Yorton vs. The Milwaukee, Lake Shore & Western R'y Co. the train, in order to protect the company against the consequences of the mistake or fault of the first conductor. According to our view, the law imposed upon him no such duty. On the contrary, when he was ordered to leave the train or pay the additional fare, he had an election to leave, or remain on the condition of paying. Having concluded to leave, he has his remedy against the company for his damages, which are not necessarily limited to the additional fare paid subsequently to go to Oshkosh, and interest thereon. The law allows him to recover full compensation for the damages he sustained by reason of the fault of the first conductor. We feel it but just to observe that the conduct of Bartlett, the second conductor, was most considerate, fair, and honorable. For while insisting that the plaintiff must pay his fare to Oshkosh or leave the train, he, at the same time, told the plaintiff that if he did pay, on the arrival of the train at Oshkosh he would go with him to Conductor Sherman's house, which was only a short distance from the depot, and if Sherman said plaintiff was entitled to passage to Oshkosh he would refund the money exacted. Thus Mr. Bartlett proposed doing all in his power to make the matter right, while he enforced the rules of his company. His conduct in that behalf certainly deserves commendation. When this case was here on the first appeal, enhanced damages were claimed because the plaintiff was compelled to leave the train at the Bear Creek station in the night, and was exposed to the chilly air, took cold, became sick, etc. It appeared, then, from the plaintiff's own testimony, that before the train left Clintonville the second conductor demanded fare of him and told him he could not ride on the trip check which he held, and that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to leave the train at Clintonville. It was in view of this testimony, and of the plaintiff's refusal either to leave the train or pay his fare, that the remark was made that Yorton vs. The Milwaukee, Lake Shore & Western R'y Co. plaintiff should not recover for any exposure or sickness which he had brought upon himself by his own foolish and perverse conduct, he having been rightfully put off the train at Bear Creek. On the last trial the jury found that the plaintiff was not notified by Bartlett that he could not ride on his train on the trip check before the train started from Clintonville. This fact was deemed material as bearing on the damages which the plaintiff should recover by reason of the exposure at Bear Creek. There are many cases cited on the brief of counsel on both sides to sustain their respective positions. While we have examined them, we do not deem it necessary to comment on them here. They are all distinguishable from the case before us. By the Court. The judgment of the county court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. A motion for a rehearing was denied March 3, 1885. A motion was subsequently made by the respondent to have the judgment against it for costs in this court set off against or applied upon a similar judgment in its favor on the former appeal. The following opinion was filed April 28, 1885: We COLE, C. J. This is a motion to have the judgment for costs in favor of the plaintiff on the second appeal offset or applied on a judgment for costs in favor of the defendant company on a former appeal. It appears from the motion papers that an execution has been issued on the last judg ment, which has been returned wholly unsatisfied. think the company is entitled to have the offset made. Both judgments are in this court and in the same cause, and it is but equitable and just under the circumstances that the costs in favor of one party should be offset against the costs in favor of the other party. Taylor v. Williams, 14 Wis. 155; Mohawk Bank v. Burrows, 6 Johns. Ch. 317; Porter Yorton vs. The Milwaukee, Lake Shore & Western R'y Co. v. Lane, 8 Johns. 357; People ex rel. Manning v. New York C. P. 13 Wend. 649; Nicoll v. Nicoll, 16 Wend. 446; Dunkin v. Vandenbergh, 1 Paige, 622; Marshall v. Cooper, 43 Md. 46; Levy v. Steinbach, id. 212; Williams v. Taylor, 69 Ind. 48; Lammers v. Goodeman, id. 76; Wright v. Mudie, 1 Sim. & St. 266; Taylor v. Popham, 15 Ves. Jr. 72; Ex parte Rhodes, id. 539. In the case of Taylor v. Williams, supra, a judgment for costs in this court in favor of one party was allowed to be set off against a larger judgment for costs against the same party in the circuit court. In the case at bar there was an assignment of the judgment by the plaintiff to his attorneys to secure them for their disbursements and advances made for his benefit in the action. But this cannot interfere to prevent the offset from being made. "Where different claims arise in the