ten charges requested by the defendant. The record does not show any refused charges that were requested by the defendant. There being nothing to support the assignments of error, the judgment of the court is accordingly affirmed. Opinion by Dowdell, J.

JASPER LAND CO. v. BARTLETT et al. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 26, 1901.) Appeal from chancery court, Walker county: Thos. Cobbs, Chancellor. A. T. London and Appling & McGuire, for appellant. Smith & Weatherly and Coleman & Coleman, for appellees. The bill in this case was filed in the name of the Jasper Land Company against the appellees as individual defendants, and sought to enjoin them from acting as directors of said Jasper Land Company. The cause was submitted in the court below for decree on motion to dissolve the injunction for the want of equity, and on the sworn denials of the answer, and on the demurrers to the bill. The chancellor rendered a decree sustaining the demurrers to the bill, ordered it dismissed for the want of equity, and dissolved the temporary injunction which had been previously granted. From this decree the complainant appeals. The decree is affirmed. Opinion by Dowdell, J.

MCANULTY v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 13, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Henry county; John P. Hubbard, Judge. Lee & Koonce, for appellant. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State. The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for the violation of a local prohibition law. The judg ment is affirmed Opinion by Dowdell, J.

McCALLEY v. RAGLAND et al. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 14, 1902.) Appeal from probate court, Madison county; S. M. Stewart, Judge. Charles J. Stone, for appellant. Humes, Sheffey & Speake, for appellee. The proceedings in this case were commenced by a petition, made by Mary A. Ragland, as administratrix of the estate of Lewis Jones, deceased, for a final settlement of her account as such administratrix. The appeal is by the guardian ad litem of an infant party from a decree of the probate court rendered on final settlement. The decree is affirmed. Opinion by Haralson, J.

MARLOWE v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 5, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Bullock county; A. A. Evans, Judge. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen.. for the State. The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for burglary. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Opinion by Haralson, J.

MARLOWE v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 5, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Bullock county; A. A. Evans, Judge. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen.. for the State. The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for grand larceny. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Opinion by Haralson, J.

RANDALL et al. v. MOSS et al. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 20, 1901.) Appeal from circuit court, Shelby county; John Pelham, Judge. W. S. Cary, for appellants. This action was brought by the appellants against the appellees to recover damages for the al

leged breach of an injunction bond. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff prosecutes the present appeal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, on the authority of Ex parte Gist, 119 Ala. 463, 24 South. 831. Opinion by Dowdell, J.

SMITH v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 17, 1901.) Appeal from circuit court, Walker county; A. A. Coleman, Judge. W. L. Acoff and F. A. Gamble, for appellant. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State. The appellant was indicted. tried, and convicted for the murder of Henry Barrentine, and sentenced to be hanged. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Opinion per curiam.

SOWEL V. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 4, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county; John P. Hubbard, Judge. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State. The appellant was indicted and tried for the murder of Lula Sowel, was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for 20 years. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Opinion per curiam.

SPIGNER v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 4, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county; John P. Hubbard, Judge. Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State. The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for aiding a prisoner to escape. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Opinion per curiam.

ren

THOMPSON v. HARRIS. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 19, 1901.) Appeal from circuit court, Macon county; N. D. Denson, Judge. O. Kyle, for appellant. Jinks & Blue, for appellee. In this court W. S. Harris, appellee in the above-stated cause, makes a motion to dismiss the appeal taken in said cause by said W. I. R. Thompson & Co., appellants, on, to wit, the 2d day of October, 1900, on the following grounds: That a judgment was dered in favor of this movant in a certain cause pending in the circuit court of Macon county, Ala., wherein W. I. R. Thompson & Co. were complainants and this movant was defendant, on the 4th of October, 1899; that on the 15th day of February, 1900. said Thompson & Co. took an appeal from said judgment of said circuit court to the supreme court of Alabama, and on, to wit, the day of 1900, this court affirmed the judgment of said circuit court on the certificate of the clerk of the circuit court of Macon county; that on, to wit, the day of June, 1900, the said appellants filed their motion in this court to set aside the affirmance on certificate, and on, to wit, the 27th day of June, 1900, the motion to set aside and vacate said affirmance was by this court overruled; that on, to wit, the 2d day of October, 1900, the said W. I. R. Thompson & Co., appellants, again took an appeal from the said judgment of the said circuit court rendered on the 4th day of October, 1899, and filed their security for costs of said appeal, and secured a transcript of the record in said cause, which has been filed in the court and is now pending as an appeal in said cause; that the judgment appealed from by said appellants on the 2d day of October, 1900, is the identical judgment of said circuit court from which they appealed on February 15, 1900, and which was on June 14, 1900, affirmed by this court; that the transcript now before this court is the same as was furnished by the clerk of said circuit court on the first appeal, except the addition of

