lection of a five-mill tax voted by the property taxpayers of that town for a period of 10 years, in aid of a railroad, and to have the same decreed illegal and unconstitutional. The parties made defendant are the mayor, aldermen, and marshal of the town, the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, and the Guardian Trust Company, the latter being the transferee of the tax. The defense is that an election was held, and that the tax in question was voted and levied under the authority of and in conformity to law and to the petition of the property taxpayers, including several of the present plaintiffs; that the road was built as contemplated, and accepted by the town, and that the plaintiffs acquiesced therein, and for several years have acquiesced in and paid the tax, and are now estopped to deny its validity. The defendants also plead the prescription of three months under Act No. 106 of 1892. There was judgment in the district court in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs have appealed. The grounds mainly relied on for the reversal of the judgment are: (1) That the taxpayers of a town are without legal or constitutional right to vote a tax against such town in aid of a railroad to be constructed outside of its corporate limits. (2) That, if the voting of the tax in this instance was legal, the defendants are nevertheless without right to collect such tax, for the reason that it has not been levied as required by law. The questions to be determined arise under certain provisions of the constitution of 1879 and statutes regulating the enforcement thereof. Article 209 of that constitution, after regulating the rate of state taxation for general purposes, provided: "That, for the purpose of erecting and constructing public buildings, bridges, and works of public improvement, in parishes and municipalities, the rates of taxation herein limited may be increased when the rate of such increase and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been submitted to a vote of the property tax payers of such parish, or municipality, entitled to vote under the election laws of the state, and a majority of the same voting at such election shall have voted therefor." Article 242 provided that: "The general assembly shall have power to enact general laws authorizing the parochial or municipal authorities of the state, under certain circumstances, by a vote of a majority of the property tax payers in number and in value, to levy special taxes in aid of public improvements or railway enterprises: provided, that such tax shall not exceed the rate of five mills per annum, nor extend for a longer period than ten years." Act No. 84 of 1880 provides, in substance, that elections concerning special taxation shall be ordered by the authorities of a parish or municipality upon the petition of one-third of the property taxpayers, and that, a majority of the persons entitled to participate voting therefor, a special tax shall be levied in aid of the construction of public buildings, bridges, and other works of public improvement within the limits of the parish or municipality, or of bridges over streams dividing contiguous parishes, or of public improvements or railway enterprises "extending within or beyond the limits of the state." Act No. 35 of 1886 is somewhat more specific in prescribing the form and substance of the petition for the election. It limits the right to extend aid by special taxation to Louisiana corporations, requires a majority in value as well as in number of property taxpayers to carry the election, and authorizes nonresident taxpayers to vote in person or by proxy. It provides that, where the result of an election is favorable to the tax, the parish or municipal authorities "shall, immediately, pass an ordinance levying such tax, and for such time as may have been specified in the petition, and shall designate the year in which such taxes shall be first levied and collected." In a subsequent section it further provides that "the police jury * * shall, when the vote is in favor of the levy of such taxes, levy and collect, annually, in addition to other taxes, a tax upon all taxable property sufficient to pay the amount specified to be paid in such petition; and such police jury shall have the same power to enforce and collect any special tax that may be authorized by such election as is, or may be, conferred by law for the collection * * of other taxes," etc. The act also authorizes the assignment of the right to receive the special tax, with the proviso, however, that no such tax shall be paid until the proposed railway shall have been completed and in operation "to such point, in such parish, city, or incorporated town, as may" have been specified in the petition for the election, and it repeals all acts in conflict with its provisions. Act. No. 106 of 1892 provides (section 1): "That any election held under articles 209, 242, and 250 of the constitution of 1879 and the laws to carry the same into effect may be contested by any party, or parties, in interest, on grounds of fraud, illegality, or irregularity, before any court of competent jurisdiction." Section 2: * Any suit under the provisions of this act shall be brought within three months after the promulgation of the result of the election contested." Act No. 153 of 1894 amends the previous legislation only in so far as to provide for elections and for the imposition of special taxes in the wards of the parishes, as well as in parishes and municipalities. It appears from the evidence that at a meeting of the board of aldermen of the town of Mansfield held upon February 13, 1896, there was presented to that body a petition, signed by more than one-third in number