Mare Island. by Mexican law, of the Departmental Deputation; but it cannot supply other and much more serious desiderata in the title, the decision of which remains for the Supreme Court. In addition to which it is to be considered, that, whatever might be the legal effect, by way of waiver, estoppel, or otherwise, of any transaction in the premises between Castro's grantees and the United States, probably no such transaction could affect the rights of Sanford, or any other adverse claimant save the grantees of Castro. Sanford, or any other person, may not be precluded by anything the United States can do, from setting up a claim better than Castro's, that is, denying the validity of the original grant to Castro, and so ousting the United States. Assuming, therefore, that the grant to Castro, though it be the only adverse claim of date anterior to the acquisition of California, yet is no sufficient answer to any claim of origin subsequent to that date, we now arrive at a new class of considerations material to be discussed and weighed. I am satisfied that the State of California may set up, and probably maintain, title, as against the United States, to so much of Mare Island as is subject to overflow by water, whether periodically or otherwise, that is, at least, to all below high water mark. In the first place, the Supreme Court has decided, in the case of Pollard v. Hagan, (iii Howard, 212,) that the shores of navigable waters, and the soil under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the States respectively; and the new States have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original States. This decision has been re-examined and more than once re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Goodtitle v. Kibbe, (ix Howard, 471-477,) and Doe v. Beebe et al., (xiii Howard, 25.) It is immaterial, under these decisions, whether the general sovereignty of the United States, and their right of domain, came by treaty with a foreign power or otherwise. In all cases, on the admission of any State into the Union, the land of the shores below high water mark passes to and vests in that State, by virtue of the Constitution, Mare Island. In the second place, by an act of Congress, passed the 28th day of September, 1850, all the swamp and other overflowed lands in the State of Arkansas, made thereby unfit for cultivation, are granted to said State; and then the provisions of the act are extended to, and its benefits conferred upon, each of the other States of the Union in which such swamp and overflowed lands may be situated. The State of California had already, by act of September 9th, 1850, been admitted into the Union, and is, of course, entitled to all the uncultivable overflowed lands within its limits, as against the United States. It seems to me that, on one or both of these grounds, the State of California may lay claim to all that part of Mare Island, which is not above high water mark, and which is just as necessary as the upland, nay more necessary, for the purposes of a navy yard. It will not avail anything for the United States to acquire the uplands, unless it may construct wharves and docks, which must of course be situated on this very overflowed or tide-water shore land. Nay, how can the United States enjoy the use of Mare Island as a naval depot, while its entire shore belongs to the State of California, whose rights of property may shut up the island against all access of ships as effectually as if it were surrounded by a wall of granite? There is another class of questions, concerning which there is not sufficient information in the documents before me, to enable me to form any satisfactory judgment, and that is, the possibility of an adverse title to some part of Mare Island having been acquired by any individual since the conquest and cession of California. I suppose a proper investigation of the claim of Henry Sanford would afford or lead to the requisite information as to this general head of inquiry into the title, without possessing which I can give no opinion on the subject. I recommend, therefore, as indispensable prerequisites to any lawful expenditure of public money on Mare Island, First, that due investigation be had, through the District Attorney of the Northern District of California, or otherwise, into the claim of Henry Sanford, and any other ground of individual claim of date subsequent to the conquest. Secondly, that the State of California be invited to relinquish Gardiner Frauds. to the United States whatever claim, if any, she may have to the shores or the overflowed land of Mare Island. