the time of executing his will, and a child is subsequently born, such will is deemed revoked, unless such child was provided for in the will, or so mentioned as to show the intention of the testator not to provide for it.* 7. Living children not provided for in the will of testator, are usually allowed to take as heirs, unless it appears from the will that their omission was intended. (Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 O. S. 284.) 8. In a number of States the statutes provide that a testator leaving a wife and children, cannot devise or bequeath his property to a charitable corporation or for charitable purposes, unless such will is executed a specified time before the death of the testator.† In Ohio this time is fixed at one year. But it is held that no one can take advantage of such defective will except those who would otherwise take the property which has been devised to the charitable purpose.§ 9. In some States the statutes protect the wife and children of the testator from being barred by his will in favor of his mistress or illegitimate children. Thus in South Carolina, a testator leaving a wife and legitimate children, cannot devise more than one-fourth of the clear value of his property to such persons, and no *Rev. Stat. of Ohio, Sec. 5959. Fairchild v. Edson, 154 N. Y. 199; Wetter v. Haversham, 60 Ga. 193; Luebbe's Est., 179 Pa. St. 447; Protestant Home v. Beecher, 87 Wis. 409; Schmidt's Est., 15 Mont. 117. Rev. Stat. of Ohio, 5915. §Trustees Ohio St. Univ. v. Folsom, 56 O. S. 701. device will be permitted to evade the provisions of such statutes.* 10. Another general statutory restraint upon the power of the testator to devise his property, is the statute or rule governing perpetuities. This rule of law is of long standing and is designated to prevent the postponement of the transfer of the legal title to real property beyond a reasonable time. The rule as generally fixed, both in England and the United States, provides that the vesting of the title of any estate cannot be postponed, upon a condition precedent, for a longer time than the life or lives of persons in existence at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years thereafter.† 11. The interest which the testator may dispose of by will must be one which survives him and is not limited to his lifetime, as an estate for life. So, while a testator has the power of disposing of an insurance policy upon his life which is made payable to his estate or his executors, he cannot by will change the beneficiary, when one has been named and the rules of the company provide that the beneficiary must be named in a particular way, as by an order acknowledged before a justice of the peace.§ *Breithautt v. Bauskett, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 465; Gore v. Clark, 37 S. Car. 537; Beaty v. Richardson, 46 L. R. A. 517. Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65; Terrell v. Reeves, 108 Ala. 264; Rev. Stat. of Ohio, Sec. 4200. Young v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287; Studdard v. Wells, 120 Mo. 25. §Mellows v. Mellows, 61 N. H. 137; Wilburn v. Wilburn, In general, subject to the restrictions above named, a competent testator may dispose of his property as he pleases. He may select such of his children or relatives as he desires for his beneficiaries, or he may pass them all by and leave his property to strangers.† Sec. 937. THE TESTATOR'S RIGHT TO MAKE A WILL IS NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT.-While the right to make a will is general, and may be exercised by all, under certain limitations, yet this right or privilege to dispose of one's property to take effect at death, is not, and has never been considered an absolute property right, so as to be protected by the various constitutional provisions designed to uphold and guard private property. As we have seen in the pre 83 Ind. 55; Pingrey v. Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374; Masonic Assoc. v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560; Arthur v. Odd Fellows Assoc., 29 O. S. 557; Hartwig v. Schiefer, 47 Ind. 64; Fox v. Senter, 83 Me. 295; Hanrihan v. Ingraham, 55 Hun 257. †It must be understood, however, that for a testator to disinherit his heirs at law, he must either expressly or by necessary implication, devise all of his property to others, and unless this is done the heirs at law will be entitled to the estate. Here is perhaps the easiest loop-hole for lessening the evils of private property, which centered in the hands of the few is becoming more threatening to the other absolute rights to life and liberty than any form of political despotism that ever maintained. It being granted that the right to make a will is a statutory rather than a natural and absolute right, it follows that the legislature in a State can curtail or limit the right or even take it away entirely. Why may not a people oppressed by the unholy acquisitions of the few use this lever to enact vious chapters, the right to dispose of real estate by will did not exist at the early Common Law, and that the disposition of property by will has been a matter of gradual allowance, depending for the most part upon express statutory provisions, and at no time independent of legislative control. The power to make a will is to be regarded, therefore, as a statutory right and not a natural or absolute right.* The legislature or sovereign authority in a State may not only prescribe regulations governing the making and construction of wills, but may also at any time qualify and limit the power to dispose of property by will. And this may be done after the real property sought to be disposed of by will has been acquired. (Patton v. Patton, 38 O. S. 590.) And the fact that the statutory changes in the law governing wills are made after the will has been executed by a living testator, and that a certain proportion, or even all, of the millions exploited from labor by the capitalist classes, at the death of the possessor should go to the State for the gradual purchase of the lands and mines and the machinery of production and distribution? *Blackstone observes that the variety of laws and usages in regard to wills, and the further fact that there were countries where wills were not allowed, "serves to evince, that the right of making wills and disposing of property after death, is merely a creature of the civil state; which has permitted it in some countries and denied it in others; and even where it is permitted by law, it is subjected to different formalities and restrictions in almost every nation under heaven."-Bl. Com. II, 491. intended to apply thereto, does not make such changes infringe any constitutional provisions.* In order that new laws governing wills may effect devises previously executed, the intention of the legislature must be plain, otherwise the law will be held to apply only to subsequently executed wills.† Sec. 938. THE RIGHTS OF DEVISEES UNDER A VALID WILL BECOME VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS AT THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR.-It is to be understood that the rights of devisees and legatees under a valid will become vested property rights at the time of the testator's death and cannot thereafter be subject to legislative control. And any attempt by the legislature, through subsequent statutes, either to make a valid will invalid, or an invalid will valid, the testator having deceased before the passage of the statute, would be unconstitutional. That is, where a will is invalid under the law in force when the testator died, no subsequently passed statute can make it valid, and likewise, if the will is valid, no subsequent legislative act can destroy its validity.‡ *Blackburn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735. In this case it was held that a change in the law after a will had been executed, and while testator was yet living, making a devise of lands for a charitable purpose void, was valid, and nullified the devise. †Swan v. Sayles, 165 Mass. 177. So in a case where the statute providing that witnesses should no longer be necessary to the execution of a will, this statute was held not to make valid a will that had been executed without witnesses previous to the passage of the statute.-Packer v. Packer, 179 Pa. St. People v. Powers, 147 N. Y. 104; Hartson v. Elden, 50 |