analogous statutes. Browne on the Statues of Frauds, sec. 362, states the rule thus: "In cases where the initials only of the party are signed, it is quite clear that, with the aid of parol evidence which is admitted to apply to them, the signature is to be held valid." And see Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Den. 478; Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen 474; Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 432; Salmon Falls Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446; Chichester v. Cobb, 14 Law T., N. S. 433. Though, therefore, we find no precise precedent, yet the analogies are all favorable, rather than otherwise, to the sufficiency of a signing by first name only, if it meets the other requirements of the act. These are matters depending on circumstances which will be considered further on. Looking beyond the decisions to the general use of language, what is understood by signing, and signature? Webster defines to sign as "to affix a signature to; to ratify by hand or seal; to subscribe in one's own handwriting"; and signature as "a sign, stamp, or mark impressed; especially the name of any person written with his own hand, employed to signify that the writing which precedes accords with his wishes or intentions; a sign manual." All the definitions include a mark, and no dictionary limits a signature to a written name. There can be no doubt that historically, and down to very modern times, the ordinary signature was the mark of a cross; and there is perhaps as little question that in the general diffusion of education at the present day, the ordinary use of the word implies the written name. But this implication is not even yet necessary and universal. The man who cannot write is now happily an exception in our commonwealth, but he has not yet entirely disappeared, and in popular language he is still said to "sign," though he makes only his mark. Thus, in Asay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 26, the witness says: "The name was written after the will was read to her, and after she had signed it. She was reclining in bed when she signed it," although the signature the witness was testifying to was only a mark. But, even in the now usual acceptation of a written name, signature still does not imply the whole name. Custom controls the rule of names, and so it does the rule of signatures. The title by which a man calls himself and is known in the community is his name, as in Main v. Ryder,

supra, whether it be the one he inherited or had originally given him or not. So the form which a man customarily uses to identify and bind himself in writing is his signature, whatever shape it may choose to give it. There is no requirement that it shall be legible, though legibility is one of the prime objects of writing. It is sufficient if it be such as he usually signs, and the signatures of neither Rufus Choate nor General Spinner could be rejected, though no man, unaided, could discover what the ragged marks made by either of those two eminent personages were intended to represent. Nor is there any fixed requirement how much of the full name shall be written. Custom varies with time and place, and habit with the whim of the individual. Sovereigns write only their first names, and the sovereign of Spain, more royally still, signs his decrees only, "I the King" (Yo el Rey). English peers now sign their titles only, though they be geographical names, like Devon or Stafford, as broad as a county. The great Bacon wrote his name Fr. Verulam, and the ordinary signature of the poet-philosopher of fishermen was Iz: Wa:. In the fifty-six signatures to the most solemn instrument of modern times, the Declaration of Independence, we find every variety from Th. Jefferson to the unmistakably identified Charles Carroll of Carrollton. In the present day, it is not uncommon for business men to have a signature for checks and banking purposes somewhat different from that used in their ordinary business, and, in familiar correspondence, signature by initials, or nickname, or diminutive, is probably the general practice.

What, therefore, shall constitute a sufficient signature must depend largely on the custom of the time and place, the habit of the individual, and the circumstances of each particular case. As already seen, the English and some American cases hold that a signature by initials only, or otherwise informal and short of the full name, may be a valid execution of a will or a contract, if the intent to execute is apparent. To this requirement our statute adds that the signature must be at the end, as evidence that the intent is present, actual and completed. On this point of the completed act, the use of the ordinary form of signature is persuasive evidence, and the absence of it may be of weight in the other scale. As well suggested by the learned

judge below, if a will drawn with formality, or in terms that indicate the aid of counsel, or the intent to comply with all the forms of law, be signed with initials or first name only, doubt would certainly be raised as to the completed purpose of the testator to execute it, and if then it appeared that his habit was to sign his name in full, the doubt might become certainty; while, on the other hand, if it were shown that he usually, or even frequently, signed business or other important papers in the same way, the doubt might be dissipated. As in all cases where the intent is the test, there can be no hard and fast legal rule as to form. The statute requires that the signature shall be at the end, and that requirement must be met without regard to intention, but what shall constitute a signature must be determined in each case by the circumstances.

