French newspaper seven years later.1 The public declaration that France had no intention of altering Morocco's independent status was given the lie by the secret agreement that "whenever the Sultain ceases to exercise authority over it," the northern part of Morocco should "come within the sphere of influence of Spain," the bulk of the territory, of course, being left for France. If Spain should decline, the Anglo-French arrangement "would be none the less at once applicable," so little, after all, does the consent of a smaller power matter. Spain, however, did not decline, but rather joined France in making a public declaration that both powers were "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultain," and in signing a secret convention which provided for the division of Morocco between France and Spain.2

With these secret treaties in his pocket, so to speak, Delcassé confidently appeared before the French Chamber of Deputies on Dec. 10, 1904, and announced that the time had come for France to convince Morocco that France in her own interest must serve the interests of Morocco: "for the sake of our tranquillity, to aid it (Morocco) in establishing internal security and order; for our prosperity, to furnish means (capital) to profit by the resources in which Morocco abounds; so that, continuing to live its own life, its customs, laws and chiefs being safeguarded, under a Sultan whose authority will be strengthened and extended, Morocco will know our power only through the benefits which will accompany it." Morocco, in plain Anglo-Saxon, was to be another Tunis.

The moment was favorable enough. The capture of an American citizen, Perdicaris, by the Moroccan bandit Raisuli, had called worldwide attention to the disorderliness of the country, and French diplomatic aid in obtaining the release of Perdicaris had made a good impression. Affairs in Morocco were approaching a crisis. The young sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, who had ascended the throne or assumed the umbrella-in 1900 at the age of sixteen years, had been encouraged to spend money recklessly on

The authenticity of the secret articles was admitted and they were officially published by the British Government in its Treaty Series, 1911, No. 24 (Cd. 5969).

Archives diplomatiques, 3d series, 96, p. 677; Amer. Jour. Int. Law, Supplement, 6, p. 30; secret agreement, Parl. Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6010) or Martens, Nouveau Recueil Général, 3d series, 5, p. 666.

fireworks, bicycles for himself and the ladies of his harem, player-pianos and other ingenious products of European civilization. To fill his empty treasury, he levied higher taxes, but they produced only revolts. He then turned to Parisian bankers, in 1904, for a loan of 622 million francs, at five per cent, on the security of 60% of his customs revenues; he received in cash, by the way, only about three-quarters of the face value of the loan, as the investment was risky. Such was the situation when Delcassé sent M. Saint-René Tailliandier to Fez with a program of "reforms" for the Sultan's signature. A force of military police was to be organized under French officers; a state bank was to be established to bring financial order out of chaos; and various public works were to be undertaken with French capital.

A CRISIS AND A CONFERENCE

Just at this point occurred the proverbial slip twixt cup and lip. "By incredible blindness," writes a candid Frenchman, the French government "took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbors whom it had serious cause to fear." Italy, Spain and England had been bought off; Russia was an ally; but Germany had been ignored. By the unwritten law of imperialist ethics, when one Great Power seizes an important colony, its rivals may justly feel aggrieved if they be ignored; they should be consulted in advance, and permitted to seize something for themselves by way of "compensation." The German government felt such a grievance, and was resolved to make its displeasure felt.2

Early in March, 1905, the Kaiser appealed to President Roosevelt, urging him to join in promising to protect the Sultan against any nation seeking exclusive control; if Spain took Tangier and France the Moroccan hinterland, the Kaiser gloomily predicted, they would dominate the road of American commerce to the Near East and the Far East. As Roosevelt

1 René Millet, Notre Politique extérieure, p. 224.

2 Die Grosse Politik, vol. 20, pt. 1, shows voluminously how sorely Germany felt the grievance. In a memorandum of June 3, 1904, Holstein writes, "Deutschland hat nicht nur aus materiellen Gründen, sondern mehr noch zur Wahrung seines Prestiges gegen die beabsichtigte Aneignung Marokkos durch Frankreich Einspruch zu erheben"-op. cit., p. 208.

3 Ibid., nos. 6558 ff., cf. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, chs. 36-37.

demurred, the Kaiser himself, acting somewhat reluctantly, at his Chancellor's suggestion,1 landed from his imperial yacht at Tangier, and made two speeches, short but fateful. The Moroccan sultan, he said, was sovereign and independent; he should be cautious about adopting (the French program of) reforms; Morocco should remain open to the commerce of all nations on equal terms. These apparently banal reaffirmations of the existing legal situation were rightly interpreted in France, by reading between the lines, as a direct veto to Delcassé's plans, a deliberate challenge.2

This impression was confirmed when, after receiving advice from a German diplomatist, the sultan declined to ratify the French program of reforms, unless they were first discussed by an international conference of the numerous powers which had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880. Germany likewise demanded an international conference. Delcassé angrily opposed the idea; it would balk his scheme. War seemed very near indeed. When the French cabinet met, early in June, to decide between yielding and fighting-for there seemed to be no other choice-Delcassé pleaded with his colleagues to maintain the honor of France, and told them that Great Britain had promised to mobilize her fleet and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein, if necessary, to support France. This British promise, by the way, is viewed by English historians as a figment of Delcassé's imagination, and it is probably true that he wrongly interpreted British expressions of sympathy as promises of support; but it is also true that years afterward, in his speech of August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey declared England had come very close to war, in 1905, on account of Morocco.

