000 of the assessment would have been made against these parks. The omission of property which should have been assessed to pay the cost of a public improvement does not render the assessment or the proceedings

cumstances would be that the assessment on property taxed for such improvement should be reduced to the extent it would have been had the omitted property been charged with its proportionate share of the expense; but parties seeking this relief must apply in the first instance to the special forum which the law has vested with authority to determine such questions, which in the case at bar was the city council. In the objections and complaints made by plaintiffs no question was raised on the score of the omission of the parks. Not having availed themselves of the opportunity thus afforded to have their proposed assessments reduced, if, under the law and facts, they would have been entitled to such a reduction, they cannot appeal to a court of equity for the relief which they might have secured in the special forum the law has provided. Spalding v. City of Denver, 33 Colo. 172, 80 Pac. 126.

The act of 1899 provides, at page 400, that the cost of a district sanitary sewer shall be assessed upon all the real estate in the district in such proportion as the area of each piece of real estate is to the area of the real estate in the district. It is claimed that this method of assessing the cost of a sewer is unjust, because property in the business section of the town worth many times more than the lots of plaintiff is not assessed for any greater sum than their property. Special assessments are not imposed upon the basis of value, but upon the basis of special benefits accruing from their construction, so that the question of value cuts no figure. In this connection we notice the claim advanced on behalf of plaintiffs that their lots are assessed for a greater sum than lots in the business section. We find, from an examination of the record, that this results from the fact that the area of their lots is greater than in the business part of the city.

Plaintiffs also complain that no notice was given fixing the time for hearing objections. The act requires a notice to be given by the city clerk of the proposed improvements, their cost, etc., and that all complaints and objections that may be made in writing concerning the proposed improvements by the owner of any real estate to be assessed will be heard and determined by the city council before final action. This notice appears to have been given. Incorporated therein was a statement to the effect that on a specified date, and at a designated hour, the city council would take up for consideration an ordinance ordering the improvements in accordance with the details, specifications, estimates made, and schedule referred to in the notice. If this was not a sufficient notice to the plaintiffs, who had theretofore filed objections with respect to the date their protests would be heard, they cannot complain. The record discloses that they did appear before the ordinance was passed at the time designated in the notice

It is urged that the objections of plaintiffs were never acted upon, or that they were refused permission to file them. It appears from the evidence that the objections to the plan of the system were heard and overruled. Later there appears to have been presented a petition asking the council to submit the sewer proposition to a vote of the taxpayers, which was laid on the table. This action was right. Such a petition was in no sense an objection or complaint which the objectors were entitled to present. Other socalled objections were presented later, but long after the time fixed by the notice as required by the statute within which complaints and objections shall be filed. Objections and complaints cannot avail the parties filing them if not filed within the time which the notice requiring them to be filed fixes when such notice complies with the law in this respect.

The final question urged is that the act is unconstitutional, for the reason that it provides for an assessment for a public improvement according to area, without regard to benefits. When the Legislature directs that the cost of any improvement be assessed to the abutting property by some designated rule, it will be presumed that the cost so assessed will not exceed the benefits unless the contrary affirmatively appears. City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899. Building lots abutting a sanitary sewer system are prima facie presumed to be benefited as the result of its construction. The rule of apportionment according to area is therefore prima facie valid; but where any general method employed, though prima facie legal, would work an injustice, relief in proper circumstances may be granted. City of Denver v. Dumars, 33 Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114. The law, then, is not unconstitutional because a general method has been prescribed by which to apportion upon the property of a district the expense of constructing a sanitary sewer. Parties whose property is thus assessed may still question the benefits accruing as the result of its construction.

The purpose of the action to be reviewed in case No. 6,201 was to annul the assessments, and, with two exceptions, raised practically the same questions we have just considered and determined. Summarized, it is, in effect, except in two particulars, a reiteration of the allegations contained in the complaints filed in the first two cases in the court below. The additional allegations are substantially as follows: By paragraph 11 it is alleged, in substance: That on February 28, 1905, the council passed an ordinance

a specified rate per square foot; that prior to its passage, and within 30 days after the publication of notice of the proposed assessment, there was filed in the office of the city clerk, by plaintiffs and other property owners in the city, written complaints and objections against the passage of the assessing ordinance, in which it was set forth that the law under which the proceedings were had and the ordinance ordering the improvements were without authority and were unconstitutional; that the sewer system was not a district sanitary sewer, but a general sewer; that the system had no connection with any other sewer system and no outlet or connection with any natural stream or drainage; that the amount proposed to be assessed against the lots owned by the protestants was greatly in excess of the benefits; that the assessment was not made on the basis of benefits; that they were not uniform; that the sewer was constructed against the objections and protests of the inhabitants of the district and especially of the complainants; that the aggregate amount proposed to be assessed against the real estate in the district was largely in excess of the cost of the sewer system under the contract made between the city and the contractors; that the amount included assessments for sand, gravel, subdrains, and other miscellaneous charges outside the contract largely in excess of the actual cost of the same; that the sewer system was not constructed according to the plans and specifications, or in the manner and with the kind of materials provided in the contract; that the system as so constructed, instead of being a benefit, was a detriment to the property owners as well as to the lives and health of them and their families; and that the council, without granting the protestants a hearing on their objections and complaints, arbitrarily overruled them and passed the ordinance, with the result that there was apportioned upon and assessed against the property of plaintiffs their proportionate share of the entire assessment according to the area plan.