and value of the property taxpayers of the town, including, as we understand it, several of the plaintiffs now before the court, which petition alleged that great benefit would result to the town and its citizens from the construction of a railroad through the parish of De Soto from north to south, "with depot and grounds located at or near the town of Mansfield"; and prayed that an election be ordered, and a special tax of five mills per annum be levied for 10 years on all the taxable property of the town, in aid of the same, such tax to become due and exigible | from and after the completion and operation of the road in the parish, and the road to be completed and operated before the 1st of October, 1898. It further appears that the board of aldermen ordered the election as requested; that the election was held in March, 1896; that it resulted favorably to the levying of the tax; and that an ordinance was adopted levying the tax of five mills annually for 10 years from January 1, 1897, "the said tax to be paid over, as collected, from year to year, to the said railway company, its successors and assigns, subject to the conditions and provisions of the petition of the property taxpayers." It is admitted that the Kansas City, Shreveport & Gulf Railway Company began and completed the work of constructing the road, and that the road was in operation, within the time specified in the petition of the taxpayers, and that passenger and freight depots were established near Mansfield, though not within the corporate limits of the town; the evidence showing that the depots are about a quarter of a mile outside such corporate limits, but are within the settled suburbs. It is also admitted that the road, as thus built, is part of a continuous line from Kansas City, Mo., to Port Arthur, on the Gulf of Mexico. We agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the two articles of the constitution which are called in question, dealing, as they do, with the same subject-matter, should be construed together. MacKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. Ann. 947, 3 South. 128; Citizens, etc., v. Williams, 49 La. Ann. 422, 21 South. 647, 37 L. R. A. 761. But in thus construing them we must give to each its utmost effect, so far as that can be done without bringing it into conflict with the other. Observing this rule, our conclusion is that, whilst the two articles, taken together, contemplated a certain class of public improvements which was to be confined within the limits of the parish or municipality voting the tax, they also contemplated another class which was not to be so confined, and that a railway enterprise falls within the latter class, or is a class of itself. This view of the matter was distinctly recognized in the act of 1880, which was repealed by the act of 1886 only in so far as its provisions were in conflict with those of the later act. There is, no doubt, some basis for the argument that the provisions of the act of 1880 relating to extraterritorial railway enterprises are in conflict with the provision of the act of 1886 to the effect that "no such tax shall be paid ・・・ until the railway shall be completed and in operation to such point in such * * * incorporated town as may be specified in the proposition set forth in the petition," etc. But when we consider that the right to impose the special tax was not limited by the constitution to railway enterprises actually terminating in or passing through a parish or town, and is not so limited by those sections of the act of 1886 which authorize the ordering of the elections and the levying of the tax, it becomes necessary that the provision in question, before being accorded the effect claimed for it, should be construed with the sections referred to and with the constitution, and that we should in that way ascertain the meaning and purpose of the whole legislation. It will hardly be denied that, whilst an electric light plant in Shreveport would confer no benefit on the town of Mansfield, a railroad between the two places might be of great advantage to both, though not entering the corporate limits of either. And this, we take it, was what the framers of the constitution had in view when they failed to restrict the right to impose special taxes in aid of railways to those terminating or to be established within the districts to be taxed. And equally is thus true of the legislative action of 1880. When the general assembly again took the matter up in 1886 it was provided by the first section of the act then adopted that "whenever one third of the property tax payers * shall petition * the municipal authorities to levy a special tax in aid of any railway company or corporation organized under the laws of this state, the said * municipal or town authorities shall order a special election." etc.; and there is no intimation, either there or elsewhere in the act, until we reach the particular clauses under consideration, that it was the purpose to restrict the right of the taxpayers to provoke an election and to tax themselves to cases where the railway to be aided was to pass through or to terminate within the corporate limits of the town. It is therefore sufficient, by the terms of the act of 1886, to entitle the taxpayers to the election for which they petition, that the railway company which they propose to aid shall have been organized under the laws of this state. The question, as the judge a quo well puts it, is one of benefit vel non, and if, in a particular case, the taxpayers are of opinion that it will answer their purposes to have a railway company which connects them with the rest of the world build its road and establish its depot within a few hundred yards of their