1 dispatch of the German foreign minister (Jagow) to his ambassador in Constantinople (Wangenheim), July 28, 1913, stating that Turkey had no active strength, but must continue to exist "until we further consolidate ourselves in our zones of activity there and until we are ready for the annexation. That moment I would like to postpone as long as possible." For Germany was not ready. It has been asserted that these diplomatic bargains would have been sufficient to settle the Bagdad Railway question, and perhaps to have prevented the Great War, had not the Central Powers precipitated the struggle in the summer of 1914. This is hardly true. English and French interests may have been satisfied, and German interests too; but no such bargains could permanently bridge the chasm between Russia and the Central Powers. The imperialistic faction at St. Petersburg might make temporary agreements for present advantage, but could not be sincerely satisfied without Constantinople. In February, 1914, a secret conclave or Crown Council of the Russian cabinet ministers and military and naval officials discussed this problem; the foreign minister considered Russian conquest of Constantinople as a well-settled aim of Russian policy; and plans were made to seize Constantinople when the next general war should break out.2 Russia, it is plain, was not content. A little later, in March, 1914, Russia made an interesting attempt to sound Germany on the Straits question. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople suggested to the German ambassador that Germany and Russia ought to cooperate in Turkey. Russia should be allowed to rule the Straits through a subservient Turkish Government, while Germany would exploit Asia Minor. The only real difficulty would be the question of Germany's support of Austria's Balkan policy. Such an entente, of course, might lead to difficulties with England and France, but Russia, said the ambassador, was quite indifferent to French hopes regarding Alsace. Germany, however, was unwilling to jeopardize her friendship with England, for an unreliable partnership with Russia, and so Berlin vouchsafed no reply to the Russian feeler." 'Quoted in Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 394. Stieve, Iswolski und der Weltkrieg, pp. 247-266. THE BALKAN CRISIS 1912-1914 Moreover, the proposed settlement in Asiatic Turkey was closely related to the perilous Balkan situation, about which, fatuously enough, the diplomats had failed to make any agreement, so far as we know. For decades Russian and Austrian diplomats had been engaging in a sordid and subtle game of intrigue at the capitals of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania, the object being to secure the favor and friendship, or better still the puppet-like subservience, of the dynasty and faction in power in each of these Balkan countries, or, if that proved impossible, to aid another faction to seize power. Thus, for example, the Russians had gone to the length, on one occasion, of kidnapping an intractable ruler of Bulgaria.1 In the case of Serbia, a pro-Austrian dynasty, allied to Austria by secret treaty, had been overthrown in 1903, or rather massacred, by a band of conspirators who placed the rival Karageorgevitch dynasty on the throne and pursued a pro-Russian policy. That Austrian statesmen should have considered, secretly, of course, plans for replacing this pro-Russian dynasty at Belgrade with a pro-Austrian sovereign, may be shocking, but can hardly be surprising. In support of his Austrian ally, Bismarck had become involved in Balkan intrigues before 1890, but he felt that Germany had no direct interest in them. Once the Bagdad Railway was begun, however, in William II's reign, it became a very vital German interest to see that the Balkan nations were properly disposed toward Germany and Austria, because through the Balkans ran the railways, particularly the Orient Railway, which linked Constantinople and the Bagdad Railway with the rail systems of Central Europe. It is significant that these Balkan lines had been owned, since about 1888, by Austrian, German and Swiss-German banks, among which was numbered the Deutsche Bank, the financial fountainhead of the Bagdad enterprise. With this background, we may examine a little more closely the imperialist interests involved in the Balkan situation from 1912 to 1914. In 1912 four of the Balkan nations-Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro-attacked Turkey. It was not 'Prince Alexander, in August 1886. 2 generally known at that time, but diplomats rightly suspected, that Russian diplomacy had secretly encouraged Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to ally themselves and drive Turkey out of Macedonia.1 Vienna was alarmed because Russian diplomacy had the upper hand; Berlin was anxious regarding Turkey, for German imperialists desired to preserve and strengthen Turkey as a Germanized vassal. For Germany and Austria the overwhelming victory of the Balkan allies against Turkey was therefore a distinct setback; for Russia, proud parent of the Balkan alliance, a diplomatic triumph. Austria would have drawn the sword against Serbia in July, 1913, had Germany and Italy been willing to back her. Hoping to undo Russia's work, Viennese statesmen fostered disagreements between Bulgaria and her former allies, over the division of the spoils. This was all the more easily accomplished, since Austria and Italy by refusing to let Serbia take Albania made it almost inevitable that Serbia should seek consolation at the expense of Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia. Between Bulgaria, on the one side, and Greece and Serbia, soon joined by Rumania and Turkey, on the opposing side, was waged an unequal contest in the summer of 1913. This second Balkan War simply made matters worse for Germany and Austria, for