the offence. The county or other place in the margin must be descriptive of the district within which the court can exercise jurisdiction, and within which the offence was committed: as for instance, in this court, the venue in the margin, must be the county in which the court, at the time, happens to sit, namely, "Middlesex;" and the like in other cases. But for felonies or misdemeanors committed on the boundary or boundaries of two or more counties, or within 500 yards of the boundary, or begun in one county and completed in another, the indictment may charge it to have been committed in either county. See 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 12. This however extends only to a case where the trial is in a county, and not in a borough or other place of limited jurisdiction. R. v. Welsh, R. & M. 175. Also, where a felony or misdemeanor is committed on any person, or on or in respect of property, in or upon any coach, waggon, cart, or other carriage whatsoever employed in any journey, or on board any vessel in a voyage or journey on any navigable river or canal,—the indictment may charge it to have been committed in any county through which the coach or vessel, &c. shall have passed in its journey or voyage. See 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 13. As to prosecutions in an adjoining county, for offences committed in cities and towns corporate, see stat. 38 G. 3, c. 52; 51 G. 3, c. 100; 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 109; R. & Ry. 179, 481. And as to murder or manslaughter committed by a British subject abroad, see 9 G. 4, c. 31, s. 7; and 2 Arch. P. A. 86, n. And as to offences committed abroad by persons holding public employments, see 42 G. 3, c. 85; 11 & 12 W. 3, c. 12; R. v. Shawe, 5 M. & S. 403. By stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 20, no judgment upon an indictment for any felony or misdemeanor, whether after verdict or outlawry, or by confession, default, or otherwise, shall be stayed or reversed "for want of a proper or perfect venue, where the court shall appear by the indictment to have jurisdiction over the offence." As to the caption of an indictment, see post.

Body of the Indictment.

Description of the defendant.] The person charged by the indictment, must be described by his christian or first name, his surname, his addition of place or late residence, and his addition of degree or mystery: as for instance, "John William Smith, late of the parish of the Holy Trinity, in the county aforesaid, labourer; James Perry, late of the same place, gentleman; Ann the wife of George Jones, of the same place, yeoman; Jane Golding of the same place, single woman," and the like. Whether the description be a correct one, is now immaterial; for by stat. 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 19, if any objection

be made to the indictment on that ground, "the court shall forthwith cause the indictment to be amended according to the truth, and shall call upon the party to plead thereto." If the defendant be not known, and he refuse to disclose his name, he may be described as a person to the jurors unknown, but who is personally brought before them by the keeper of the prison. Anon, R. & Ry. 489. In indictments against a parish or township for the non-repair of a highway, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 68, or the inhabitants of a county for not repairing a bridge, the indictment may be against the inhabitants of the parish, township, or county generally, without naming any individual. A corporation aggregate, also, may be indicted by their corporate name for a breach of duty, though not for a crime. R. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co. 3 Ad. & El. N. C. 223.

But when it is necessary to describe the party charged, in any particular way, to bring him within the purview of any statute on which the indictment is framed, such statute extending only to such persons as are specially mentioned in it: the indictment must so describe the party, as to bring him within the words and meaning of the statute, and the evidence must support the description. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 112.

Description of the indictor or party injured, &c.] The indictor or party injured, if known, must be described with certainty; 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 71; if an individual, he must be described by his christian and surname; if a corporation, by their name of incorporation. But if the party be described by the name by which he is usually known, it will be sufficient; and therefore where the prosecutor was named in the indictment John Hancox, his real name being John Walter Hancox, but he was usually called and known by the name of John Hancox: Park, J. held it to be sufficient. R. v. Berriman, 5 Car. & P. 601. So, where the real name was Richard Jeremiah Pratt, but he was named in the indictment Richard Pratt, the name by which he was generally known, it was holden sufficient. Anon. 6 Car. & P. 408. Where the name was spelt Whyneard, the real manner of spelling it was Winyard, and it was pronounced Winnyard, the judges held it to be sufficient. R. v. Foster, R. & Ry. 412. And where the prosecutrix was named in the indictment by a name which she had assumed, but by which alone she was known in the neighbourhood, the judges held it sufficient. R. v. Norton. R. & Ry. 510. On the other hand, where a prosecutor is described by his right name, although it be not that by which he is generally known, it will be sufficient. R. v. Williams, 7 Car. & P. 298. It is not necessary to give the party any addition of degree or mystery, &c.; 2 Hal. 182; and see R. v. Peace, 3 B. & Ald. 579: nor is it safe to do so; for where, in bigamy, the second wife was described as Elizabeth

Chant widow, and it appeared in evidence that Elizabeth Chant was at the time in fact and by reputation a single woman, the judges held the misdescription to be fatal, although it was not necessary to have stated more than the name of the party. R. v. Deeley, R. & Ry. 303. 4 Car. & P. 579. By stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 20, no judgment upon an indictment shall be stayed or reversed, because "any person or persons mentioned in the indictment is or are designated by a name of office or other descriptive appellation, instead of his or her proper name or names." If the names of the party be unknown, he should be described as "a person to the jurors aforesaid unknown ;” see R. v. Biss, 8 Car. & P. 773. R. v. Clark, R. & Ry. 358. But if at the trial afterwards it appear that the party was known, the defendant cannot be convicted. See R. v. Robinson, per Richards, C. B., 1 Holt, 595. And where an indictment against an accessory before the fact to a larceny, stated the larceny to have been committed by a person unknown, and the grand jury found the bill upon the evidence of a person who acknowledged that he had committed the larceny: Le Blanc, J. ordered the defendant to be acquitted. R. v. Walker, 3 Camp. 264.

