such person as they come of age, or after twenty years from testator's death, are valid.*

Charitable devises, by which are meant gifts to an indefinite class of persons from the general public, for the promotion of their well-being, are said not to be within the rules governing perpetuities, and such gifts may stand though in violation of the rule in the sense that the gift is not to become absolute within the term fixed by the rule. But such a gift is void if it is not to vest within the time fixed by the rule against per

petuities.‡

4. A condition can not be attached to an absolute and vested gift of property that it should be free from the claims of the creditors of the beneficiaries.§ But a gift of the income of real or personal property may be made that shall cease if the devisee becomes insolvent; and the property may be settled in trust for the benefit of a beneficiary in such a manner that he can not alienate it and that his creditors can not reach it. This constitutes an equitable estate and under the English law can only be created by providing that upon the

*Healy v. Healy, 70 Conn. 467; Stevenson v. Evans, 10 0. S. 307; Hughes v. Hughes, 91 Wis. 138; Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296.

†Page on Wills, Sec. 641; Parker v. Churchill, 104 Ga. 122; Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163.

Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625; State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456; John's Will, 30 Ore. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242.

§Hobbs v. Smith, 15 O. S. 419.

¶Steibe v. Whitehead, 11 Ill. 247; Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395; Beader's Est., 190 Pa. St. 606; Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 759, 18 L. R. A. 212.

insolvency of the beneficiary and the attempt of creditors to reach such an estate, it shall pass to another.* This rule is followed in some States, while in others a provision that the estate shall not be transferred by the beneficiary during his life, and that it shall not be taken for his debts is sufficient.†

5. Where an estate is limited upon an unlawful condition, and the condition is precedent to the vesting of the estate, the legacy or devise fails. While if the condition is subsequent, the condition itself is ignored and the estate becomes absolute.

Sec. 1026. PROVISIONS CONCERNING A SUIT TO CONSTRUE A WILL.-The occasion and the power to construe a will arise only, as a rule, in an action brought for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the will, and courts of law have no jurisdiction of such an action brought solely for the purpose of securing a construction; but where the will involves or creates a trust in real or personal property, an action may be brought in a court of equity for the purpose of securing a construction of such will. On the other hand, a court of equity has, in most States, no such jurisdiction if the will creates or involves a purely legal estate.§

*Shee v. Hale, 13 Ves. Jr. 404.

Thornton v. Stanley, 55 O. S. 199; Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395; Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 2 L. R. A. 113. Bonnell v. Bonnell, 47 N. J. Eq. 540; Dill v. Wisner, 88 N. Y. 153.

§Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323; Edgar v. Edgar, 26 Ore.

In the absence of statutes providing a court, the State courts of general equity powers are the proper tribunals in which to bring an action to enforce the provisions of the will, and secure a construction of its terms.* The proper party to bring such a suit may be the executor, or administrator with the will annexed, or the beneficiary whose immediate interests are affected by the terms of the will. Such a suit is not a contest of the validity of the will, and the will can not be reformed by the court as in the case of a deed or contract. The decree when rendered is binding upon all parties to the suit until attacked directly by appeal or error.§

Sec. 1027. WHEN PAROL EVIDENCE WILL BE ADMITTED TO AID IN CONSTRUCTION. -The following rules are applicable to the admission of parol evidence in suits to construe wills, though the same principles may be applicable in other cases:

1. The intention of the testator is to be gathered primarily from the will itself, and where his intention is

65; Hollister v. Howe, 6 O. Dec. 157; 4 O. N. P. 168; Austin v. Bailey, 163 Mass. 270.

*Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323; Ladd v. Chass, 155 Mass. 417; Burton's Est., 93 Cal. 459.

In re Battchelder, 147 Mass. 465; Davis v. Hutchings, 15 O. C. C. 174; Stevens v. Dewey, 55 N. J. Eq. 322; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560.

Mason v. Roll, 130 Ind. 26; Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 127 N. Y. 196; Eckford v. Eckford, 91 Ia. 54.

§Coglan v. Dana, 173 Mass. 421; Stoff v. McGinn, 178 Ill. 46; Hawthorn v. Beckwith, 89 Va. 786.

there clearly expressed, it can not be contradicted, altered or extended by any use of parol evidence.*

2. The names of persons or amounts omitted from the will can not be supplied by showing by parol evidence whom or how much the testator intended.†

3. Parol evidence, is not admissible to change rules of construction.

4. Parol evidence may be received to aid in deciphering the handwriting when obscure, or to translate the language when that is necessary.

5. Parol evidence may be used to identify the person or thing described in the will, when such identification is necessary to apply names or descriptions contained in the will.‡

6. Parol evidence may be resorted to, to clear up a latent ambiguity.§

In case of a patent ambiguity it may be admitted for the purpose of showing the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator, and of putting the court as nearly as possible in the testator's position.¶

In all these cases where there is an ambiguity in the

*Sturgis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134; Bingel v. Volz, 142 Ill 214, 16 L. R. A. 321.

†Heidenheimer v. Bowman, 84 Tex. 174, 31 Am. St. Rep. 29. Ikard v. Thompson, 81 Tex. 285; Daugherty v. Rodgers, 119 Ind. 254.

§In re Ashton, P. 83; Tilley v. Ellis, 119 N. C. 233; Gordon v. Burris, 141 Mo. 602.

Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68; Nicholas v. Boswell, 103 Mo. 151; Masters v. Masters, 1 P. Williams 425; Chappell v. Society, 3 Ind. App. 356.

will, parol evidence of testator's circumstances, surroundings, family and general situation may be received for the purpose of obtaining such light as these facts may throw upon his intentions to "enable the court to place itself in his situation, to see things as he saw them, and to apply his language as he understood and intended it" (Pruden v. Pruden, 14 O. S. 251; Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 28 L. R. A. 149).