Plaintiffs then state, with particularity as to amount and details, items which they allege were unlawfully and fraudulently included by the city authorities in making up the aggregate amount assessed against the property of the district for the expense of constructing the sewer, which, they say, approximated the sum of $31,000. They then allege that on July 11, 1905, the newly elected city council appointed an investigating committee to investigate and make report upon the matters relating to overcharges, fraudulent items, and increase in the cost of the system, set out in their complaint; and allege that until such report was made, which was January 11, 1906, they had no knowledge of the alleged wrongful and fraud

ties with respect to the overcharges and items disclosed by the report; and further allege that they are unable to determine what, if any, amount should be tendered or paid by them as a lawful charge against their property, and for that reason are unable to make tender of any amount that might be due and payable thereon in case any lawful assessment is charged against their property; and aver that, in case it should be determined that any assessment against their property is lawful, they stand ready to pay such amount as may be so found due and payable.

This complaint was filed April 26, 1906. The demurrer thereto was based upon the grounds: That it did not state a cause of action; that it appeared upon its face the plaintiffs had failed, within 30 days after the publication of the assessing ordinance complained of, to commence an action attacking the assessment; and that it does not appear from the averments of the complaint that plaintiffs or either of them tendered any sum or amount in payment of that portion of the assessment which was legally chargeable against their respective premises. As previously stated, this demurrer was sustained, and the action dismissed. Counsel for plaintiffs contend the demurrer should not have been sustained because the law is unconstitutional, that the proceedings are void for the reason it appears from the complaint that steps prescribed by the statute under which the city authorities acted were not taken, that no authority existed to order the construction of a sewer without an outlet, that it was in violation of the Constitution and of the statutes to create a sanitary sewer district which embraced practically all the city, and that charges amounting to $30,000 and upwards allowed by the city authorities were unjust and illegal because they embraced items which could not properly be included in such assessment.

The unconstitutionality of the law is again urged upon the ground that it prescribes an arbitrary rule by which to assess the property in a district for the expense of constructing a sanitary sewer. We have held that such a law is not invalid, but that, where it appears the assessments made by the method prescribed amount to more than the benefits conferred by the construction of the improvement, relief may be granted; that is to say, the assessment in such circumstances on a proper showing may be reduced to a sum equal to the benefits, and it is not necessary to rediscuss this question. The rule is that, in constructing local public improvements and levying special assessments against the property therefor, the statute must be substantially followed; but the Legislature has the power to prescribe the time within which actions to annul assessments made against property for the cost of public

Denver v. Campbell, 33 Colo. 162, 80 Pac. 142; Jackson v. City of Denver, 41 Colo. 362, 92 Pac. 690.

Section 45 of the act of 1899 provides: "All actions, legal or equitable, for relief against any proceedings had under this law, whether based upon irregularities or jurisdictional defects, shall be commenced within thirty days after the wrongful act complained of, or else be thereafter perpetually barred." The assessing ordinance was passed on February 28, 1905, as appears from the allegations of the complaint, and the suit was not commenced until April 26, 1906, or almost 13 months after the time when, according to the provisions of the section above quoted, plaintiffs should have instituted the action which they now seek to maintain. Under our decisions to which we have referred, the statute constitutes a bar to the maintenance of their action. Cases from other jurisdictions upholding similar statutes are: Kansas City v. Gibson, 66 Kan. 501, 72 Pac. 222; Holmquist v. Anderson, 67 Kan. 861, 74 Pac. 227; City of Leavenworth v. Jones, 69 Kan. 857, 77 Pac. 273; U. P. Ry. Co. v. Kansas City, 73 Kan. 571, 85 Pac. 603; Loomis v. City of Little Falls, 176 N. Y. 31, 68 N. E. 105; Blackwell v. Village of Cœur d'Alene, 13 Idaho, 357, 90 Pac. 353. See, also, State v. Smith, 177 Mo. 69, 75 S. W. 625, in which it was held that a provision in a city charter requiring the owner of any land charged with the payment of a special assessment for a public improvement to file with the board of public works within 60 days from the date of the issuance of a tax bill therefor a written statement of all objections to the validity of such tax bill for the doing of the work, etc., and that in any suit on such tax bill no objections should be pleaded other than those set out in the objections filed with the board, was valid; and that, unless such objections were filed with the board within the time prescribed, suit attacking the validity of the assessments could not be maintained. Reasonable limitations regarding the time within which actions can be commenced attacking the validity of special assessments for public improvements are necessary. To meet the expenses of such improvements, bonds must be negotiated, and, unless there is some reasonable limit within which actions may be commenced to attack assessments levied for the purpose of liquidating such bonds when they mature, they could not be disposed of advantageously, because parties purchasing would never know when an action might be commenced by some dissatisfied taxpayer; and, on the other hand, after the lapse of the statutory period, they would have the right to presume no such actions could be maintained, and their rights ought to be protected by a statute which fixes a time within which suits must be commenced, unless it