Where, in an indictment for felony or misdemeanor, it becomes necessary to state the ownership of any property, real or personal, belonging to partners in trade, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, it shall be sufficient to name one of such persons, and to state such property to belong to the person so named and another or others, as the case may be; and whenever in any indictment for felony or misdemeanor, it shall be necessary to mention, for any purpose whatsoever, any partners, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, it shall be sufficient to describe them in the manner aforesaid; and this provision shall be construed to extend to all joint stock companies and trustees. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 14; see R. v. Boulton, 5 Car. & P. 537. 1 Arch. P. A. 207, n. So, by 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 15, in any indictment for any felony or misdemeanor respecting any "bridge, court, gaol, house of correction, infirmary, asylum or other building, erected or maintained in whole or in part at the expense of any county, riding, or division; or on or with respect to any goods or chattels whatsoever, provided for or at the expense of any county, riding or division, to be used for making, altering or repairing any bridge, or any highway at the ends thereof, or any court or other such building as aforesaid, or to be used in or with any such court or other building: it shall be sufficient to state any such property, real or personal, to belong to the inhabitants of such county, riding or division; and it shall not be necessary to specify the names of any such inhabitants." So, goods provided for the use of the poor of any parish or township, &c., may be stated to belong to the overseers of the poor of such parish, &c., for the time being. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 16. See R. v.

Went, R. & Ry. 359. So, tools and materials for repairing highways, not under trustees or commissioners, may be described as belonging to the surveyor of the highway for the time being, without specifying his name. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 16. So, buildings, gates, &c., erected in pursuance of any Act for making a turnpike road, or any tools, materials, &c., may be described as belonging to the trustees or commissioners of the road, without naming them. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 17. So, property under the commissioners of sewers, may be described as belonging to such commissioners, without naming them. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 18.

The facts, &c., constituting the offence.] Every offence must of course consist of certain facts and circumstances: in the case of an offence at common law, these facts, &c., are defined by the rule of the common law upon the subject; in offences against statutes, by the statute creating the offence. And the general rule of pleading, with respect to this part of an indictment, is, that all the material facts and circumstances comprised in the definition of the offence, whether by a rule of the common law or a statute, must be stated; if any one material fact or circumstance be omitted, the indictment will be bad. If, for instance, in larceny, the indictment were merely to state that the defendant feloniously took the goods in question, without stating also that he carried them away, the indictment would be bad; as the carrying of them away is a material part of the definition of larceny. So, an indictment for murder, omitting the words ex malitia præcogitata, would be bad, even although it charged that the defendant felonice murdravit, &c., which implies malice. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 60. And the same in other cases. See several similar cases of indictments on statutes, deemed bad on this ground, 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 110.

Time and place.] The indictment must state, either expressly or by way of reference, when and where each fact stated in the indictment took place; otherwise the indictment will be bad. 2 Hawk.c. 25, s. 77, 83. See R. v. Wright, 1 Ad. & El. 434. This is usually done, in the first instance, by stating, that the defendant Ion the first day of August, in the seventh year of the reign of our Sovereign Lady Victoria, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, at the parish of A. in the county aforesaid," did so and so, stating the act done; and the facts subsequently mentioned may be stated to have been done then and there," referring to the time and place before specifically stated. See 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 78.

In the first place, in indictments for felony, time must be

laid to every material fact, otherwise the indictment will be bad. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 77. 2 Hal. 177, 178. As for instance, in an indictment for murder, time must be stated, not only to the assault, but to the stroke also, and the death. Id. But in misdemeanors, it is said not to be necessary to lay a time to every fact, as the time first laid is deemed to be connected with all the facts subsequently stated; 2 Hal. 178; but the omission of time, even in those cases, if not objectionable in point of law, is at least not very indicative of good or careful pleading. See R. v. Holland, 5 T. R. 607, 625. And the time so stated must not be repugnant, uncertain, or impossible; and therefore, if an indictment state a fact to have occurred on a day subsequent to the finding of the bill, it will be bad. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 77. And formerly a defect in this respect was not cured even by verdict. Id. But now, by stat. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 20, judgment upon an indictment for felony or misdemeanor, whether after verdict or confession, &c., shall not be stayed or reversed, for "omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed, in any case where time is not of the essence of the offence, nor for stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offence to have been committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment, or an impossible day, or on a day that never happened."

It is only, however, in cases where a fact of commission is charged, that time must be stated; where the offence consists altogether of an omission, it is not necessary to allege any time to it. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 79. And in cases where it must be stated, it is sufficient to state the day and year, without giving the hour, &c., Id. s. 76, except perhaps in burglary, and nightpoaching, and the like, where the offence must appear to have been committed in the night time. The true time, however, need not be stated in any instance, unless made necessary in some particular case by statute; but the fact stated to have occurred on one day, may be proved to have occurred upon another. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 81. 2 Hale, 179. Yet it is in general prudent to state the day correctly; for the grand jury, from their ignorance of the rule of law upon the subject, often make a difficulty in finding a bill, when there is a variance between the time laid and that proved by the witnesses before them.

So a place must be laid to every material fact, otherwise the indictment will be bad; and the place stated must appear to be within the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is found. 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 83. Formerly, not only the county, but the parish or other place within the county, in which the fact was supposed to have been committed, must have been stated. But as by the late Jury Act, 6 G. 4, c. 50, s. 13, the jury, in criminal cases as well as civil, are now re