Kugler vs. Prien, imp. plaintiff obtained a verdict, and was entitled to a judgment in his favor. The defendant was beaten, and judgment should have been rendered against him at the time of the rendition of the verdict; but the circuit court gave him a judgment to which he was not entitled, simply because the justice lost jurisdiction to render judgment for the plaintiff, who was entitled to recover. We think this was error. By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to simply reverse the judgment of the justice, with costs. KUGLER VS. PRIEN, imp. January 15-February 3, 1885. Guardian and ward. No action at law for moneys in the hands of the guardian can be maintained by a ward until the guardian's accounts have been settled in the county court. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The defendant Prien appealed from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion. G. W. Stephens, attorney, and P. G. Stroud, of counsel, for the appellant, cited Critchett v. Hall, 56 N. H. 324; Waterman v. Wright, 36 Vt. 164; Gregg v. Gregg, 15 N. H. 190; Kittredge v. Betton, 14 id. 401; 3 Redf. on Wills, 266-459; Woodbury v. Hammont, 54 Me. 332; O'Brien v. Strang, 42 Iowa, 643; Willis v. Fox, 25 Wis. 648; Batchelder v. Batchelder, 20 id. 452; German Bank v. Leyser, 50 id. 258; Lannon v. Hackett, 49 id. 261. For the respondent no brief was filed, but there was oral argument by J. M. Olin. Kugler vs. Prien, imp. COLE, C. J. This is an action at law to recover of the defendant Prien, $400, alleged to be in his hands as guardian, belonging to the plaintiff. The other defendants are sureties on the guardian's bond, but no judgment is asked against them. The complaint states in substance that Prien was duly appointed guardian of the plaintiff and two other minors; that as such guardian he received $600 belonging to his wards; that he has paid over to one of the wards his share, but has never settled or paid over to the plaintiff the share belonging to him, although he is of age, and has demanded the same; that the amount in the hands of Prien belonging to plaintiff is $400, which Prien refuses to account for or pay over, and is justly indebted to the plaintiff in that sum. These are the material facts stated consti tuting the cause of action. There is no allegation that Prien has ever settled his accounts as guardian with the county court, or that he has been cited by said court to settle them and refused to do so, or that he has settled his accounts with the plaintiff after the latter arrived of age; and the main objection taken to the complaint on the demurrer is that an action at law to recover money in the hands of the guardian should not be maintained by the ward before the guardian's accounts have been settled in the county court. It is said that our statute gives the county court ample jurisdiction over the matter of the accounts of guardians, and that it would be unwise and inconvenient to allow the ward to maintain an action against the guardian while the guardian's accounts remain unsettled in that court. It seems to us there is great force in this argument, and that it is the manifest policy of the statute to require the accounts between guardian and ward to be adjusted in the county court, rather than by an action at law in the circuit court. The county court appoints the guardian; approves of the bond which the guardian gives for the per Kugler vs. Prien, imp. formance of his trust; receives the inventory of the ward's estate, and knows the condition of that estate. It can, therefore, make all necessary orders for allowances for the support of the ward, and give any directions in regard to the management of the ward's estate which may be essential for the protection of the ward's interests. In short, it has full power to compel the guardian to settle his accounts, and can possess itself of all the facts necessary for an intelligent settlement of such accounts more readily than a jury possibly can do, and with less expense to the parties. In view of these considerations, and of what seems to be the policy of the statute, we think no action at law for money in the hands of the guardian should be brought by the ward until the guardian's accounts have been settled in the county court. That tribunal is invested with ample power to compel the settlement of guardian's accounts, and can do so more conveniently than the circuit courts. In Batchelder v. Batchelder, 20 Wis. 452, an action in equity was brought to enforce a provision made in a will for the support of the plaintiff. In deciding the case, this court said that no special facts were stated showing a necessity for a court of equity taking jurisdiction over the estate and executing the trust, and that the county court could afford complete relief. The complaint was held bad. Willis v. Fox, 25 Wis. 646, was an equitable action, and it was said that courts of equity should not exercise jurisdiction over guardians and compel them to account, except where some special reasons were shown for withdrawing the matters from the county court. In that case it was thought that the question as to the alleged mismanagement of the ward's estate was a sufficient reason for the circuit court entertaining jurisdiction. Whether the doubt there expressed, that the county court could not fully investigate that matter and give the proper relief, was well founded or not, certain it is the jurisdiction of the circuit court was sustained on that Plank vs. Grimm. ground. Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 Wis. 507, was a suit in equity to enforce the payment of certain legacies. The original equitable jurisdiction of the circuit court was sustained upon the facts stated in the complaint, which were somewhat peculiar. It is said in that case that it has already been decided by this court that the county courts have jurisdiction in such matters, concurrent with the circuit court, by force of the statute. But these were all equitable actions. But, as we have said, this is an action at law, and because the county court has power, under the statute, to enforce a settlement of guardians' accounts,- can protect and secure the rights of all parties interested at much less expense than can be done in the circuit court, we think the plaintiff should resort to that tribunal for relief. It follows from these views that the demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained. By the Court. The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. PLANK VS. GRIMM. January 16-February 3, 1885. Assault and battery: Evidence: Intent: Self-defense. 1. The defendant in an action for assault and battery may testify as to the intent with which he approached the plaintiff, and also as to what he thought the plaintiff was about to do with an axe which he raised in his hand. 2. Evidence showing, among other things, that the defendant, after disarming the plaintiff, threw him upon the floor and struck him, is held not to sustain a plea of self-defense or support a verdict in favor of the defendant. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The facts will sufficiently appear from the opinion. Plank vs. Grimm. The cause was submitted for the appellant on the brief of Jones & Sanborn, and for the respondent on that of G. W. Cate. TAYLOR, J. The appellant brought his action in the cir cuit court to recover damages against the respondent for an alleged assault and battery committed by the respondent upon the person of the appellant. The case was tried in the circuit court by a jury, and a verdict was rendered in favor of the respondent; and thereupon the appellant moved the court, upon the minutes of the trial, to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, upon two grounds: (1) That the court erred in the admission of evidence on the trial; and (2) that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence given on the trial. The motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial was denied. The plaintiff excepted; and from the judgment entered on the verdict he appeals to this court, and assigns as error the refusal of the circuit court to set aside the verdict for the causes assigned in his motion. The evidence upon the trial showed that the plaintiff and defendant, just before the alleged assault and battery took place, were in the wagon-shop of Mr. Milliard, in the town of Almon, both sitting upon the same bench. The bench was from twelve to sixteen feet long. The plaintiff was sitting on one end, and the defendant on the other. While in that position a controversy arose between them, and abusive. language was used by the plaintiff; that the defendant got up from his end of the bench, and approached to within a few feet of the plaintiff. The evidence which was excepted to related to this change of position on the part of the defendant. The defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, was asked by his counsel the following question: "What was your object in coming from the place where you were sitting around in front of him, where you say you did go?" This was objected to by the plaintiff. The |