town, rather than through the heart of it, we are not prepared to hold that the act of 1886 denies them the right, contemplated by the constitution, to impose a tax upon their property in aid of such road. The particular provision of the statute which we are now considering was intended, as we think, to secure the completion and operation of the aided road in the manner contemplated in the petition of the taxpayers as a condition precedent to the recovery of the tax by the corporation to be aided, but not as a limitation upon the right of the taxpayers to call an election and vote a tax for the aid of a road the construction of which will be to their advantage, though neither passing through nor terminating within the corporate limits of the town upon which the tax is to be imposed. This being the case, we conclude, upon the facts stated, that the election of which the plaintiffs complain was authorized by the constitution and laws of the state, and is not open to the objections urged. Both the act of 1886 and the act of 1894 provide that, where the election results favorably to the tax, the parish or municipal authorities "shall, immediately, pass an ordinance levying such tax and for such time as may be specified in the petition; and shall designate the year in which such tax shall be first levied and collected." The word "levying" is thus obviously, though incorrectly, used in the sense of "imposing," and So construing it, the board of aldermen of the town of Mansfield, after ascertaining the result of the election, passed an ordinance "levying" the special tax voted for 10 years, as specified in the petition of the taxpayers, and designating the year in which it should "first be levied and collected." In a subsequent section the word "levy" is again used in connection with the grant of authority and the imposition of the obligation to collect the special tax annually, and in the same manner as other taxes are collected, and it is thus used in the sense of "collect," and does not, therefore, conflict with, but is in furtherance of, the preceding provisions. The charge contained in the petition that the election in question was carried by misrepresentation was not insisted on in the original brief filed on behalf of the defendant, and is not sustained by the evidence. The conclusions which have been stated render it unnecessary that we should pass on the defendants' pleas of prescription and estoppel. Judgment affirmed. BLANCHARD, J., takes no part, having been originally of counsel. (106 La.) PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA v. CAMPBELL et al. (No. 14,035.) (Supreme Court of Louisiana. Dec. 16, 1901.) INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LICENSES. Where, in a general parish election, under Act No. 76, 1884, the majority of the voters of the parish decide against the sale of intoxicating liquors, the police jury is powerless to exact licenses for that business anywhere in the parish; but, if those voters of the parish who live in a particular town subsequently reverse that decision, in so far as their town is concerned, they thereby authorize the exaction of parochial licenses for liquor selling in such town, just as they authorize the exaction of state and municipal licenses. (Syllabus by the Court.) 31 So.-4 Appeal from judicial district court, parish of Tangipahoa; Robert R. Reid, Judge. Action by the parish of Tangipahoa against Campbell & Hart. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. D. M. Sholars (Boatner, Dodds & Boatner, of counsel), for appellants. Robert S. Ellis, Dist. Atty., for appellee. MONROE, J. The defendants appeal from a judgment condemning them to pay $500 for a parish license as retail liquor dealers at Ponchatoula, in the parish of Tangipahoa. It is admitted that, at an election held throughout the parish of Tangipahoa, in 1889, under Act No. 76 of 1884, there was a majority vote against the sale of intoxicating liquors in the parish; that subsequently, in 1900, the town of Ponchatoula, by a vote of its citizens, decided to authorize such sale, within its limits; and that, thereafter, the police jury imposed a license of $500 upon the business so authorized, though the matter had not been submitted to the voters of the parish since the election of 1889. It is also admitted that the defendants are engaged in selling intoxicating liquors, at retail, in the town of Ponchatoula; that they have paid a state and municipal license therefor; and that the police jury has adopted, for the collection of the parish licenses, the mode prescribed by the general assembly for the collection of state and parish taxes. Article 229 of the constitution, after authorizing the state to levy a license tax, proceeds as follows, to wit: "No political corporation shall impose a greater license tax than is imposed by the general assembly for state purposes. This restriction shall not apply to dealers in distilled, or alcoholic, or malt, liquors. The general assembly shall have authority to provide that municipalities levying license taxes equal in amount to those levied by police juries for parochial purposes shall be exempted from the payment of such parochial licenses." By Act No. 115 of 1898, amending Rev. St. § 2743, police juries are authorized "to levy such taxes as they may judge necessary to defray the expenses of their respective parishes." So far as property taxation is concerned, this is necessarily subject to the 10-mill limitation contained in article 232 of the constitution; but in the matter of licensing dealers in distilled, alcoholic, or malt liquors, the power of the police juries, in general, is without limitation, other than is found in Act No. 76 of 1884, since the general