in backing Bulgaria they had again picked the losing horse. Serbia emerged jubilant, enlarged and aggressive; by decreeing the nationalization of railways in her territory she served notice on the Central Powers that their railway imperialism was no longer to be tolerated. Rumania was, so to speak, flirting with Russia, although legally wedded. to the Triple Alliance by a secret treaty. On the other hand, in Greece, Germany could count on King Constantine, a brotherin-law of William II; and of course there was Bulgaria, but Bulgaria was badly battered. Such was the situation on the eve of the Great War. The Austrian foreign minister was secretly planning to attempt the difficult diplomatic feat of forming a new Balkan alliance under Austrian patronage. Germany, for her part, was sufficiently conscious of her weakened position so that she was willing to make agreements, at considerable sacrifice, with France and England, in order to remove 'See Siebert, op. cit., pp. 307-59; Stieve, Iswolski und der Weltkrieg, pp. 86 ff, 225 ff. Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, II, especially Nos. 243, 317, 401, and following documents. 'But see p. 256. supra. opposition to the Bagdad Railway. At the same time, unfortunately, German military leaders felt it necessary to increase the German army, and to send a German general, Liman von Sanders, to reorganize the demoralized Turkish army. The former measure alarmed France and Russia; the latter provoked the Russians to hold the secret Crown Council of February, 1914, which has already been alluded to. Only in the light of these clashing imperialist aims can one perceive the full significance of the crime that was committed in the dusty streets of Serajevo, in June 1914, and of the resulting Austrian attack on Serbia. It was more than a quarrel between Austria and her small neighbor; it was more than a question of suppressing pan-Serbian agitation for the dismemberment of the Hapsburg monarchy. It was also a crucial move in the Near Eastern chess game played by the financiers and diplomats of Europe. The Vienna Government probably intended to invade Serbia, assign some Serbian territory to Bulgaria and Albania, reduce Serbia to a properly servile condition, and found a pro-Austrian Balkan league. Berlin, though pretending disinterestedness for diplomatic reasons, was vitally concerned, not only to preserve Austria's strength and prestige, but also to insure Austro-German predominance in the Balkans. Behind Serbia loomed the Russian aim of dominating the Balkans and Constantinople; behind Austria towered German imperialism, determined to safeguard the "German road to the East." WAR AND PEACE During the war, the wildest dreams of German imperialists were realized, for a moment, in the Near East. Turkey, having secretly joined the Triple Alliance, was brought into the war on Germany's side, partly by the efforts of Young Turks like Enver Pasha, who felt that Russian victory would mean an end to Turkey, and partly by the presence of two German warships. Bulgaria, too, joined the Central Powers a little later, in October, 1915. Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and most of Rumania, were conquered by Germany and her allies. The Balkan peninsula was now a broad highway connecting Austro-German Central Europe with Germanized Turkey. But Germany was defeated, as all the world knows, and it was left to the Allies to divide the spoils of Turkey. The Allies were not unprepared. Even in the darkest hours of the war, Allied statesmen were optimistically arranging the partition of Turkey. Russia was to annex Constantinople and the adjoining territory, so France and England agreed in March, 1915-just before the great Russian defeat in Poland. A year later, France agreed (Sazonov-Paléologue agreement of April 26, 1916) that Russia should also have about 60,000 square miles of northeastern Turkey, that is, of Turkish Armenia, while the region stretching southwestward from this region to the Mediterranean, including Syria, should be French. Next France and England defined their claims, by the Sykes-Picot agreement of May, 1916: France was to administer Syria and the hinterland reaching up to the Russian zone in Armenia, and a "zone of French influence" was to stretch eastward from Syria across the Euphrates and Tigris, as far as the Persian border. All south of this would be a British zone of influence, excepting Palestine, which would be under international control (the Palestinian ports of Akka and Haifa were to be British, however) and Mesopotamia, which would be under British administration. Italy, too, demanded a share. In the secret treaty of London (April 26, 1915) by which they purchased Italy's entry into the war, England, France and Russia promised Italy "a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia." The demands of justice apparently were large, for when France and England came to settle details with Italy, in the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement of April 17, 1917, Italy would be contented with nothing less than the right to annex the southern third of Anatolia, stretching from Smyrna in the west almost to Adana in the southeast; and in addition a large area north of Smyrna was to be a zone of Italian influence. Of Turkey there would be left, after each of the Allies had taken its share, only the northern half, or less, of Anatolia.1 The promissory generosity of the Allies toward each other was never fully realized in fact. Russia by becoming Bolshevist for F. S. Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings; Current History, XI, pp. 339-41; Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, VI, pp. 1-22; R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, I, ch. 4; Shane Leslie, Mark Sykes, pp. 250-8; Grannini, I Documenti Diplomatici della Pace Orientale. |