CHAPTER him either to refuse it, or to require evidence of the circumstances under which the alteration was made (k). (k) The American cases on this subject are not harmonious. The weight of authority, however, sustains the positions in the text. Byles on Bills, 5th American ed. p. 481. The question of the burthen of proof in such cases arose in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Barr. 186, and it was held that the onus of showing that an alteration in a material part of a negotiable instrument was lawfully made, is on the holder; and that where the place of payment is in a different handwriting from the body of the instrument, there is a presumption of alteration. See the 5th American ed. of Byles on Bills, p. 482. crime. common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment (b), and Definition of the a conviction of it, as of any other species of the crimen falsi, makes a man infamous, and formerly rendered him incompetent as a witness (c). The forgery of bills or notes, or of any part of them, and Existing statutes, the uttering of them knowing them to be forged, are respec tively felonies, punishable by penal servitude for life (d). Fraudulently obliterating or altering the crossing of a check is felony (e). (a) See Reg. v. White, 1 Den. C. C. 208. now capacitated by 6 & 7 Vict. (b) 4 Bl. Com. 248. (c) Com. Dig. Testm. A. 5; Rex v. Davis, 5 Mod. 74. He is (d) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 22. CHAPTER XXV. Forgery of void bills. Of invalid and informal bills. Forgery by misapplication of a genuine signature. The fraudulent signing of a bill or note for any other person by procuration or otherwise, without lawful authority, or knowingly uttering the same, has, by the recent act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 24, for the first time been erected into a felony (ƒ). Inducing a person by violence or threats to execute a bill or note or other valuable security, is now also for the first time made a felony (g). Fraudulently to obtain by false pretences a signature to a bill or note, or the destruction of the instrument in whole or in part, is now a misdemeanor (h). Forging or uttering such a bill or note as the Legislature has declared void, is not within the statutes, as, for example, a bill or note for less than 20s., or a bill or note for less than 51., which did not comply with the requisites of 17 Geo. 3, c. 30 (i), in the former state of the law. Where there is no payee, or no maker's name, it has been held that the offence is not within the act (j). A mere informality, as the omission of the word POUNDS in the body, where the letter £ precedes the figures 50 in the margin (k), does not prevent the crime amounting to forgery. In order to constitute forgery, it is not necessary that the instrument should be duly stamped, or stamped at all (7). The most common species of forgery is, fraudulently (f) See as to the law before this statute, Maddock's case, 2 Russ. C. & M. 499; Reg. v. White, 1 Den. C. C. 208; 2 C. & K. 404. (g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 48. See Rex v. Phipoe, 2 Leach, 673; Rex v. Edwards, 6 C. & P. 521. (h) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 90. See Reg. v. Danger, 1 D. & B. C. C. 307. (i) Rex v. Moffat, 1 Leach, 431; 2 East, P. C. 954, S. C. (j) Rex v. Richards, R. & R., C. C. 193; Rex v. Randall, R. & R., C. C. 195; and see as to other fatal defects, Rex v. Jones, Doug. 287; Rex v. Pateman, R. & R. 455, where there was no maker's name; Rex v. Burke, R. & R. 496; Rex v. Wilcox, Bayley, 6th ed. 11. To constitute the forgery of a bill of exchange within 1 Will. 4, c.66, s. 4, the instrument must be complete. Reg. v. Turpin, 2 C. & K. 820. Forging an acceptance to an instrument in the form of a bill, but without the drawer's name, is not within the statute. Reg. v. Butterwick, 2 Moo. & R. 196. (k) Rex v. Post, R. & R. 101, and Bayley, 11; and see Collinson's case, 2 Leach, 1048. (1) Teague's case, 2 East, P. C. 979; R. & R. 33, S. C.; Rex v. Hawkeswood, 1 Leach, 257; 2 East, P. C. 955, S. C.; Rex v. Lee, 1 Leach, 258, n.; Merton's case, 2 East, P. C. 955. writing the name (m) of an existing person. But a fraudulent misapplication of the genuine signature of another man is as much forgery as counterfeiting his signature. Thus, where the prisoner, having in his possession the genuine signature of one Thomas Gibson, wrote over it a promissory note for 6,4007., he was indicted and convicted of having forged the note (n). And where the same prisoner, having the genuine signature of Samuel