assembly has never seen fit to exercise the authority conferred on it to exempt from the payment of parochial licenses persons paying licenses to municipalities. Act No. 76 of 1884 amends and re-enacts sections 1211 and 2778, Rev. St., and provides: "That the police juries of the several parishes of this state, the municipal authorities of the several towns and cities, and the city council of the city of New Orleans, shall have the exclusive power to make such rules and regu lations for the sale, or the prohibition of the sale, of intoxicating liquors, as they may deem advisable, and to grant or withhold licenses for drinking houses and shops within the limits of any city, parish, ward of a parish, or town, as a majority of the legal voters of any city, ward of a parish, or town, may determine, by ballot; and the said ballot shall be taken whenever deemed necessary by the police juries of the several parishes, the municipal authorities of the several cities and towns, and the city council of the city of New Orleans; provided, that said election shall not be held more than once a year; and provided, further, that, whenever, at an election held under this section, the majority of the votes cast in a ward, if only a ward election has been held, or the majority of votes cast in a parish, if an election has been held for a whole parish, shall be against granting licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, said vote, or decision, shall govern and control the action of any ward, incorporated town, or city, within the limits of said ward, or parish, as the case may be, as fully and completely as if said election had been held by the authority of said town or city." Considering these different provisions of the law, constitutional and statutory, together, we find no reason for supposing that it was intended to vest in the majority of the voters of a parish, or in the majority of the voters of any subdivision of a parish, the power to exempt from the payment of a parochial license any person actually engaged in a business otherwise liable to that species of taxation. It is true that the body of the voters in the parish of Tangipahoa decided that liquor should not be sold in the parish, and, so long as their decision remained effective, the police jury was powerless to exact licenses for that business in any part of the parish. But those voters of the parish who live in Ponchatoula thought proper to reverse that decision, in so far as their town is concerned, and, in doing so, they authorized the exaction of parochial licenses for liquor selling in Ponchatoula, just as they authorized the exaction of state and municipal licenses, which the defendants admit that they have paid. If this were not so, we should have the singular spectacle presented of a temperance law so operating as to exempt retail liquor dealers in Ponchatoula from the payment of parish licenses for which all other callings in the town are liable. Judgment affirmed. (106 La.) STATE ex rel. MULLER v. BROWN, Judge. (No. 14,115.) (Supreme Court of Louisiana. Dec. 16, 1901.) MANDAMUS-DISTRICT ATTORNEY-DUTIES. It being made the duty of the district attorney to represent the state in all criminal and civil actions in his district, he has the right to represent the state in magistrates' courts on the trial of cases for assault; and this right, if denied to him by the magistrate, may be enforced by mandamus. (Syllabus by the Court.) Application by the state, on the relation of Anthony N. Muller, for a writ of mandamus to Robert Brown, judge of the city court of the city of New Iberia. Motion made peremptory. Anthony N. Muller, Dist. Atty., in pro. per. Robert Brown, in pro. per. PROVOSTY, J. The respondent magistrate refused to permit the district attorney to represent the state before his court in the prosecution of an assault case,-he "ruled him out"; and this is an application by the district attorney to this court for mandamus, under the supervisory pow. ers of this court, to compel the recognition of his right to represent the prosecution in state cases before the respondent's court. The respondent returns as follows: "In refusing to permit the relator to prosecute in the court over which respondent presides, he was so induced to do upon the realization that, if the district attorney was permitted to make an appearance in a case entertained by him upon an affidavit of another party, it was opening the door to the mulcting of the parish for the fees allowed the district attorney for convictions in cases of misdemeanor. Frequently the offense charged is of such a trifling nature that a judge of the city court cannot consistently impose but a minimum sentence upon the party accused. All criminal cases within his jurisdiction are instituted without the assistance, and in the most instances without the knowledge, of the district attorney. He is of no prac tical assistance to the court. It would in such cases be a hardship upon the parish to have to pay the district attorney a greater fee than that realized by the fine, and in some cases besides being made to pay for the party's board when he has been remanded to jail. The parish is already called upon to pay the salary of the judge of the city court, and the purpose of the act creating the court is manifestly to reduce criminal expenses. If the district attorney be permitted notwithstanding to collect fees for conviction in cases in which he has neither taken the initiative nor instituted proceedings, then the result will be that the criminal expenses of the parish will be increased, instead of diminished. Most frequently the offenses charged before the city court are of a nature that the grand jury would not entertain, or the district