whereby if Belgium should ever be willing to relinquish Congo, the colony's fate would be considered by a conference of the powers.1 Taken all together, these German demands of 1911 show clearly the secret aim. In this connection, it is interesting AND to add that in 1913 Sir Edward Grey of England secretly WORLD offered to include Belgian Congo, along with most of the Portu- WAR I guese colonies, in Germany's sphere of interest, so the German WAS ambassador Lichnowsky claims, but Germany refused to incor- SUPPOSED porate this offer in a treaty intended for publication.2 That TO HAVE her refusal was a matter of diplomatic tactics, not of self-denial, BEL N may be proved by the conversation which the German foreign FOUGHT minister, Herr von Jagow, held with the French ambassador BY in the spring of 1914. With the obvious purpose of sounding NOBLE France regarding Belgian Congo, von Jagow declared that only BRITAIN Great Powers had the strength and resources needed for colo- TO nization; smaller competitors must disappear or gravitate into DEFEND the orbits of the great."

THE RIGHTS OF

TERR P

The Great War brought such German aims out into the limelight. Imperialists in Germany openly and enthusiastically BELGIUM demanded the creation of a German Mittelafrika extending from the Sahara in the north to the Zambesi in the south, and AGAINST from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and including all the Belgian, Portuguese, French and British possessions in this vast GERMANY region. But the ordeal of arms decreed that instead of gaining, Germany should lose an empire. The former German colonies were to become "mandates" of the Allies, Togoland and Kamerun being divided between France and England, South West Africa assigned to British South Africa, and—we might as well add now German East Africa being given to Great Britain, except a small corner in the northwest, which was handed over to Belgium, and a narrow strip on the south, to Portugal.*

1 Staatsarchiv, 81, No. 14256.

'Lichnowsky's memorandum, in International Conciliation, No. 127, pp.

58-65.

Beer, op. cit., p. 49, citing Belgian Correspondance Diplomatique.
Cf. infra, pp. 483, 498.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST AND EXPLOITATION OF
EAST AFRICA

ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY

THE partition of the western and eastern coasts of Africa was almost simultaneous, beginning in earnest about 1884, and reaching virtual completion within ten years. Before 1884, Portugal held a long but vaguely defined strip of malarial coast land, on both sides of the Zambesi River, which enters the sea just opposite the great island of Madagascar. All north of this Portuguese colony of Mozambique was eligible for conquest, since it belonged to no European power, but was claimed by a Mohammedan "sultan," who from his capital on the island of Zanzibar (a little below the equator) attempted rather unsuccessfully to assert authority over more than a thousand miles of the mainland coast. On one occasion (1877) the sultan had offered to let William McKinnon, a very God-fearing Scottish shipowner, collect all the customs duties in this empire, but the British Foreign Office had vetoed the project. Bismarck, likewise, had to discourage German schemes to acquire control of Zanzibar or East Africa-before 1884.

In 1884, however, a livelier tune was called by Dr. Carl Peters an impetuous young German, who had absorbed the spirit of imperialism during a visit to England, and had founded in Germany a Company for German Colonization to provide capital for the acquisition of a colony. Not knowing just where to begin, Peters accepted the suggestion of Count Pfeil, another German who had lived in Africa and had profitably read Stanley's books. The expedition was planned in secrecy, for officialdom had frowned upon Peters' earlier proposals; moreover, Peters himself preferred stealth to publicity, melodrama to diplomacy. On October 1, 1884, Peters embarked at Triest, with Pfeil and two other associates. They were disguised as

English workingmen, and Peters took the alias, Mr. Bowman. Arriving at Zanzibar a month later, Peters found a telegram awaiting him, expressing Bismarck's disapproval of the enterprise. With characteristic verve, the young adventurer replied that he begged to have refusals delayed until he asked for something. With assistance from a German commercial house at Zanzibar, the little group of empire-builders obtained necessary supplies, and crossed over to the mainland. Ten days. later, Peters was back in Zanzibar, with a dozen treaties, placing the native kingdoms of Useguha, Nguru, Usagara, and Ukami— about 60,000 square miles in all-under the protection of his company. How by presents, persuasion and cajolery he and his friends had induced the bewildered native chieftains to make their marks on the treaties, is a story that he himself has told.1