Edwards, wrote on the other side of the paper a promissory note, payable to Samuel Edwards, and so turned the genuine signature into an indorsement, he was convicted of forging the indorsement (o). So if a clerk be intrusted to fill up a blank check signed by his master with a particular sum, and he fraudulently inserts a larger sum, it is a forgery of the check (p). There may be an innocent misapplication of his own genuine signature by the party himself: Thus, where a man was induced to sign his name to a bill by a fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of the instrument, it was held that, if not guilty of negligence, he was not liable even to an innocent holder, any more than if he had been blind or illiterate, and the instrument had been falsely and fraudulently read over to him (q). fictitious name. To sign the name of a fictitious or non-existing person is By signature of forgery (r). Where the prisoner was convicted of forging an order for payment of money, and it appeared that he had bought goods from the prosecutor, and paid for them with a draft signed in the fictitious name of H. Turner, although the prosecutor had sworn that he gave credit to the prisoner and not to the draft, it was held that the prisoner was rightly convicted. The Judges said that it was a false instrument, not drawn by any such person as it purported (m) Making a mark, and suffering the assumed name to be written against it, is forgery. Rex v. Dunn, 1 Leach, 57; 2 East, P. C. 962. Putting the address of an existing person to a name, being the name of another person, is forgery. Reg. v. Blenkinsop, 1 Den. C. C. 276. (n) Rex v. Hales, 17 St. Tr. 161. (0) Rex v. Hales, 17 St. Tr. 209, 229. (p) Reg. v. Wilson, 17 L. J., M. C. 82; 1 Den. C. C. 284, S. C.; (q) Foster v. Mackinnon, L. R., (r) Rex v. Francis, Bayley, 6th ed. 572; Russ. & Ry. 209; Lockett's case, 1 Leach, 94; East, P. C. 940; Taft's case, 1 Leach, 172; East, P. C. 959; or in the prisoner's own name to represent a fictitious firm; Reg. v. Rogers, 8 C. & P. 629. CHAPTER By signing a nau's own name. Uttering a genuine signature, and personating the party siguing. to be, and that the using a fictitious name was only for the purpose of deceiving (s). But the signing a fictitious name will not amount to forgery, if it were used on other occasions as well as for that very fraud, or system of fraud, of which the forgery forms a part (t). Where proof is given of the prisoner's real name, and no proof of any change of name until the time of the fraud committed, it lies on the prisoner to show that he has before assumed the false name on other occasions, and for other purposes unconnected with forgery (u). It is a forgery, also, to sign a man's own name with intention that the signature should pass for the signature of another person of the same name (v). And where a person, whose name was Thomas Brown, was indicted for forging a promissory note signed Thomas Brown, and it appeared that he had uttered the note as a note of Captain Brown, a fictitious person, and the prisoner was convicted, the Judges held the conviction right (x). But the adoption of a false description and addition, where a false name is not assumed, is not forgery. Thus, where the prisoner drew a bill, and directed it to "Mr. Thomas Bowden, baize manufacturer, Romford, Essex;" and it was accepted by one Thomas Bowden, but there was no Thomas Bowden of Romford, it was held by a majority of the judges, that the giving a false description of Bowden on the bill, with intent to defraud, was not forgery (y). Where the signature on the bill is genuine, an uttering by another person, with a representation that he is the person whose signature is on the bill, is not forgery, or a felonious uttering. The prisoner uttered a bill purporting to be payable to Bernard M'Carthy, or order, and having the indorsement B. M'Carthy thereon: he was indicted for forging that indorsement, and uttering it knowing it to be forged; the jury found that there was such a man as B. M'Carthy, and that the indorsement was his handwriting, but that the prisoner passed himself off as that B. M'Carthy when he uttered the bill. The Judges were unanimous, (s) Sheppard's case, 1 Leach, 226; 2 East, P. C. 967; Whiley's case, R. & R. 90. (t) Rex v. Bontien, R. & R. 260. (u) Peacock's case, R. & R. 278. (v) Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28. (x) Rex v. Parkes, 2 Leach, 773; 2 East, P. C. 963, S. C. (y) Webb's case, R. & R. 405; 3 B. & B. 229, S. C.; Rex v. Watts, R. & R. 436; 6 Moore, 442; 3 B. & B. 197, S. C. |