attorney file an information. It will also be noted that an appeal lies from the city court to the district court in case of conviction, and this fact would indicate that in contemplation of law the city court is merely one of subsidiary police power, not one in which an accused can be finally and irrevocably convicted, un less with his sanction and acquiescence. District attorneys are paid for final convictions, and this would mean that, if an accused would appeal to the district court, then the district attorney prosecuting there would be entitled to a fee in event that the finding of the city court is affirmed. If no appeal is prosecuted from the city court, the finding thereof is final only through the acquiescence of the party accused, and not through any efforts of the district attorney. There is an additional objection to the district attorney's appearance in the premises, -one that would result in tying the hands of the city court if disregarded. Respondent alludes to the fact that there are two parishes in the judicial district. Frequently the relator is performing his duties in the adjoining parish of St. Martin. It is physically impossible for him to attend to prosecutions in the city court during that time. Now, his enforced absence extends on many occasions to a period of thirty days. During that time is the city court to cease operations by reason of his absence? Even when attending the district court in this parish, relator cannot give any time to the city court. The act creating the city court provides that it shall be open at all times. Shall this provision be rendered nugatory? Moreover, article 9 of the constitution allows the legislature to provide for the prosecution of misdemeanors on affidavit, yet no act has ever been passed authorizing district attorneys to prosecute on behalf of the state except when indictment has been returned or information filed. All of the law appertaining to duties of district attor neys is silent on the privilege in such a case as the instant one. The inference from this silence is inevitable that the lawmakers sought, by permitting misdemeanors to be entertained upon affidavits filed, to save the parishes of such criminal expenses as that of the fees of district attorneys. Act No. 96 of 1880, defining duties of district attorneys, contemplates only duties in district courts. Act No. 48 of 1900, creating the city court of the city of New Iberia, does not contain a syllable authorizing the district attorney to appear and prosecute therein in behalf of the state. So realizing and so reasoning, respondent was impelled to deny relator's right to prosecute in the premises, and submits respectfully the foregoing, with the prayer that the writs be dismissed at relator's cost. Robert Brown, in Propria Persona." This return shows that the respondent was actuated by the most laudable motives, but it does not deny the fact that the case in question was a criminal case prosecuted under a state statute, and therefore a case coming clearly within the province of the district attorney, whose duty it is, by Act No. 96 of 1880, § 1, to "represent the state in all civil and criminal actions" in his district. State v. Bezou, 48 La. Ann. 1369, 20 South. 892. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the mandamus herein be made peremptory at the cost of the respondent. (104 La.) In re JOHN LANGE LAND & IMPROVE- Application for appointment of a receiver under Act No. 159 of 1898. Held, taking the case as presented and the proof administered in support thereof, no sufficient showing for the order is made. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from civil district court, parish of Orleans; Walter B. Sommerville, Judge. In the matter of the John Lange Land & Improvement Company, Limited. From a judgment refusing a receiver, Frank Lange appeals. Affirmed. A. J. Lewis, for appellant. Cage, Baldwin & Crabites, for appellee. BLANCHARD, J. Frank Lange, the peti tioner, is a stockholder and director in the John Lange Land & Improvement Company, Limited. He brought this action to dissolve and annul the charter of the corporation, and asked, as a preliminary step, the immediate appointment of a receiver to take charge of and administer the affairs of the corporation pending further proceedings in the case. The application for the appointment of receiver is made under Act No. 159 of 1898: The district judge having ordered the company to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed (section 2 of the act of 1898), and this rule having been tried, there was judgment denying, for the present, the appointment of a receiver. No opinion of the trial judge or reasons for judgment appear transcribed in the transcript. This left the cause to be tried on its merits, i. e., whether or not the dissolution and annulment of the charter should be decreed; and it also left open the question of appointment of a receiver later, should appropriate steps to that end be taken, or grounds develop justifying such appointment. From the judgment refusing the immediate appointment of a receiver this appeal is prosecuted. It is observed that, besides asking the dissolution and annulment of the charter of the corporation, the petitioner prayed that Charles Lange, who was cited both as president of the company and individually, be ordered to render a full and complete account of all the property of every kind belonging to the estate of John Lange, deceased. It seems that Charles Lange had been the administrator of John Lange's succession; that this succession had been a proceeding pending in another division of the civil district court of the parish of Orleans; that it had there been administered; and that an account filed by |