Tested by these views, the will in the present case appears to have been well executed. Of the handwriting and of the identity of the testatrix there is no question, and her completed intent to execute the paper, as the expression of her testamentary wishes, is attested at the end of it by a signature admitted to be made by her, and shown to be in the form which she habitually used. The writing has not the usual formalities of a will, but is in form a letter, addressed to no one by name, but clearly intended for her mother, or such of her family as should assume control of her property after her death; and the form of the instrument might well account for the signature she was accustomed to use, were it not still more clearly explained by the unfortunate differences with her husband, and her repugnance to using his name, as shown by her avoidance of it in her correspondence, and her direction not to put it on her tombstone. On the evidence, it is clear that the testatrix intended this as a complete execution of the instrument, and we find nothing in the law to defeat its validity for that purpose.

Judgment affirmed.

JENKINS v. GAISFORD AND THRING.

3 Sw. & Tr. 93. English Court of Probate, 1863.

Probate of will and two codicils.

Henry Atkins deposed that he was testator's amanuensis, and often employed a stamp bearing a fac-simile of testator's signature, to sign testator's letters, as testator had had difficulty in writing; that at testator's request he had thus stamped the name on each of the two codicils and thereupon testator laid his hand on the paper and acknowledged the signature.

Probate refused on motion. After special declaration, and citation to next of kin, the question of the sufficiency of the signature was argued ex parte by Dr. Spinks.

Sir C. CRESSWELL. I am of opinion that the codicils were duly executed so as to comply with the 1 Vict., c. 26, s. 9. It has been decided that a testator sufficiently signs by making his mark, and I think it was rightly contended that the word "signed" in that section must have the same meaning whether the signature is made by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence or by his direction, and therefore a mark made by some other person under such circumstances must suffice. Now, whether the mark is made by a pen or by some other instrument cannot make any difference, neither can it in reason make a difference that a fac-simile of the whole name was impressed on the will instead of a mere mark or X. The mark made by the instrument or stamp used was intended to stand for and represent the signature of the testator. In the case where it was held that sealing was not signing, the seals were not affixed by way of a signature.

IN THE GOODS OF SUSANNA CLARKE (DECEASED), ON MOTION.

1 Sw. & Tr. 22. English Court of Probate, 1858.

The testatrix executed a will in 1844, by mark. Against her mark the name Susanna Barrell (her maiden name) was written instead of Susanna Clarke, her real name, and the one by which she was described in the commencement of the will and in the testimonium clause.

Shortly before her, death, she delivered the will in a sealed envelope to F., one of the executors named therein, in whose custody it remained until after her death, telling him "that she wanted him to manage for her." F. deposed that both the attesting witnesses were dead, that the will was in the handwriting of Sidney, one of them; and he believed the word "Barrell" to have been a clerical error of Sidney's.

Dr. DEANE, Q. C. The execution satisfies the Wills Act. (In the goods of Bryce, 2 Curt. 325, and In the goods of Clark, Ib. 329.)

Sir C. CRESSWELL. There is enough to show that the will is really that of the person whose it professes to be. Her mark, at the foot or end of it, is a sufficient execution, and that which some one else wrote against her mark cannot vitiate it.

COOK v. WINCHESTER ET AL.

81 Mich. 581, 46 N. W. Rep. 106. 1890.

Case made from circuit court, Kent county; GROVE, Judge. Petition by Ariston J. Cook to admit to probate the alleged will of Alzina Page, deceased. Contested by Laaden Winchester and Clarissa Winchester. Probate was refused by the probate judge, and, on appeal to the circuit court, this action was affirmed. Proponent appealed to this court.

MORSE, J. This controversy involves the validity of a will, the sole question being whether or not it was duly executed, or