the second citation and security for costs. On this motion the court holds that another appeal could not be legally taken from the judgment rendered on June 14, 1900. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. Opinion by McClellan, C. J.

VAUGHN v. WALKER. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 4, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Lauderdale county; A. B. Almon, Judge. Simpson & Jones and R. T. Simpson, for appellant. John T. Ashcraft, for appellee. This was a suit by appellee against appellant for damages claimed to have been suffered by trespassing stock, in contravention of the provisions of an act for the protection of plantations and crops within certain limits of Lauderdale county. Acts 1869-70, p. 9. There were verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Reversed, rendered in part, and remanded. Opinion by McClellan, O. J.

WELLS v. SMITH. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 15, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; A. A. Coleman, Judge. John W. Chamblee, for appellant. Charles B. Powell, for appellee. This action was brought by the appellant against the appellee, and counted upon a promissory note. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Dowdell, J.

(107 La.)

In re CONNELLY et al. PALFREY_et_al. v. CONNELLY, Sheriff, et al. (No. 13.974.) (Supreme Court of Louisiana. Feb. 3, 1902.) Action by George D. Palfrey and others against A. W. Connelly, sheriff and tax collector, and others. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed by the court of appeals, and defendants apply for certiorari or writ of review. Order of court directing the sending up of the record revoked, and proceedings dismissed. Charles A. O'Niell, for plaintiffs. Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and W. P. Martin, Dist. Atty., for defendants.

NICHOLLS, C. J. Most of the pleadings and facts of this case will be found recited in Palfrey v. Connelly (No. 14,021) 31 South. 148; the latter being an appeal to the supreme court from the judgment rendered therein by the district court for the parish of Terrebonne. The assessor for the parish of Terrebonne having made an assessment in the name of the plaintiffs upon trees standing on certain lands which belonged to Mrs. Humphreys, upon the ground that by and through a contract between them and Mrs. Humphreys they had become the owners in full property of the trees standing on the land, and which had thus become movables and liable to taxation and assessment separately from the land itself, the plaintiffs enjoined the tax collector from enforcing the tax on the ground that they were not the owners of the trees and were not liable for taxes upon the same. They further claimed that said trees standing by the roots formed part of the Magnolia plantation, and could not be reached for purposes of taxation by a separate assessment upon them as movables; that they could only be reached for taxation as being part of the plantation and under the assessment made of the plantation; that the trees had been assessed in fact as part of the plantation, and the separate assessment was a dual assessment, and the property taxed was not properly de scribed. They prayed that the tax be decreed to be not enforced (the claim so to do resting upon no legal warrant), and that the assessment be decreed null and void and of no effect, and the inscription thereof on the records be

