not amount to satisfaction of the joint debt (u). But, in general, the taking a separate bill of one of two joint acceptors of a former bill is a relinquishment of all claim on the former security (x). CHAPTER XIII. A plea of waiver must state that the party waiving was Pleading. the holder of the bill at the time of the waiver (y). By acceptance, the drawee admits the signature and What acceptance capacity of the drawer, and cannot, after thus giving the admits. bill currency, be admitted to prove that the drawer's signature was forged (z). He moreover admits, and so does the maker of a promissory note, the then capacity of the payee, to whose order the bill or note is made payable, to indorse. Hence the acceptor is estopped from saying that the payee being a bankrupt could not indorse (a), and even from saying that a second bankruptcy before the acceptance precluded him from indorsing, though the effect of such second bankruptcy be (b) to vest, ipso facto, all the bankrupt's property in his assignees (c). Neither can the acceptor be allowed to defeat the indorsement by setting up the infancy of the payee (d). Nor can the acceptor plead that the drawer to whose order the bill was made payable, being a corporation, had no authority to indorse (e); nor that the drawer was a married woman, although as the husband may sue or indorse, the consequence may be that the acceptor may possibly be compelled to pay the bill twice (f). Nor that the drawing and first indorsing were in the name of a deceased person (g). But the acceptance of a bill drawn and indorsed in the name of a really existing person is no (u) Bedford v. Deakin, 2 B. & Ald. 210; 2 Stark. 178, S. C. (x) Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp. 89; Reed v. White, 5 Esp. 122; Thompson v. Percival, 5 B. & Ad. 925; 3 N. & M. 667, S. C. (y) Steele v. Harmer, 15 L. J., Exch. 217; 14 M. & W. 136, S. C. As to this point affirmed in error, 4 Exch. 1. (2) Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354; 1 W. Bl. 390, S. C.; Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp. 82; Prince v. Brunatte, 1 Bing. N. C. 435; 1 Scott, 342; 3 Dowl. 382, S. C.; Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, 1 Stra. 648; Jenys v. Fawler, 2 Stra. 946; and see Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & Sel. 13; 4 Camp. 78, S. C. Phillips v. Im Thurn, L. R., 1 (a) Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C. 473. (b) 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 127. (d) Taylor v. Crocker, 4 Esp. (f) Smith v. Marsack, 18 L. J., C. P. 68; 6 C. B. 486. (g) Ashpitle v. Bryan, 32 L. J., Q. B. 91; 3 Best & S. 474, affirmed in error, 33 L. J., Q. B. 328. CHAPTER XIII. admission of the handwriting of the indorser (h), unless at of a forging as incapablikation, Where drawee If the drawee has once admitted that the acceptance is in his own handwriting, and thereby given currency to the bill, he cannot afterwards exonerate himself by showing that it precluded from was forged (n). By paying one forged acceptance (h) Smith v. Chester, 1 T. R. 655; Carvick v. Vickery, Doug. 2nd ed. 653, n. 134. X a man is not cstopped from despeelry(i) Beeman v. Duck, 11 M. & another. Similar W. 251. (j) Tucker v. Robarts, 18 L. J., Q. B. 169; 22 L. J., Q. B. 270; aux. Morrin error, 16 Q. B. 560, S. C. a Bethel LiR: 5 Cl 47 oblegation to accept (k) Story on Bills, p. 489; but see a dictum of Patteson, J., in Tucker v. Robarts, supra; Beeman v. Duck, supra. (1) Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455; 1 Moore, 150, S. C. (m) Cooper v. Mayer, 10 B. & C. 468; 5 M. & R. 387, S. C.; Beeman v. Duck, 11 M. & W. (n) Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp, 226. V to hold by Ellenborough Su mawin book hord A PERSONAL demand on the drawee or acceptor is not necessary (a). It is sufficient if the bill be exhibited and (a) And it has been held in America, that if made by a notary on the drawee in the street, away from his place of business, it is insufficient. Byles on Bills, 5th American edition, p. 328. CHAPTER How made. CHAPTER In case of bankruptcy or insolvency. payment be demanded at his usual residence or place of business, of his wife or other agent; for it is the duty of an acceptor, if he is not himself present, to leave provision for the payment (b). And it is sufficient if payment be demanded of an agent who has been authorized to pay, or has usually paid bills for the drawee. Where a promissory note is payable at either of two places, presentment at