1865. and wrong, the King shall be bound by such Act, though Mayor &c. of not named. But where a statute is general, and thereby WEYMOUTH NUGENT. any prerogative, right, title, or interest is devested or taken from the King, in such case the King shall not be bound, unless the statute is made by express terms to extend to him." And the doctrine contained in the latter clause, which is found in the case of Magdalene College (a), was upheld in the modern case of The Attorney General v. Donaldson (b), where Alderson B., delivering the judgment of the Court, said, pp. 123-4, "It is a well established rule, generally speaking, in the construction of Acts of Parliament, that the King is not included unless there be words to that effect; for it is inferred primâ facie that the law made by the Crown, with the assent of Lords and Commons, is made for subjects and not for the Crown; Willion v. Barkley” (c). [He also cited Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, p. 382.] A local Act imposing tolls or duties is not within any of the exceptions to the rule that the Crown is not included in Acts of Parliament unless there be words to that effect. Exemption from toll, custom and taxes is one of the prerogatives of the Crown; Bro. Abr. Prerogative le Roy, pl. 112, Com. Dig. Toll (G1.) referring to Rex v. The Corporation of Maydenhead (d), Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, pp. 376-7, whether granted by charter from the Crown or imposed by Act of Parliament. [Cockburn C. J. In Rex v. The Corporation of Maydenhead (d) Sir Geoffrey Palmer is speaking of tolls payable by virtue of a Royal grant.] In Rex v. Cook (e) Lord Kenyon said, "Although there is no special exemption of the King in this Act of Parlia (a) 11 Co. 66 b. 74 b. (b) 10 M. & W. 117. (e) 3 T. R. 519. 522. 1865. WEYMOUTH V. NUGENT. ment," 25 G. 3. c. 51. s. 4., "yet I am of opinion that he is exempted by virtue of his prerogative, in the Mayor &c. of same manner as he is virtually exempted from the 43 El." c. 2. "and every other Act imposing a duty or tax on the subjects." [Crompton J. That was a decision on a statute, imposing a public tax, which is not analogous to an Act of Parliament granting a toll to private persons.] In Westover v. Perkins (a) it was held that, though the exemption from toll in The General Turnpike Acts expresses only horses and carriages attending Her Majesty or any of the Royal family, a carriage and horses belonging to the Queen in the use of a member of her household, with her permission, were impliedly exempt by virtue of the prerogative. The exemption is inserted ex abundanti cautelâ. Secondly. The Crown is by implication excepted from stat. 6 G. 4. c. cxvi. It was an Act passed to improve an ancient public harbour, and the Sovereign, if bound by it, would be excluded from her own harbour except on payment of toll: this is very different from an Act for making docks and railways, which are private property. Sect. 4 charges the customs and duties in respect of "goods, wares, merchandises and commodities" imported into the harbour, and empowers the collector to ask, demand and require payment of the customs and duties charged upon all ships and vessels coming into the harbour, "from the respective masters of every such ship or vessel, or the person having charge thereof." [Blackburn J. According to the argument on the other side, the master of a vessel carrying some of Her Majesty's goods and some of other persons might under sect. 4 be required to pay the duties in respect of all, and would have a right to sell the Queen's goods in order to (a) 2 E. & E. 57. 1865. V. NUGENT. recoup himself.] Sect. 5, for discovering who are the Mayor &c. of Owners of goods imported, enacts that all masters of WEYMOUTH vessels coming into the harbour shall deliver to the collector an account of all goods on board and to whom they belong. By sect. 6 masters of vessels who shall have paid the duties to the collector are authorised to detain the goods on which the duties have been paid, and to sell them if the duties are not repaid by the owners of the goods within a time limited. [He also referred to sect. 7.] The exemption in sect. 23 from toll for passing over the bridge is nearly the same as that in The General Turnpike Acts, which was considered in Westover v. Perkins (a), and it is doubtful whether the prerogative of the Crown would have extended so far. The saving in sect. 29 is unnecessary, and the prerogative is not affected by it. [Blackburn J. It will bear the sense that, where a person has contracted to supply coals for Her Majesty's steam packets, the coals are exempt though they remain his property.] Lush, in reply.