The second ground upon which the court relied is that of the unconstitutionality of Title XXIII as being class legislation and in conflict with the requirement of the state constitution that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."16 The uniformity required is merely that of uniform operation upon all persons in the same category and upon rights and things in the same relation." A statute meets this condition if it applies alike to all persons or objects within a class founded upon some intrinsic distinction.18 Do the associations contemplated by Title XXIII properly constitute such a class? The California court holds that there is nothing peculiar to the instant organization which distinguishes it from any commercial packing company. But co-operative marketing associations possess distinctive features which are fundamental and amply justify a classification to which a general law may uniformly apply. Aside from the conditions imposed by their articles of incorporation the law imposes peculiar regulations to which commercial packing companies are not subject.19 Realizing the economic necessity for

Wheat Growers' Ass'n. v. Schulte (1923) 216 Pac. 311 (Kan.); Oregon Growers' Co-op. Ass'n. v. Lentz (1923) 212 Pac. 811 (Ore.); Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n. v. Jones (1923) 117 S. E. 174 (N. C.); Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n. (1922) 246 S. W. 1068 (Tex.). In Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n. v. Stovall (1923) 253 S. W. 1101, 1108 (Tex.) the court said, "It is insisted that this contract is unenforceable in equity at the suit of the association, because of lack of mutuality of remedy. The contract before us was authorized by the statute which gives the association the remedy of specific performance and injunction. The statute having authorized these remedies, whatever may have been the rule in equity, the statute will control."

16 Cal. Const., Art. I, § 11. It is also provided in the California Constitution that the legislature shall not pass local or special laws where a general law can be made applicable. Cal. Const., Art. IV, § 25 (33). Also, that no citizen or class of citizens, shall be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 21.

17 People v. Henshaw (1888) 76 Cal. 436, 18 Pac. 413; Wigmore v. Buell (1898) 122 Cal. 144, 54 Pac. 600; Selowsky v. Superior Court of Napa County, supra, n. 11.

18 Solano County v. McCudden (1898) 120 Cal. 648, 53 Pac. 213; Vail v. San Diego County (1899) 126 Cal. 35, 58 Pac. 392; Ruperich v. Baehr (1904) 142 Cal. 190, 75 Pac. 782; Moore v. Indian Spring etc. Mining Co. (1918) 37 Cal. App. 370, 174 Pac. 378; Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors (1920) 183 Cal. 434, 192 Pac. 40.

19 It is provided that "no person, firm, corporation or association, hereafter organized or doing business in this state, shall be entitled to use the word "co-operative" as part of its corporate or other business name or title for producers' co-operative marketing activities, unless it has complied with the provisions of this act." Cal. Civ. Code, § 653ss. Also, the power of the association to handle the agricultural products of any non-member except for storage, unless empowered to do so by the articles of incorporation and then not to an amount greater in value than the value of such products as are dealt in or handled by it for its own members or stock holders, is denied. Cal. Civ. Code, § 653ff (a). Such associations are not organized to make profit for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such, but only for their members as producers. Cal. Civ. Code, § 653bb (d). The nature and amount of the dividends which may be declared are fixed by statute. Cal. Civ. Code, § 653jj (i).

"

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co-operative marketing associations the Federal government has recognized them as a distinct class upon several occasions 20 and the public policy of this state and others is definitely committed in favor of co-operative marketing." In every case in other jurisdictions statutes similar to that in California have been upheld as being a reasonable classification consistent with state and Federal constitutions.22

20 In listing the organizations which are exempt from taxation under the Federal Income Tax, it is provided that "(11) Farmers', fruit growers', or like associations, organized and operated as sales agents for the purpose of marketing the products of members and turning back to them the proceeds of sales, less the necessary selling expenses, on the basis of the quantity of produce furnished by them; or organized and operated as purchasing agents for the purpose of purchasing supplies and equipment for the use of members and turning over such supplies and equipment to such members at actual cost plus necessary expenses," are exempt. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, 42 U. S. Stats. at L. 253, U. S. Comp. Stats. (1923 Supp.) § 6336 1/8 o, Fed. Stats. Ann. (1921 Supp.) 150. Also, the Clayton Amendment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act expressly exempts agricultural and horticultural organizations from anti-trust provisions when they are instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and have no capital stock and are not conducted for profit. An Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, etc., Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 U. S. Stats. at L. 731, U. S. Comp. Stats. (1918) § 8835f, 9 Fed. Stats. Ann (2d ed.) 737. And the Capper-Volstead Act, the latest federal enactment on this subject, provides that "persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common, and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however, That such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such producers," and conform to certain requirements as to dividends, voting of stock, and scope of activities, to which mere commercial packing companies are not subject. Capper-Volstead Act, § 1.

