Eminent Domain-State Jurisdiction. Somers and the Washington. If so, why did it not employ the same words? For aught we may know to the contrary, it employed other words in the very purpose of narrowing the application of the provision. Congress may have reflected that, in the case of the Somers and the Washington, it had gone beyond the range of its general policy, and may have deliberately refused to go so far in the case of the Grampus. It is quite presumable that the framers of the last act did not reflectingly omit marines; and yet they have done it. Can we by construction supply the assumed error of omission? not. Clearly To insert "marines" in the act before me,-and to construe "orphans" to mean father or mother, brother or sister,—would be legislation, not interpretation. There is an earlier act concerning the Grampus, (that of June 12, 1844,) which fixes the time, when pension to the widows of the officers, seamen, and marines of the Grampus shall commence, and which extends the right of pension in certain contingencies to minor children. (v Stat. at Large, p. 665.) I do not perceive anything in this act to change my view of the necessary legal construction of the subsequent act making special provision for the officers and seamen of the Grampus. I am, very respectfully, Hon. JAMES C. DOBBIN, Secretary of the Navy. C. CUSHING. EMINENT DOMAIN-STATE JURISDICTION. It is in the power of either of the States to take land of its citizens for public use by special act and without intervention of jury, but on payment of reasonable indemnity ascertained by Commissioners. A public use of the United States is a public use of each of the States of the Union. Consent of a State to the purchase of land within it conveys, in general, jurisdiction to the United States; but not when all jurisdiction is expressly secured by the State Eminent Domain-State Jurisdiction. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, August 11, 1856. SIR: Your communication of the 24th ult., referring to me the title papers of the proposed site of a lighthouse on Seabrook's Island in the State of South Carolina, involves questions of law, which seem to me to deserve separate consideration. It appears that Col. Seabrook, the proprietor of the land, refuses to sell the same to the United States; and the Government is to acquire title, if at all, in virtue of a special act of the legislature of the State of South Carolina applicable to a number of lighthouse sites, the selection of which is authorized within the limits of that State. The provision of the act is as follows: "That if the person or persons, whose land shall be chosen for the above-mentioned purposes, should not be disposed to sell the same, or if the person or persons appointed to make the purchase should not be able to agree upon terms with such owner or owners of said land, the same shall be valued upon oath by a majority of three Commissioners to be appointed for that purpose by His Excellency, the Governor of the State, and the said land shall be vested in the United States, upon their paying the amount of said valuation to the owner or owners of such land respectively." It is under the assessment made by these Commissioners, then, and the payment (or tender) of the amount to the proprietor of the land, that the United States are to obtain title. Will the title pass by such means? Only two pertinent questions in this relation occur to me, one of which has been the subject of adjudication in the State of South Carolina, and the other has been passed upon heretofore by this office in another case, that of the Washington Aqueduct. The first question is whether, in virtue of her rights of eminent domain, the State of South Carolina may take the land of one of her citizens, in this mode, for public use, on the payment of a reasonable indemnity? Does any question of trial by jury, or other constitutional impediment, stand in the way? The cases of Lindsay v. Commissioners, ii Ray 38,-Starke v. McGowan, i Nott & McCord 387,-Patrects v. Commissioners, Eminent Domain-State Jurisdiction. iv McCord 541,-and Louisville C. and C. Railroad v. Chappell, Rice 383,-seem to be conclusive in support of the assumed power of the State of South Carolina in the premises. It is not necessary to cite adjudications of other States on a question of title in the State of South Carolina. Still, as inquiry of right of trial by jury under the Constitution of the United States has been suggested in this matter, it will not be amiss to say, that the views of the judicial and legislative authorities of the State of South Carolina are in accordance with those expressed in other States. See the arguments and authorities collected in the case of Beckman v. Saratoga and Schenectady Railroad Co., iii Paige's Ch. R. 45; and more especially in the case of The West River Bridge Company v. Dix, vi How. 507, in which the whole question of the exercise of the right of eminent domain by the several States of the Union is learnedly discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The other question is, whether a public use of the United States constitutes a public use of the particular State, so as to authorize the application of the doctrine of the State's eminent. domain