erased. To meet the contingency of the court's ruling against them, and holding them and their property liable for the tax. they averred that in the contract between themselves and Mrs. Humphreys touching the trees in question she had bound herself to pay all taxes subse quent to the contract, and would be bound as warrantor to protect and hold them harmless from the tax claimed. At their instance, Mrs. Humphreys was cited as a warrantor, and judgment against her was contingently prayed for. The district court rendered judgment sus taining the separate assessment as made, dissolved plaintiffs' injunction, and dismissed their suit. It held that plaintiffs' demand against Mrs. Humphreys as a warrantor under the contract made between the parties was not well founded, and rejected the same. Plaintiffs obtained two orders of appeal from this judg ment, one to the supreme court, upon the question of the constitutionality and legality of the tax and of the violation vel non of the constitution and of Act No. 170 of 1898, especially section 7 of that act; the other to the court of appeals of the Fifth circuit upon all questions and issues not appealable to and appealed to the supreme court. The appeal to the supreme court under that order of appeal was not perfected; but a later appeal was granted, after the circuit court had passed upon the issues before it, under which the appeal was brought up. The court of appeals rendered a judgment by which it annulled, avoided, and reversed the judgment of the district court, and ordered and decreed that the assessment in the names of the plaintiffs of the property or rights acquired by them be annulled and set aside as having no effect as to plaintiffs. The court declared that in its opinion there was a dual assessment of the trees, the assessment upon the latter being included in and falling under the assessment of the plantation itself; that the trees could not, in the case at bar, be assessed separately from the land to which they were attached, as having been "mobilized" by anticipation; that the plaintiffs had not become absolute owners of the trees, but only acquired a right which could be exercised for six years. Though the court declared that in its opinion Mrs. Humphreys was bound by her agreement as to payment of taxes, it did not fix the scope of that agreement and rendered no decree affecting her, other than that resulting from the reversal in entirety of the judg ment of the district court, part of which had been in her favor. Upon the rendering of this judgment the tax collector and assessor (defendants in the district court and appellees in the circuit court) applied for and obtained an order for a writ of review of the judgment of the circuit court, and under that order the record was brought up.

On Review.

The plaintiffs (George D. Palfrey et al.) have sought to change neither the judgment of the district court nor of the circuit court so far as the liability of Mrs. Humphreys to themselves is concerned. The tax collector and assessor have no interest in the situation as between George D. Palfrey et al. and Mrs. Humphreys. That branch of the case is not before us on this review. We have just held in the branch of this case before us on appeal that trees standing on the Magnolia plantation on the 1st of January, 1900, formed part of the same at that time, and were therefore included in the assessment of that property for that year; that it was of that date and of the property in its condition at that time and that basis that the assessment of the plant r tion and trees was to be made (Southern Its Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 40. 21 South. 913); that the subsequent sale of tee trees to the plaintiffs did not authorize the being assessed a second time and in their name that the payment by Mrs. Humphreys of the

taxes upon Magnolia plantation included and carried with it the payment of all taxes on the trees which were standing thereon on the 1st of January; that the law of 1898 expressly declares that taxes on the same property shall not be paid for twice in the same year. That decision carried with it, either directly or by way of consequence, all the issues sought to be reviewed in the present proceeding. The conclusions of the court of appeals are not at variance with our own, but in accord with them. Under the circumstances we deem it unnecessary to take any further action herein. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of this court directing the sending up of the record herein be revoked, and that the record be returned to the court of appeals and the proceedings here be dismissed.

BLANCHARD and PROVOSTY, JJ., take no part.