Hastening back to Berlin, he reorganized his company as the German East Africa Company, and demanded from Bismarck a Schutzbrief-a proclamation of governmental protection-for his acquisitions. When Bismarck seemed reluctant, Peters announced that he was going to Brussels, knowing Bismarck would suspect the purpose of the trip to be an offer of East Africa to the grasping King Leopold. Bismarck understood the move, and quickly published the Schutzbrief, March 3, 1885. Whether his hand was forced by the importunate Peters, or the whole drama was but a puppet-show devised to mask the chancellor's own designs, has been a favorite theme for historical debate. A reasonable interpretation of the facts now available would be that Bismarck, ever an opportunist, cautious when uncertain as he was bold when assured of success, carefully assumed a diplomatically correct attitude of disapproval until the Peters expedition had succeeded, and then perceived an opportunity to gain a colony. His decision was made easier by the preoccupation of England with Anglo-Russian disputes in Asia.

'C. Peters, Die Gründung von Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin, 1906); Lebenserinnerungen (Hamburg, 1918). On this whole episode I am indebted also to Miss Townsend's Origins of Modern German Colonialism and M. von Hagen, Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik, pp. 510-552. Cf. Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, I, pp. 303 ff.

'Hertslet, op. cit., I, p. 303. This charter did not establish a protectorate in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, a tutelage by the German government over a native ruler; rather, it declared German "suzerainty" and "protection" over the territories and granted the company all rights of jurisdiction.

England, however, was not willing to permit the Germans to have things all their own way in East Africa. An English explorer, whose name Sir Harry Johnston-must already be

familiar to the persevering reader of these pages, had ventured into the locality of Mount Kilimanjaro, just north of Peters' domain, a few months earlier, to observe the flora and fauna, and, incidentally, to make treaties with native chieftains "if a French traveler seemed to be coming to the neighborhood" (he

ㄠ

had no suspicion of the Germans). These were taken up, in 1885, by a group of Manchester merchants, and others who formed the British East Africa Association, later reorganized INCLUDING as the Imperial British East Africa Company. As the French THE Government also claimed an interest in the East Coast, the ROTHSCHILD three Great Powers-England, Germany and France-ap- OF pointed a joint commission to settle their conflicting claims, and ENGLAND to determine whether East Africa was really the property of the sultan of Zanzibar. The decision, reached in 1886, allowed to the sultan only his islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and a strip of the coast ten miles deep and about a thousand long. Of this the German company was to have the southern six hundred miles and the British the northern four hundred, as a sphere of interest. Back of the ten-mile limit, the hinterland was divided between Germany and England by a line drawn as far west as Lake Victoria. France, for her part, was left free to pursue interests in Madagascar.1

The next step was to obtain from the sultan the "littoral," the ten-mile coast strip. Each of the rival chartered companies -the German East African and the British East Africanleased from Zanzibar its respective "sphere" of coast. But this arrangement could not last long. The Germans were eager to obtain outright possession of the coast, so that they might control the tariff. Moreover, the question of western extension raised problems. Were the Germans free to push their frontier back to meet the Congo Free State at Lake Tanganyika, leaving no corridor for the projected British Cape-to-Cairo Railway? Was the fertile inland kingdom of Uganda, described by explorers as the jewel of eastern Africa, to be British or German?

The future of Uganda became an urgent question in 1890. In earlier years French Roman Catholic missionaries, Cardinal Lavigerie's "White Fathers," had entered this negro kingdom and won many converts; British Protestants also sought to evangelize the kingdom. Islam, too, had found its devotees. Disliking the growth of these religious factions, the king, Mwanga, hit upon the interesting expedient of placing Christians and Mohammedans together on an island in Lake Victoria, and let

'See Anglo-German agreement of Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 1886, in Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, II, p. 615.