3

4

Fortunately for peace, Delcassé's colleagues in the cabinet were against him. They dared not risk war, with Russia, sole ally of France, crippled by the Russo-Japanese War and torn by revolution. Delcassé therefore resigned, and the French

On this point his memoirs are confirmed by Die Grosse Politik, esp. 20, pp. 262 ff.

Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc, 1901-5; Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy; The Kaiser's Memoirs, ch. 4; Bourgeois et Pagès, Origines de la Grande Guerre, p. 308; Debidour, Hist. dipl. de l'Europe, II, pp. 3263, 96-102.

'Mévil, De la Paix de Francfort à la Conference d'Algéciras, Chs. 4 and 5, for this item and a justification of Delcassé. Cf. Morocco No. 1 (1906). E.g. Cambridge Hist. of British Foreign Policy, III, pp. 342-3.

1

premier, Rouvier, agreed to a conference. That France yielded gracefully, averting war, was in part due to President Roosevelt's secret urging. "It looked like war," Roosevelt reminiscently confessed, "so I took active hold of the matter . . . and got things temporarily straightened up." He persuaded France that war would be dangerous; and that if a conference were held he would exert his influence to safeguard legitimate French interests. "It was eminently wise," he told the French ambassador, "to avoid war if it could be done by adopting a course which would save the Emperor's self-esteem; that for such a purpose it was wise to help him save his face.'

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

The Conference held at Algeciras, from January 16 to April 7, 1906, included representatives of eleven European nations, and of the United States, and of Morocco. France had secret assurances of support from England and Russia, and could count also on Spain and Italy, while Germany was practically alone, save for Austria's half-hearted backing. The American delegates, Henry White and Samuel Gummere, took little part in the public proceedings, except to demand equal treatment for the numerous Jews in Morocco; but behind the scenes Roosevelt was working for France. The real contest was fought over the questions of police and finance; who would have military control, and who would exploit Morocco? That the sultan would remain nominally independent, with a nominally open door, was agreed in advance. But France wanted to officer the police and control the bank. Germany, of course, was opposed, and so stubbornly opposed that Roosevelt later wrote Whitelaw Reid: "The trouble is that with Russia out of the way as she now is, Germany believes that she can whip both France and England." Strenuously Roosevelt urged the Kaiser to accept a compromise, whereby France would accept "jointly with Spain a mandate from all the Powers, under responsibility to all of them for the

1

1 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, I, chs. 26-7; cf. Die Grosse Politik, 20, chs. 147-148.

The French yellow book, Protocoles et Comptes Rendus de la Conférence d'Algeciras, together with British Parliamentary Papers on Morocco, give the official diplomacy, but need to be supplemented by subsequent relevations, notably Bishop, op. cit., and Die Grosse Politik, vols. 20-21.

maintenance of equal rights and opportunities." The word mandate, which I have italicized, and indeed the whole conception, anticipates in almost uncanny fashion the mandate system established fourteen years later.

Germany, however, refused the plan, and offered instead, through the Austrian representative, a project for French military "instructors" at Tangier, Safi, Rabat and Tetuan; Spanish at Mogador, Larache and Mazagan; Swiss, Dutch or Belgian at Casablanca; all supervised by the diplomatic corps representing all the powers, at Tangier. How Roosevelt interpreted such proposals, one may learn from his confidential letter to Reid: "We became convinced . . . that Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco, which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to desire. She first endeavored to secure a port for herself, and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzerland, which we were convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland, become German. The French said they would not yield on these points, and as you know it looked as if the conference would come to nothing and that there would then be the possibility of trouble between France and Germany."

Shrewdly taking advantage of the Kaiser's egotism, Roosevelt threatened to publish the whole secret correspondence, if Germany should persist in her refusal of compromise; but if Germany yielded, he would keep his own rôle secret and give all the credit for preserving peace to the Kaiser. The psychology was accurate. Germany yielded, and Roosevelt publicly declared, perhaps with a suppressed chuckle, "In no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and for Germany's exalted ruler, Emperor William, than here in America." In private, Roosevelt admitted: "In this Algeciras matter, you will notice that while I was most suave and pleasant with the Emperor, yet when it became necessary at the end I stood him on his head with great decision." Or, to put it differently, "where I have taken part of the kernel from him, I have been anxious that he should have all the shell possible, and have that shell painted any way he wished." After such decisive inter

Since this was written, volume 21 of Die Grosse Politik has appeared. The latter shows that Roosevelt did oppose the Austrian proposal and threaten to publish his correspondence with "certain Powers" (nos. 7113 and 7115) and that Germany promptly returned a conciliatory reply (no. 7121); but the German ambassador does not report Roosevelt's promise to