course of the same suit, or in relation to the same matter, and it is equitable and just that these equities should be arranged between the parties without reference to the solicitor's or attorney's lien, his lien being only the clear balance due to his client after all these equities are settled, such lien will not prevent the parties from having the mutual demands arranged by setoff as the equities between them shall require, without regard to the lien of the attorney or solicitor." Waterman on Setoff, § 361. The above cases show that the lien of the attorney, or even an assignment of the judgment prior to a motion to have the setoff made, will not defeat the right to the setoff. Williams v. Taylor, supra; Marshall v. Cooper, supra; Levy v. Steinbach, supra. The reason is that the assignee and attorney stand in no better position than the judgment creditor himself, and are subject to the same equitable rights which existed in favor of the adverse party. This precise point was considered and decided by this court in the case of Gano v. C. & N. W. R'y Co. 60 Wis. 12. In that case the company moved to set off a judg ment for costs in its favor against one obtained by the plaint State ex rel. The Town of La Valle vs. Supervisors of Sauk County. iff. It was insisted that the offset should not be allowed ̧ because the attorney had made advances for printing and other costs, and that his lien was superior to the right of the judgment creditor to have the judgments offset. But the objection was overruled. No opinion, however, was filed on the motion. By the Court.-Motion granted. THE STATE ex rel. THE TOWN OF LA VALLE VS. THE Board of SUPERVISORS OF SAUK County. January 16-March 3, 1885. Constitutional law: Town and county government: Bridges. 1. Ch. 315, Laws of 1881, relating to county aid in the construction of bridges, and providing that "this act shall not apply to the county of Grant," violates sec. 23, art. IV, of the constitution requiring uniformity in town and county government. 2. Where it is essential to the validity of an act that it should be uniform in its application, and the legislature has expressly declared that it shall not apply to a certain locality, the whole act must be held invalid. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Sauk County. This is an appeal from an order denying a motion of the relator town for a writ of mandamus, and dismissing the proceedings in that behalf. The application was made under sec. 1319, R. S., as amended, to compel the county of Sauk to aid in the construction of a certain bridge in that town. The motion was founded upon an affidavit setting forth all the facts which, under that statute, are essential to the relator's right to the relief demanded. Sec. 1319 was first amended by ch. 126, Laws of 1879, to read as follows: "Whenever it shall appear to the county board that any one of the towns in its county would be re State ex rel. The Town of La Valle vs. Supervisors of Sauk County. quired to raise an amount equal to more than one tenth of one per centum of all the taxable property in such town, according to the last equalized valuation, for the purpose of erecting or repairing any bridge or bridges upon the principally traveled highway of such town; or when it shall be made to appear that a bridge in any town is necessary for the use and convenience of the adjoining town rather than the town in which it shall be situated, it shall cause such sum to be levied upon the taxable property of the county as will be sufficient to defray the expense of erecting or repairing the same, or such part of such expense as it may deem. proper." The remainder of the section contains no provision material to this case. Sec. 1319 was again amended in 1881 by ch. 315 of the laws of that year. The material features of such amendment are that the town in which the bridge is situated should be required to raise one fourth of one per cent. bridge tax, instead of one tenth of one per cent., as required by the law of 1879, before the county could be compelled to furnish aid; and it takes away the discretion of the county board as to the portion of the expense which should be borne by the county, by requiring the county to defray the whole of the expense of erecting and repairing the bridges mentioned therein. It also contains the proviso that "this act shall not apply to the county of Grant." Because it contained. such proviso, the circuit court denied the relief demanded. G. Stevens, for the appellant. R. P. Perry, for the respondent. LYON, J. The principal question to be determined on this appeal is whether ch. 315, Laws of 1881, violates sec. 23, art. IV, of the constitution, which ordains that "the legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable." It is maintained that the statute does violate that constitutional |