HUDSON v. LOVEJOY. (Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 21, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Yallobusha county; P. H. Lowery, Judge. Action by Mrs. M. A. Lovejoy against Price Hudson. Defendant below, in 1898, under section 1068 of the Code of 1892, before a justice of the peace of beat No. 2 of Yallobusha county, sought to recover of defendant damages under said section 1068 for enticing away her employés. Yallobusha county is divided into two circuit court districts, and beat No. 2, in which this suit was brought, lies partly in the First and partly in the Second circuit court district. Defendant resided in that part of beat No. 2 which lay in the First circuit court district. Judgment was given in the justice of the peace court against Mrs. Lovejoy, and she appealed the case to the circuit court, and gave bond which recited that she should appear and prosecute her appeal in the Second judicial district. Mrs. Lovejoy appeared at the next term of the circuit court of the Second judicial district, and obtained judgment against defendant. Defendant appealed the case to the supreme court, where it was reversed and remanded. Afterwards Mrs. Lovejoy filed her appeal papers in the circuit court of the First circuit court district of the county, amended her bond to that effect, and at the trial obtained judgment for $75. At the time of the last trial, section 1068 of the Code, which provided for recovery of double damages, had been amended by chapter 102 of the Acts of 1900, which is as follows: "Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that section 1068 be amended as follows: If any person shall willfully interfere with, entice away, knowingly employ, or induce a laborer or renter who has contracted with another person for a specified time to leave his employer or leased premises before the expiration of his contract without the consent of the employer or landlord, he shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than $25 nor more than $100 and in addition shall be liable to the employer or landlord for all advances made by him to said renter or laborer by virtue of his contract with said renter or laborer, and for all damages which he may have sustained by reason thereof." At the last trial of the case in the court below, the plaintiff asked for and was granted by the court several instructions, to the effect that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover damages at all, she was entitled to double the amount of the actual damages proven to have been sustained. Defendant appeals from the judgment of the court, and assigns as error the action of the court in granting the instructions authorizing the jury to find double damages, and in permitting the plaintiff to amend her bond so as to make the appeal be to the First, instead of the Second, judicial district of the county. Affirmed, on condition. Earl Brewer

and Frank Johnston, for appellant. J. T. Blount, for appellee.

TERRAL, J. This case in every particular is like the case of Nations v. Lovejoy (this day decided) 31 South. 811. For the reasons therein given, the judgment will be reversed, unless appellee shall remit one-half of the damages recovered by her; or, if one-half the damages be remitted, the judgment will be affirmed, in either case at the cost of appellee.

NATIONAL MUT. BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N OF NEW YORK v. GIBBS. (Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 7, 1902.) Appeal from chancery court, Lauderdale county; Stone Deavors, Chancellor. Suit by Medora Gibbs against the National Mutual Building & Loan Association of New York. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Reversed. A. S. Bozeman, for appellant. F. V. Brahan, for appellee.

TERRAL, J. Medora Gibbs, being indebted to the appellant company in about the sum of $500, conveyed to it, in satisfaction and discharge of said debt, a lot of land owned by her in the city of Meridian, of about the value of $500. Thereafter, alleging that the greater part of said indebtedness was composed of usurious interest, not collectible by the laws of the state of Mississippi, and alleging that she was a colored woman of little education and experience in business, she sought and obtained in the chancery court a cancellation of said conveyance upon certain terms specified in decree, from which this appeal is taken. Medora, though colored, is from the record a woman of good intelligence and business qualifications, and the evidence discloses no ground for setting aside the conveyance of her lot to appellant in satisfaction of her debt to it. Under the circumstances of its execution, it seems the only reasonable outcome of the transaction. Certainly there is no evidence of any undue influence imposed upon her by the appellant or its agents. The decree below is reversed, and the bill is dismissed.

STANDARD GUANO & CHEMICAL MFG. CO. v. GRISSOM et al. (Supreme Court of Mississippi. Feb. 10, 1902.) Appeal from circuit court, Smith county; J. R. Enochs, Judge. Action by the Standard Guano & Chemical Manufacturing Company against Grissom & Suggs. A writ of attachment was levied upon a stock of goods and some real property as the property of the defendants in the attachment. The plaintiffs filed their declaration, and defendants filed a plea in abatement and the general issue to the declaration. Afterwards Murray, Hollifield & Co. filed a claimant's affidavit, and claimed the property as belonging to them. At the September term of the circuit court, the claimants, Murray, Hollifield & Co., filed a motion suggesting that the defendants in attachment were declared bankrupts within four months after the attachment was sued out, and praying for a judgment against plaintiffs discharging the lien of the attachment, and directing that the sheriff turn over to the claimants all the property levied on. The motion was sustained by the court, and the sheriff directed to turn all the property levied on over to the claimants. From that judgment plaintiffs appeal. Reversed. Stubbs & Russell and Kirkland & Bullard, for appellants.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons set forth in the opinion in the case of Fertilizer Co. v. Same Defendants (delivered today) 31 South. 336, this cause is reversed and remanded.

