coöperation beat down the opposition of the honest and independent members. Such accusations are the lot of every statesman who has to devise great financial measures. In our own times Secretary Sherman had to move through a storm of abuse in accomplishing the resumption of specie payments, and a like tempest raged around Secretary Carlisle in maintaining the integrity of treasury obligations. But no statesman has ever had to contend against so virulent an opposition with such slender resources as Alexander Hamilton.

Maclay gives an acrid account of Hamilton's negotiation with members of Congress for support to his measures. Various combinations of interest were tried and at last the greedy squabble over the site of the national capital afforded him the necessary leverage. There was really more active concern in Congress about that matter than about the national finances. Even the austere Maclay remarks, that with Dr. Rush he had "puffed John Adams in the papers and brought him forward for Vice-President," because "we knew his vanity and hoped by laying hold of it to render him useful among the New England men in our scheme of bringing Congress to Pennsylvania." Maclay relates that Madison made a motion reducing General St. Clair's salary as governor of the Western territory the very day the general had disparaged the claims of the Potomac site, although previously Madison had favored a

larger amount.1

The bill for assuming state debts was finally carried by means of a bargain arranged between Hamilton and Jefferson, the votes of a sufficient number of Southern members being obtained in return for Northern votes for the Potomac site. The foundations of the national government were laid by "log-rolling."

Although Hamilton's assumption of leadership was made good for a time, from the start it met with an opposition which showed that it could not be permanent. The bill establishing the treasury department made it the duty of the Secretary "to digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the support of the public credit." Page, of Virginia, immediately moved to strike out that clause on the ground that "a precedent would be established which might be extended until ministers of the government should be admitted on that floor to explain and support the plans they had digested and reported, thereby laying the foundation for an aristocracy or a detestable monarchy." Madison defended the proposed grant of power on the ground that it would promote good administration, which was the chief end of government. Page's motion was defeated, but the word "prepare" was substituted for "report," and it was made evident that the open connection between administration and legislation would continue only so long as the

1 Maclay's Journal, p. 150.

House should choose to permit it. The temporary splice between the executive and legislative branches was too weak to stand party violence, and at this point the first attack was made when an opposition was organized and the formation of national parties began. Originally the only standing committee of the House had been one on elections. Any matter on which the House desired information, whether a claim, petition, or memorial, was generally referred directly to the head of the proper department. When the House took up an attitude of hostility towards the Secretary of the Treasury, the system of standing committees, which has had such a a monstrous development, was begun. In January, 1795, Hamilton quitted an office which had lost the functions that made it useful for his purposes. The effect of the changed relations upon the conduct of the public business was described with prophetic insight by Fisher Ames in a letter to Hamilton, two years after the latter's retirement from office :

"The heads of departments are chief clerks. Instead of being the ministry, the organs of the executive power, and imparting a kind of momentum to the operation of the laws, they are precluded even from communicating with the House by reports. In other countries they may speak as well as act. We allow them to do neither. We forbid them even the use of a speaking-trumpet; or more properly, as the Constitution has ordained

that they shall be dumb, we forbid them to explain themselves by signs. Two evils, obvious to you, result from all this. The efficiency of government is reduced to a minimum-the proneness of a popular body to usurpation is already advancing to its maximum; committees already are the ministers; and while the House indulges a jealousy of encroachment in its functions, which are properly deliberative, it does not perceive that these are impaired and nullified by the monopoly as well as the perversion of information by these committees. The silly reliance of our haughty House and Congress prattlers on a responsibility of members to the people, &c., is disgraced by every page in the history of popular bodies." 1

The attempt to maintain the unity of administration by means of ministerial leadership had failed. The political organism was constrained to develop new faculties for that purpose. The necessary control was resumed through the agency of party.

1 Hamilton's Works, Vol. VI., p. 201.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGIN OF PARTIES

THE bane of the Whig ideal of government was party spirit. It introduced principles of association inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. Because of party spirit gentlemen betrayed the interests of their order and menaced the peace of society by demagogic appeals to the common people. Instead of the concert of action which should exist between the departments of government as the result of a patriotic purpose common to all, devotion to party was substituted, and the constitutional depositaries of power were converted into the fortifications of party interest.

Throughout the eighteenth century, party was regarded as a gangrene, a cancer, which patriotic statesmen should combine to eradicate. This chord of sentiment was skilfully touched by Bolingbroke in his influential treatise, "The Patriot King," in which he eloquently portrayed the character of the just ruler who should break down party control and command for the state the service of all good men. The policy of George III. was formed upon this ideal, and it influenced the conduct of the greatest statesmen of the age. The