21 See supra, n. 4, for a list of states in which enabling statutes have been enacted; 8 Minnesota Law Review, 1, 8; in California the Cartwright Act exempts associations "the object and business of which are to conduct its operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable profit those products which cannot otherwise be so marketed, provided further, that it shall not be deemed to be unlawful,-for persons, firms, or corporations, engaged in the business of selling or manufacturing commodities of a similar or like character, to employ, form, organize or own any interest in any association, firm, or corporation, having as its object or purpose the transportation, marketing or delivering of such commodities." Cartwright Act, § 1 (5), Cal. Stats. 1909, p. 593.

22 Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n. v. Jones, supra, n. 15, where the statute was verbatim that of California; Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n., supra, n. 15; Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n. v. Schulte, supra, n. 15; Owen County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback (1908) 128 Ky. 137, 107 S. W. 710; Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op. Ass'n., supra, n. 15; Oregon Growers' Co-op. Ass'n. v. Lentz, supra, n. 15; Washington Cranberry Growers' Ass'n, v. Moore (1921) 117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773; Pierce County Dairymen's Ass'n. v. Templin (1923) 215 Pac. 352 (Wash.); Wisconsin Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, Supreme Court of Wis., November 13, 1923; Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n., Court of Appeals of Ky., December 21, 1923.

An analogous situation has arisen before in California. A law which distinguished corporations from individuals and partnerships engaged in the same business, for the purpose of penalizing the former for failure to give certain service, was upheld and the classification sustained.23 In the words of a Kentucky court, which decided that such associations constitute a proper class and that an act similar to the California statute was not violative of state and federal constitutional inhibitions, "we believe the act, by enabling the farmers to market their crops co-operatively for the purpose, as declared in the act, of regulating distribution and stabilizing the prices of farm products, serves a pressing public need that justifies the classification of farmers as a distinct class and treats all of the class equally and fairly and not better, if that were important, than other distinctive productive classes are treated under the laws of the state and nation. It does not, therefore, in our estimation, offend either the federal or state constitution."24

W.V.C.

23 Hansen v. Vallejo Electric Light Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 492, 188 Pac. 999. 24 Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n., supra, n. 22; see also 8 Minnesota Law Review, 1, 6.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS: Forfeiture Under the Wright Act OF A VEHICLE USED IN THE UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUOR: RIGHTS OF A CONDITIONAL VENDOR-Will the conditional vendor of a vehicle which has been used in the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor without his knowledge be protected in a proceeding under the Wright Act for the forfeiture and sale of the property? In the case of Traffic Truck Sales Co. of Cal. v. The Justice's Court of the Township of Red Bluff1 the conditional vendee of an automobile truck placed it in the custody of the defendant who was apprehended while using it in the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor after the rights of the conditional vendee had been terminated by default in payment. The defendant was prosecuted in the justice's court for violation of the Wright Act, found guilty, and the truck ordered to be forfeited and sold after proper notice. The conditional vendor, learning of the contemplated sale, petitioned the justice's court for release of the property but the court refused to entertain further jurisdiction of the matter. The petitioner then took a writ of prohibition to the Supreme Court and the case was there considered as one arising upon a writ of review2 resulting in the annulment of the judgment of the lower court because of its lack of jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding in equity or one involving the amount here in controversy. To decide what would have happened had the proceeding been prosecuted in the proper court was not germane to the instant decision and the Supreme Court left it problematical.

Much has been said concerning the rights of an innocent lienor3 under the various state laws which provide for the confiscation and forfeiture of vehicles used in the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor. Suffice it to say that the question is largely one of statutory construction" and the statutes of most states are qualified

1 (November 6, 1923) 66 Cal. Dec. 563, 220 Pac. 306.

2 The court will look toward the ultimate result rather than consider itself constrained to observe the technicalities of pleading. Where the application for a writ of prohibition brings up the complete record of the case so far as relates to the point involved, and when the record presents to the appellate tribunal a sufficient case for consideration as one arising upon a writ of review, the case will be considered and the court will give such relief as the record warrants. Van Hoosear v. Railroad Commission (1922) 189 Cal. 228, 207 Pac. 903; Traffic Truck Sales Co. v. The Justice's Court, supra, n. 1.

3 The "lien" referred to in the National Prohibition Act and in state enforcement statutes is not a lien in the strict common law sense in that it does not require that the lien holder be in possession of the property. "Lien" is used in these statutes as the equivalent of encumbrance. 72 Pennsylvania Law Review, 181, 182, and cases there cited. But see United States v. Montgomery (1923) 289 Fed. 125, where a conditional vendor was denied protection under § 26, Title II, National Prohibition Act, upon the theory that a conditional sales contract is not one creating a lien within the meaning of the statute in favor of the seller.

47 Cornell Law Quarterly, 269; 72 Pennsylvania Law Review, 181; 34 Harvard Law Review, 200; Blakemore on Prohibition, p. 401.

34 Harvard Law Review, 200, 201, where there is a discussion of the principles of construction which are proper to apply in the interpretation of these statutes.