to expropriation in this form for the use of the United States. This point arose, with many others, in the act of the State of Maryland, giving authority for the possible expropriation of the land of private persons, for the use of the Washington Aqueduct, in which case the opinion was expressed by me that any constitutional public use' of the United States was a public use of every part of the United States, and therefore of each one of the States. (Opinion April 24, 1855.) In confirmation of this position, permit me to refer, among other corroborative cases which might be adduced, to sundry cessions for military puposes, held by the United States in the State of New York, of which Rouse's Point is a signal example, and the title to which the United States obtained in virtue of legislative acts of expropriation, both general and special, of the State of New York. (Acts of March 18th, 1808, November 12th, 1816.) I am of opinion, therefore, that the act of the legislature of the State of South Carolina, here in question, is constitutional Clerk of Courts in the District of Columbia. and valid; that land in that State may be in this way lawfully expropriated for any constitutional public use of the United States; and that, therefore, the title to the present site of a lighthouse on Seabrook's Island may thus effectually pass to the Government. But inspection of the act suggests another and more serious difficulty in the case. The consent of the legislature of the State to the purchase is coupled with conditions reserving all jurisdiction over the land, and public officers or other persons thereon, to the State of South Carolina. If the assent of the State to the purchase stood by itself, the Constitution would carry jurisdiction to the United States. (Opinion February 11, 1856.) But here is express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the United States. Is not that such a condition affixed to the purchase, as to require further steps to be taken by you in this respect, before assuming to make expenditures on the premises in behalf of the Government? I am, very respectfully, Hon. JAMES GUTHRIE, Secretary of the Treasury. C. CUSHING. CLERK OF COURTS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Responsibility of clerk of the Courts of the United States in the District of Columbia for fees receivable by his office, reaffirmed. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, August 12, 1856. SIR: I have carefully reconsidered the opinion rendered to you on the 13th December last, in regard to the fees of the clerk of the Circuit and District Court of this District, with the remarks of Mr. R. J. Brent on the subject. Mr. B. cannot have given due attention to the question. He assumes that the act of February 26, 1853, does not apply, because in the 1st section of that act reference is made to "the several States." That is true, but the inference drawn thereVOL. VIII.-3 Clerk of Courts in the District of Columbia. from is an erroneous one. The statute is general by its title, covering "the Circuit and District Courts of the United States," and it even contains enactments expressly applicable to the Territories, to say nothing of the District of Columbia; and the only section of the act material to the present question, the 3d, is, in comprehension of terms, in spirit, and in received construction, applicable to the clerk of the Circuit and District Courts of the District of Columbia. Mr. B. further proceeds to say that, if the act of 1853 does apply, "it merely regulates the maximum of (the clerk's) compensation, disposing of the surplus fees, and making good the deficit." Merely does this. Very well, what is the effect of this? The provision is that the clerk "shall retain of the fees and emoluments of his said office, and for his own personal compensation," that is over and above specified expenses, "three thousand five hundred dollars per year." Suppose now that the net fees of the office above expenses are seven thousand dollars, one-half accruing on the business of private suitors, and one-half on that of the Government. Is the clerk to neglect to collect of private suitors, and assume the right to collect only of the Government? Is he to call on the Government to make up to him the fees which he omits to collect from others, and in effect to compel it to pay the court expenses of private suitors? It is impossible that such can be the meaning of the law. Such a construction defeats the manifest and the only conceivable object of the act of Congress. But, while inconsiderately denying the application of the act of 1853, Mr. B. admits that paragraph No. 167 of the act of May 18, 1842, applies; and if he did not, its application, prior to the enactment of the act of 1853, has been recognised and established by my predecessors; and if the act of 1853 does not apply, then that of 1842 is not affected by the repealing clause of the act of 1853, and remains unrepealed and in full force so far forth, and has precisely the same effect in regard to the accountability of the clerk of the Circuit and District Courts of the District of Columbia. (Comp. x Stat. at Large, p. 165, and v Stat. at Large, p. 483.) Now let us inquire what comes of insisting that the act of |