TENNISON v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Mississippi. Feb. 17, 1902.) Appeal from cir

cuit court, Lowndes county; E. O. Sykes, Judge. "To be officially reported." R. B. Tennison was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed. Z. P. Landrum, Jas. T. Harrison, and S. M. & W. C. Meeks, for appellant. Monroe McClurg, Atty. Gen., for the State.

WHITFIELD, C. J. In this case the testimony on the motion for a change of venue is substantially the same as that delivered in the case of Tennison v. State (this day decided) 31 South. 421; and the opinion in that case controls this one. Reversed and remanded.

ABANDONMENT.

Of homestead, see "Homestead," § 3.

ABATEMENT.

Of nuisance, see "Intoxicating Liquors," § 6; "Nuisance," § 1.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL.

Judgment as bar to another action, see "Judgment." § 5. Right of action by or against personal representative, see Executors and Administrators," § 4.

§ 1. Another action pending.

A prior suit in the same jurisdiction, between the same parties, for the same cause of action, may be pleaded as lis pendens.-Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana (La.) 131.

Plaintiff has no right to a second suit, when its cause can be amply protected in the first.Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana (La.) 131.

Parties cannot, by not pleading part of their defense, proceed to a second suit, with the object of preventing further proceedings in the first.-Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana (La.) 131.

§ 2. Death of party and revival of action.

Under Code, §§ 1916, 1917. the death of the party assailed does not terminate the right to recover punitive damages.-Wagner v. Gibbs (Miss.) 434.

ABETTORS.

Criminal responsibility, see "Criminal Law,” § 1.

ABUTTING OWNERS.

Compensation for taking of or injury to lands or easements for public use, see "Eminent Domain." § 2.

Rights in highways in general, see "Highways," § 1.

ACCEPTANCE.

Of guaranty, see "Guaranty," § 1.

ACCESSION.

Annexation of personal to real property, see "Fixtures."

ACCESSORIES.

Criminal responsibility, see "Criminal Law," $ 1.

ACCOMMODATION PAPER.

See "Bills and Notes."

ACCOMPLICES.

Criminal responsibility, see "Criminal Law," $ 1. Testimony, see "Criminal Law," § 7.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

See "Payment."

A fixed price is of the essence of the contract of dation en paiement.-Pulford v. Dimmick (La.) 879.

certain price having been agreed upon by the The validity of the dation depends upon a parties or left to the arbitration of a third person, who fixes it.-Pulford v. Dimmick (La.) 879.

Where the value of the object given exceeds by one-half the amount of the charges or the value of the services, it is necessary that the act of remunerative dation should be passed before a notary and two witnesses.-Pulford v. Dimmick (La.) 879.

ACCOUNT.

See "Account, Action on."

Accounting between partners, see "Partnership," § 5.

Accounting by executor or administrator, see "Executors and Administrators," § 5.

ACCOUNT, ACTION ON.

stating that "plaintiff claims $225 due by acIn an action for work and labor, a count count between plaintiff and defendants is not demurrable as failing to show the kind of account, since it will be taken as an open account.-Hartsell v. Masterson (Ala.) 616.

ACCRUAL.

Of right of action, see "Limitation of Actions." § 2.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

Of child, see "Bastards," § 1.

Of conveyance of homestead, see "Homestead," $ 2.

Of indebtedness barred by limitation, see "Limitation of Actions," § 3.

Operation and effect of admissions as evidence, see "Criminal Law," § 10; "Evidence," § 6.

§ 1. Taking and certificate.

A deed acknowledged in a sister state by an officer styling himself as "chancery clerk' and "ex officio notary public," but without notarial seal, heid inadmissible for want of a sufficient acknowledgment.-Hayes v. Banks (Ala.) 464.

ACTION.

Abatement, see "Abatement and Revival."
Accrual, see "Limitation of Actions." § 2.
Bar by former adjudication, see "Judgment."
§ 5.