either of them will suffice. Thus, where a country bank note was made payable both at Tunbridge and in London, presentment in London was held sufficient, though it was proved that, had it been presented at Tunbridge, the nearest place, it would have been paid (c). But it is conceived that presentment of a check to the London bankers of the drawee, though described on the check as agents, is insufficient, for the obligation to pay a check must in general depend on the state of the drawer's account, which the London agents may not know (d). The bill or note ought to be exhibited (e), for it should be then and there delivered up. The party presenting should also be ready and authorized to receive the money, and has no right (at least, unless usage requires it) to impose on the drawee any trouble or risk in remitting the money elsewhere (ƒ). The bankruptcy or insolvency of the drawee is no excuse for a neglect to present for payment; for many means may remain of obtaining payment, by the assistance of friends or otherwise (g). It has been held in the King's Bench, that the shutting up of a bank, when any demand there made would have been inaudible, is substantially a refusal by the bankers to pay their notes, to all the world (h). But it was decided in the same case, on error in the Exchequer Chamber, that an allegation in the declaration, that the makers became insolvent, and ceased, and wholly declined and refused, then and thenceforth to pay, at the place specified, any of their notes, is insufficient, not being (b) Matthews v. Haydon, 2 Esp. 509; Brown v. M'Dermot, 5 Esp. 265. If the bill be payable at a particular place, see post. (c) Beeching v. Gower, Holt, N. P. C. 313. (d) Bailey v. Bodenham, 33 L. J., C. P. 252. (e) See the American authorities, Byles on Bills, 4th American edition. (f) See Bailey v. Bodenham, 33 L. J., C. P. 255. (g) Russel v. Langstaffe, Doug. 496; Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 245; Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 609; Ex parte Johnstone, 1 Mont. & Ayr. 622; 3 Deac, & Chitty, 433, S. C.; Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East, 114; Lafitte v. Slatter, 6 Bing. 623; 4 M. & P. 457, S. C.; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373; 9 D. & R. 391. (h) Howe v. Bores, 16 East, 112. equivalent to an allegation of presentment (i). But it is conceived, notwithstanding the observations of the Court in the last case, that it cannot be necessary for the holders of the notes of a bank which has notoriously stopped payment, and is shut up, to go through the empty form of carrying their notes up to the bank doors, and then carrying them home again (k). CHAPTER XIV. to charge a guarantor. A presentment for payment is now decided not to be Unnecessary necessary in order to charge a man who guarantees the due payment of a bill or note (). And it had before been held that where a party was a guarantee for the vendee of goods, who had accepted a bill for the amount, and then became bankrupt, the notorious insolvency of the vendee was sufficient so far to excuse the drawer as to enable him to charge the guarantee, unless it could have been shown that the bill would have been paid if duly presented, though it would have been otherwise in an action on the bill (m). If the drawee has shut up his house, the holder must Where the inquire after him, and attempt to find him out. drawee absconds. of drawee. If the drawee be dead, presentment must be made to his In case of death personal representatives; and, if he have none, then at his house (n). If the holder die, presentment should be made by his of holder. personal representatives. In treating of the time when presentment is to be made, When to be made. it will be necessary to consider, first, how, on the various sorts of bills, time is computed, and then on what bills, and to what extent, days of grace are allowed. In Acts of Parliament passed before the end of the year Time, how com1850 (o), in deeds, in other contracts and written instru- puted. (i) 5 Taunt. 30, S. C. in error. (k) Since the above observations were written, I observe that the point has been so ruled at Nisi Prius and afterwards at Chambers. See Henderson v. Appleton, Chitty, 9th ed. 356, and Rogers v. Langford, 1 C. & M. 637, where Lord Lyndhurst says, "It is possible, if you had returned the notes in due time, that might have done instead of presentment." See also Turner v. Stones, 1 Dow. & L. 122; (1) Hitchcock v. Humfrey, 5 (m) Warrington v. Furbor, 8 |