such a deed as satisfies the conditions of the 192nd section has been filed and registered shall be available"? Against the latter, and I think the correct construction, which would have the effect, after notice given in the London Gazette that such a deed as satisfies the conditions of the 192nd section had been filed and registered, of making the certificate, though it ought not to have been granted, a protection to the debtor from arrest, without leave of the Court of Bankruptcy, it must be admitted that the clear intention of the Legislature that the chief registrar should give the protection provided by the 198th section to those debtors only by whom a deed satisfying the conditions of the 192nd section has been executed raises some presumption. On the other hand, a statutory certificate that those conditions had been satisfied, under the signature of the officer whose duty it is to register deeds and grant protection, and under the seal of the Court of Bankruptcy, must have been intended by the Legislature for the practical purpose of an assurance to the ministers of the law that the matter which it certified had been inquired into and ascertained to be the truth; and the question is, whether the machinery thus employed by the Legislature to effect its purpose, and in particular the peremptory rule laid down for the observance of the sheriff's officer in the 113th section of The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106., incorporated by reference to it in the 198th section of The Bankruptcy Act, 1861, be not such as to make it notwithstanding the warrant he holds from the sheriff, his personal duty to discharge a debtor, who, though not really entitled to it, possesses and produces an unrevoked certificate under the 198th section of his 1865. LLOYD V. HARRISON. 1865. LLOYD V. HARRISON. having executed and registered a deed satisfying the conditions of the 192nd section, a certificate purporting on the face of it to be available to him "for all purposes as a protection in bankruptcy." The object of the 198th section unquestionably was to secure for a debtor really entitled to a certificate an immediate discharge or arrest. It may be that the Legislature, in reliance on the precautions taken by it that a certificate of a deed satisfying the conditions of the 192nd section having been filed and registered should not be granted in the case of a deed not satisfying those conditions, and on the authority vested in the Court of Bankruptcy to correct any mistake of the chief registrar by giving leave, notwithstanding such filing and registration, to issue execution, has made the certificate on its production to the sheriff's officer a warrant and order to him to discharge the debtor; and the case of Saffery v. Jones (a), in which Lord Tenterden said, p. 601, that, " even if the Insolvent Court had no jurisdiction" under stat. 7 G. 4. c. 57. to discharge the debtor, the language of the 81st section of that Act was "sufficiently strong to make the order of the Court a protection to the gaoler" who had discharged him, seems an authority for so holding. The difficulties which attend any other construction of these sections of the recent Act appear to me insuperable. By the 52nd section, the duty of granting protection is imposed upon the registrars, and they may adjourn any matter coming before them (the question, e. g., of the compliance or non-compliance of any deed with the conditions of the 192nd section) for the consideration of the Commissioner. By the 193rd (a) 2 B. & Ad. 598. section, after being satisfied by affidavit or by the certificate of the trustee or trustees of a deed, that the 5th condition of the 192nd section, which relates to matters dehors the deed, has been complied with, the chief registrar is to enter the date, names, and descriptions of the parties to such deed, "together with a short statement of the nature and effect thereof," in a book to be kept exclusively for the purpose of the registration of deeds satisfying the conditions of that section, words which imply the obligation on him of considering and deciding whether deeds brought to him for registration do or do not satisfy those conditions; he is next to give public notice in the London Gazette that such a deed has been filed and registered; and finally, by the 198th section, he is to discharge the duty of granting protection, by signing and affixing the seal of the Court of Bankruptcy to a certificate of the filing and registration of "such deed," which certificate is intended and declared by the Act to be "available to the debtor for all purposes as a protection in bankruptcy." "Protection in bankruptcy" has no meaning but the meaning given to it in the 112th section of The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, viz., freedom "from arrest or imprisonment by any creditor," to insure which, by the 113th section of the same Act, incorporated with The Bankruptcy Act, 1861, by sect. 232, express direction is given to the officer effecting an arrest, that on production by the bankrupt of his protection he shall be "immediately discharged;" that the officer shall not detain him, and that if the officer do detain him, except for so long as is necessary for obtaining a copy of the protection, he personally shall forfeit to the bankrupt 1865. LLOYD V. HARRISON. 1865. LLOYD V. HARRISON. for his own use the sum of 51. for every day during which the detention lasts. In construing these provisions, the first consideration that occurs to one is, the great improbability that the Legislature can have intended the words "such deed," in the latter part of the 198th section of The Bankruptcy Act of 1861, to qualify the plain meaning of the directions given by the 113th section of The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, to a ministerial officer of the humblest class, under a penalty on him personally with which it would be preposterous to visit an honest mistake or error of judgment, or any thing but the perverse and wilful disregard of a clear and unmistakeable duty. It is hardly conceivable that such a penalty should have been imposed upon a person presumably incompetent to determine any question of legal difficulty, and to whom time for consultation and means of knowledge or advice are expressly denied, if more were required of him than that he should have no opinion of his own, but humbly and submissively obey the clear instructions set forth for his especial guidance in the only section of an Act of Parliament which relates to the execution of his duty, on production to him of a document which that section clearly describes. The unreasonableness of expecting him to understand that the words "a certificate of the filing and registration of such deed shall be available" do not mean 66 a certificate that such a deed has been filed and registered shall be available," and that from the words "such deed" the instructions given to him in the 113th section of The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, are not to be the rule of his conduct, in the UNIV. OF MICH. LAW LIBRARY. 1865. LLOYD V. event (of which he can know nothing) of the chief (b) 14 M. & W. 353; affirmed in error, 16 Id. 885. |