AUTOMOBILES: MOTOR VEHICLE ACT: PROVISIONS OF THE ACT AS ESSENTIAL an automobile pass from a conditional vendor to his assignee where the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act relating to the transfer of title have not been complied with? This question is not squarely presented by the case of Parke and Browne v. Franciscus (1) which arose under the Motor Vehicle Act of 1919(2) The act provides that until a motor vehicle is registered as required by its terms and the transferee has received the new certificate of registration and has written his name upon its face, "delivery of said motor vehicle shall be deemed not to have been made, and title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and said intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and (3) not to be valid or effective for any purpose. In the instant case the conditional vendor of an automobile had allowed it to remain registered in the name of the party from whom he had originally purchased. He assigned his rights under the conditional sales agreement to assignees (1) (January 23, 1924) 43 Cal. App. Dec. 240. Rehearing granted in Supreme Court March 20, 1924. (2) Cal. Stats. 1919, p. 191. (3) Motor Vehicle Act, #8, Cal. Stats. 1919, p. 201. who gave notice to the conditional vendee but failed to have the registration changed. The conditional vendee and vendor subsequently transferred the property to an innocent purchaser whose name was filled in on the certificate of registration by the conditional vendor. action of claim and delivery, brought by the assignees of the conditional vendor against the innocent purchaser, the court held that legal title had passed to the assignees despite non-compliance with the statute; that the Motor Vehicle Act makes no attempt to modify the established law of property or to affect the contractual relations of individuals, but that its purpose is merely to raise revenue for use in the upkeep of the state highways and that the conditional vendor, by inserting the name of the purchaser in the certificate of registration, could not divest the legal title to the car held by the assignees under the contract. Granting the latter statement, the assignees, by allowing the conditional vendor and vendee to keep the certificate of registration, indorsed in blank by the true owner, put it in their power to dispose of the property to an innocont purchaser in the belief that he was obtaining valid title thereto. In such a situation the assignees should be estopped from invoking the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act to deny the title of an innocent purchaser. (4) The query remains, did non-dompliance with the statute prevent (4) Boles v.Stiles (1922)188 Cal.304,204 Pac.848,63 Cal. Dec.293; Chucovich v. San Francisco Securities Corp. (1923)40 Cal.App.Dec.317, 214 Pac.263; Goodman v.Anglo-California Trust Co. (1923)41 Cal.App. Dec.527,217 Pac.1078; Pacific States Securities Co.v.Steiner (1923)42 Cal.App.Dec.74. the assignees from getting good title themselves? If the California legislature has clearly and unequivocally expressed its intention that legal title to such a vehicle shall not pass for any purpose if the provisions of the statute are not met, there is no doubt that such enactment precludes the passage of title to one in the position of the assignees of the conditional vendor or in the instaut case. case.(5) It is within the Police Power of a state to regulate the sale of goods and it may enact different regulations for the sale of goods of different classes so long as the classification is reasonable and the law operates uniformly. (6) Automobiles have been held to be a (5) In the case of Ferris v. Langston (1923) 253 S.W.309 (Texas) the court said, "But the Legislature possesses the unqualified and unquestionable right and power, not only to prescribe methods of transferring a particular kind of personal property, but it also possesses the full power by valid enactment to render compliance with such methods an essential to the validity of such transfer of the class of personal property affected; that is, to predicate validity of title upon such compliance." In Arotzky v. Kropnitzky (1923)120 At1.921(N.J.) the court said, "Touching the statute now before us, it is not necessary to search for legislative policy, because the Legislature is the judge of its own policy; but it is not far to seek. The act is manifestly intended to discourage and prevent, so far as possible, the sale of stolen motor vehicles, and voids a sale made without compliance with its provisions, much as the common law refuses to recognize a sale of land without the delivery of a deed." See Swank v.Moisan(1917)85 Ore. 662,166 Pac.962; Stein v.Scarpa (1921)96 L.J.L. 86,114 Atl.245; Foster ▼. Beall(1922) 242 S.W.1117(Texas); Goode v.Martinez (1922) 237 S.W.576 $Texas);Haimond Motor Co.v.Warren (1923)113 Kan. 576,213 Pac.810; Chaddick v. Sanders (1923) 250 S.W. 722 (Texas). (6) Cases collected, 12 Corpus Juris, 1162. |