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. JAMES C. DOBBIN, C. CUSHING. Secretary of the Navy. GARDINER FRAUDS. Report to the President as to the investigation and prosecution of fraudulent claims preferred by and paid to Gardiner, under the treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 15, 1853. SIR: I have the honor to report, as to the letter addressed to you by Mr. Fendall and Mr. May, of the 8th inst., regarding the cases of the United States v. Gardiner, that all the proceedings in those cases were instituted by the direction of your predecessor, President Fillmore, who also conferred with counsel, and otherwise gave particular personal attention to the subject. The adoption of this course was occasioned, it is presumed, by the relation of the subject to one of the members of Mr. Fillmore's administration. Provision was made for the expenditure in these cases, and also for investigations instituted as to another case, that of Hargous, by the direction, in like manner, of the President,money being drawn from the Treasury and placed in the hands. of Mr. McKean, a clerk in the Treasury Department, as disbursing agent, and the accounts of expenditure having been examined and passed by the President. These expenditures were held to be authorized by the act of March 3, 1847, which appropriates three millions of dollars "to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, and boundaries, with the republic of Mexico, to be used by him in the event that said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of both governments, and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of the same or any part thereof." (ix U. S. Statutes, 174.) As the Gardiner and the Hargous inves Church Lands in Delaware. tigations all grew out of payments for indemnity under provisions of treaty with Mexico, including the treaty of peace and limits, commonly called of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and specially referred to by the above-cited act of March 3, 1847, (see art. 13 and 14 of the treaty, ix Stat. at Large, p. 933,) the authority for the expenditure was deemed sufficient by Mr. Fillmore. In this way the sum of $21,000 has already been drawn; of which about $1500 still remain in the hands of the disbursing agent; and there is a further sum in the Treasury, as balance of the three-million appropriation. In consideration of the character of these investigations, and of the inducements which led Mr. Fillmore to enter upon them, it seems to me that the subject-matter may properly continue to be conducted to a conclusion, substantially as commenced and proceeded in by him, except that no reason now exists why the President should himself assume the labor of attending personally to all the ordinary details of the business. I therefore recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized to draw on the balance of the three-million appropriation, for the purposes herein explained; that Mr. McKean be continued as disbursing agent until further order; and that the whole subject be placed under the supervision of the Attorney General. I am, very respectfully, C. CUSHING. To the PRESIDENT. .CHURCH LANDS IN DELAWARE. Legal effect of a lease of two thousand years. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have examined the abstract, with the letter of expla nation, transmitted to you by the District Attorney of the district of Delaware, relative to a parcel of land, in the city of Wilmington, selected as the proposed site of a custom house and post office in that city. Church Lands in Delaware. It appears that one Wellington Grubb was, at the time of his decease, in lawful possession of the premises, under color of title; and the whole question is, whether a conveyance of his title will vest the land in the United States. The decision of this question depends on distinct conclusions of law, namely, the value to be given to a leasehold term of two thousand years, in the premises, created by the minister, vestrymen, and churchwardens of the Swedes' Church, so called, in the year 1763; and the value ascribable to a deed of release, executed the present year by the vestrymen and churchwardens of the same church: both titles by lease and release being united in the said Grubb. It seems to be well settled in the United States, that a leasehold interest of whatever term, even a thousand or two thousand years, is not a fee simple estate, but only a chattel, passing by that designation in wills. (In re Gay, iii Mass. R. 419; Brewster v. Hill, i N. H. R. 350.) But, though not technically a fee simple estate, such a lease may be so considered for all purposes of beneficial possession, (Montague v. Smith, xiii Mass. R. 396, 402;) and the statute of 21 Henry VIII, ch. 18, which enabled the lessee to protect himself by ejectment against a stranger, though not, as by virtue of the lease, against the lessor or a grantee of the reversion, (iii Black. Comm. 200,) may be assumed to be in force in the United States. There is, therefore, in this particular, an apparent defect in the title, it not being technically, and in all possible relations, a fee simple. Perhaps this defect may be considered as cured by the long possession of the tenant or his predecessors in the lease, according to the doctrine of the case of Dunn v. Barnard, (Cowp. 595,) which decides that a lessee, under a lease for two thousand years, may hold by proof of adverse possession for twenty years, notwithstanding the lease. "It is answered," says Lord Mansfield, "that the testator held under an old term of two thousand years. But that will not avoid the title, if the jury are satisfied that he has been in possession twenty years. If no other title appears, a clear possession of twenty years is evi |