—In the case of Magdalene College (a) it was resolved that stat. 13 El. c. 10., restraining ecclesiastical persons in making leases, bound the Queen though not mentioned in it: "First, it was resolved, that the general words of the Act extend to the Queen, for the words are, 'To any person or persons, body politic or corporate,' and without question the Queen was a person, as it is said in 10 H. 7. 18 a. Then if the Act be general, and the Queen be clearly included within the words, if she shall be exempt out of the Act, it ought to be by construction of law; and as this case is, the law will not make such construction for reasons apparent in the Act itself;" p. 70 a. "And as to (a) 2 E. & E. 57. (b) 11 Co. 66 b. all the cases which have been put on the other side, 1865. WEYMOUTH V. NUGENT. it was resolved, 1. That none of them impugn any Mayor &c. of of these reasons or grounds. 2. That where the King has any prerogative, estate, right, title or interest, that by the general words of an Act he shall not be barred of them, as in the said case of reasonable aid, the King has an estate and interest in it, and therefore the general words of the Act of Westminster 1. c. 46., shall not extend to it. But in the case at bar, the King is not excluded of any estate, right, title, interest or prerogative, that he had before the Act." p. 74 b. 75 a. The Sovereign is not debarred of any right by payment of this duty. [Crompton J. Imposing a charge on the Crown is a stronger act than the restraint in stat. 13 El. c. 10. Cockburn C. J. The Crown is not bound by stat. 43 El. c. 2., which imposes a tax for the general benefit of the Kingdom; à fortiori it is exempt from an Act imposing a local tax.] The passage in Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, pp. 376-7, refers to tolls granted by royal charter; but in p. 383 it is said "And though upon the construction of a statute, nothing shall be taken by equity' (or relaxed construction,) against the King'; yet it has been observed by J. Doderidge, that, 'where the subject has authority to do a thing by the express letter of a statute, this shall not be taken away by any strained construction, though it be for the benefit of the King;'" citing Roll. R. 67, and referring to 10 Rep. 84 [83 a]. The Corporation of Weymouth do not derive any private advantage from the tolls. They are granted to them as trustees for the persons from whom the money has been borrowed. [Cockburn C. J. The main, tenance of the harbour is principally a local benefit. B. & 8. VOL. VI. D 1865. WEYMOUTH Blackburn J. It is very analogous to a highway.] The Mayor &c. of judgment of Erle J. in Westover v. Perkins (a) is founded on the exemption of the Sovereign by special enactments in the General Turnpike Acts. T. NUGENT. COCKBURN C. J. I am of opinion that the decision of the justices was right. There are two great principles which, from an early period of our history, have obtained with regard to the prerogatives of the Crown; first, that the Crown is exempt from the payment of tolls; second, that, except in certain cases, the Crown is not bound by an Act of Parliament unless specially named in it. The question here is, whether the Crown, acting through one of its servants, is liable in respect of stone brought into the harbour of Weymouth, for the use of the government works, to the duties imposed by stat. 6 G. 4. c. cxvi. The doctrine as to the immunity enjoyed by the Crown from the payment of tolls arose in the times when tolls were leviable by virtue of a grant from the Crown, or by prescription from which a grant from the Crown was presumed; and it may well be assumed that when tolls were so granted the Crown did not intend to include itself in the liability to pay them. But whether or not that be the origin of the immunity, it has obtained from the earliest times, and we cannot suppose that the Legislature took upon itself to make the Crown liable to the payment of these duties without mentioning the Crown in the statute. Even supposing that those who represent the Crown could not succeed upon the first principle, I think the second concludes the case. The rule that the Crown is (a) 2 E. & E. 57. 65. |