the gospel must be the principle of all that is acceptable to God-of all right obedience. When I say they mistake, I do not mean that they adopt a false sentiment, but that they misapprehend the import of this passage. The sentiment may be true; but it is not the sentiment of this verse. The faith in this maxim is a conviction of the will of God:and the maxim is, that whatever proceeds not from this conviction "is sin." So that it is not enough that we refrain from doing a thing when we are convinced that it is not the will of God; we must refrain unless we are convinced that it is. Even uncertainty or suspicion is a sufficient reason for refraining. Let us never treat conscience with lightness,never trifle with the will of God. Let us inquire after that will, that we may know it; let us not act till we know it; and whenever we do know it, let us maxim to all cases in which there which we feel 66 not quite sure."

act. We may apply the is room for hesitation, in We may, in many cases, be

tempted by others into a step or into a course in which they see no harm; but if we do not see our own way clear, we must by no means comply. It is wrong, very wrong on their part to attempt to persuade us.

But does the converse of the maxim hold? If whatsoever is not of faith is sin; does it follow, that whatsoever is of faith is duty? That were a very false and perilous conclusion indeed-unsettling the law of God and the principles of duty, and leaving all to be determined by every man's private opinions. This would be to justify the most enormous evils

even all the evils that have arisen from an ill-informed and misguided conscience. Christ says to his disciples:"They shall put you out of the synagogues: yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service."+ And Paul, in consistency with this statement, says of himself:-" I verily thought that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth."+ But did this justify him? No: he ought to have known better. And when he attained true self-knowledge he per

*Heb. xi. 6; Gal. v. 6, &c. † John xvi. 2.

Acts xxvi. 9.

ceived and owned his sin-even that pride and worldliness of heart that had withstood and resisted the truth. He felt that the principles by which he had been actuated were such as, instead of vindicating, constituted him the "chief of sinners." It would be fearful in the extreme to invert the maxim, and justify whatever any man under the influence of a mind misguided by a deceitful and wicked heart might fancy to be duty or to be lawful. Even the testimony of the believer's conscience to his integrity, and innocence of charges brought against him, is no infallible proof of such innocence. Our first duty, then, is to have conscience well-informed from the word of God, and never in any case to anticipate, far less to violate, its decisions.

LECTURE LXV.

ROMANS XV. 1-7.

"We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification. For even Christ pleased not himself; but, as it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached thee fell on me. For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning; that we, through patience and comfort of the scriptures, might have hope. Now the God of patience and consolation grant you to be like-minded one toward another according to Christ Jesus; that ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ also received us, to the glory of God."

THIS is a continuation of the same subject, of which the discussion commenced at the beginning of the preceding chapter. In the first verse, an inference is drawn from something that had gone before-" We, then, that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves." This conclusion seems to be deduced especially from what the Apostle had said respecting the serious consequences which might result from "offending the weak"-from tempting them by our conduct to violate the dictates of their consciences, and so to endanger their souls.*

To "bear the infirmities of the weak," is opposed to “setting them at nought,"-treating them with harshness, and pride, and supercilious disregard. It means to deal gently with their scruples, holding themselves in affectionate esteem, as conscientious although feeble-minded, and offering even

*Chap. xiv. 15, 20-23.

their prejudices, as we may reckon them, no unnecessary violence; living with them in peace and love, in the fellowship of the Gospel.-Opposed to "bearing their infirmities" is "pleasing ourselves." To please ourselves is to act according to our own views of things, our own inclinations, without consideration of the consequences to others. It is to gratify our selfish principles-our pride, for example, of superior discernment and strength of mind; which would tempt us to say disdainfully, Let them do as they will, we will follow our Own course- -Who would heed such weakness? This is often a strong temptation. Of few things are we more apt to be proud than of our superior discernment. We like vastly to show it off; and there is nothing, we know, that serves that end so effectually as setting it in practical contrast with the weakness of others. Or in such a case as that chiefly dwelt upon in the context, "the strong" might "please themselves" by preferring the gratification of their own appetites to accommodation to the conscientious scruples of their weak-minded brethren. 'Why," say they, "should we be debarred the use of any description of food we like, when we are satisfied ourselves that there is no difference, merely to please the whims of those who do not see so far as we do? we will take our own way, and eat what we choose." That such a motive might operate, sensual and unworthy as it was, the language cited from the preceding chapter is sufficient to show.*—Or, further, we may "please ourselves" by consulting simply our own convenience; doing what suits us at the time, without regard to what others may think or feel, or be tempted to do,-saying, It is our own conscience and not that of another that is to regulate our conduct. We don't interfere with other people's consciences, and they have no right to interfere with ours; why should we be cramped and put to inconvenience in this way?

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The general principle is, that selfishness ought to be repressed; that even in regard to things which in our own view are lawful and right,-in cases wherein our refraining

* Chap. xiv. 20, 21, with which compare 1 Cor. viii. 13.

violates no obligation of duty, and our acting would prove injurious to others,-self-denial is to be exercised, and selfwill and self-indulgence laid under control.-Instead of making self-pleasing our end (v. 2), "Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification." It is quite evident, that there are limits to the principle of pleasing our neighbour, as well as to that of pleasing ourselves: and indeed the limits are suggested by the very expression here used-"for his good to edification."

There is, first, the limit of sin in ourselves. When we are convinced that He who is the acknowledged Lord of the conscience requires us to do a thing-then it would be sin in us to decline or abstain from the doing of it. No consideration of other consciences can release our own from any positive obligation. We must neither do what Christ forbids, nor refrain from doing what Christ enjoins, for any consideration whatever. There is nothing that can set aside the express requisitions of His will.

While we

There is, secondly, the limit of sin in them. must not commit the one, neither must we encourage the other. The case in question was not one of sin. It was neither sin in "the weak" to maintain the distinctions of meats nor was it sin in "the strong" to abstain from eating what they were convinced it was lawful for them to partake. Had there been sin on either the one side or the other, the case would have been entirely altered. Though "the strong" are commanded to "bear the infirmities of the weak," they could never be commanded to bear their sins—to treat with indulgence their transgressions of the divine will. Pleasing their neighbour in sin would have been anything but "for his good to edification." "The strong" would have been reprehensible in acting such a part as would have tempted "the weak" to sin by violating the dictates of their own consciences; or such a part as would have engendered the exercise in their bosoms of unchristian tempers and feelings toward "the strong." This is the spirit of the whole preceding chapter.*

* It is expressed briefly—1 Cor. x. 32, 33, which is in harmony with