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and he trufted would like Edinburgh have caufe to be thankful to Providence for the accomplishment of an union with Great Britain.

He then animadverted on the proceedings of the chief adverfaries of the Union, who not fatisfied with exercising their deliberative powers within those walls, but organizing themselves in another place, empowering certain perfons* to fend their letters miffive through the country, and establishing agents in the different counties, to bring the mafs of the people to the bar of that house, as petitioners against the meafure of Union. He was forry to say, that fome of the agents of thofe gentlemen had gone forth with the most unwarrantable pretences, and adopted the most treacherous artifices, and the most ludicrous mifrepresentations, to deceive and diftract the populace, whose fignatures against an Union they wished to obtain. That had alfo been the cafe in the Scotish Union? The table of the parliament was day after day, for the space of three months, covered with fuch petitions: but the Scotish legiflators acted as, he trufted, the Irish parliament would act; they confidered only the public advantage; and, steadily pursuing that object, neither mifled by artifices nor intimidated by tumult, they received, in the gratitude of their country that reward, which amply compenfated their arduous labors in the great work fo happily accomplished.

The principle of the measure had been inveftigated with fuch depth of argument and fuch found ability,† in a fpeech, which had been fince committed to the press, that he confidered it as placed beyond question or doubt.

With regard to the mode of proceeding, which the projectors of the fcheme intended to adopt, he premised, that it was originally their wish to follow the form purfued in the Union with Scotland, and to propofe the appointment of commiffioners of both realms, who might digeft articles for the confideration of the two parliaments; but that, as this plan had been prevented by the refufal of the Irish Houfe of Commons to allow a difcuffion of the queftion, it became expedient for his majefty's minifters to adopt meafures, which might defeat the mifreprefentations of their views, and unfold to this kingdom the liberal intentions of Great Britain. For this purpose they had introduced into the British parliament thofe articles, which had been now tranfmitted to Ireland, forming a bafis for more extenfive refolutions. After the minute inveftigation of these articles in the parliament of Ireland, and the detailed ap

* Alluding to the Marquis of Downfhire, &c. vide antea.

By Mr. Smith.

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plication of the general principles involved in them, the matured scheme would be submitted to the approbation of each legislature, and eventually fanctioned by folemn acts.

The fecretary's first propofition stated the grand object in terms fimilar to those of the first resolution of the British parliament. The three articles which followed tended to establish the complete identity of the executive power in every poffibility of circumftance and in every application of authority. Some would think that this object was fecured by the act of annexation; but, though he venerated that act as the only bond now connecting this realm with Britain, he confidered it, both in principle and operation, as extremely defective. In principle, it gave to the parliament of another country, in which the Irish are not represented, one of the most important legislative powers, that of regulating the fucceffion to the crown. That the prac tice was not lefs defective than the principle, appeared in the cafe of the regency; for the prince of Wales was abfolutely constituted regent by the address of the Irish legislature, before any regent was appointed by Great Britain.

Το prove the danger of fo imperfect a connexion his lordship instanced the conduct of James II., when after his abdication of the crown of England, he repaired to Ireland, and made use of the parliament as an inftrument for erecting his oppofition to England, and establishing a diftinct monarchy in Ireland.*

He then put fome illuftrative questions refpecting the predicament in which Ireland stood in the important cafes of war, of peace, and of treaties. He then referred to a more frequent and just ground of complaint in that house, that the Irish minifter, acting as he did under the direction of a British cabinet, was not responsible to the Irish parliament from the moment of his withdrawing from this kingdom, unless, by a derogation from our independence, we should impeach him at the bar of the parliament of Great Britain for offending against the conftitution of Ireland. Who, he asked, advised the measures of the Irish government? The English minifter. And how could the Irish parliament reach him? Who adminiftered the great feal of England, without which no legislative act could be ratified? An English minifter. And how could the Irish parliament reach him? In fhort, how could an efficient and conftitutional refponfibility be obtained, but by making the jurifdiction of parlia

* Vide antea, Vol. I.

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ment as comprehenfive as the executive power? And this could be effected. by an Union alone.

He separately and fucceffively refuted all the objections made against the Union, as to its reducing Ireland to a mere colony, as to its weakening the executive power in Ireland, as to the impotency of a non-resident parliament, and as to future commercial and financial arrangements.

He then entered into the following detail.

Upon a comparison of the average value of the imports and exports of Great Britain for three years, ending with January, 1799, compared with thofe of Ireland ending on the 25th of March preceding, he found that the value of British commerce amounted to 73,961,8997., and that of Irish commerce to 10,925,9617. and that they bear the proportion to each other of nearly feven to one. On a fimilar comparison of the value of the following articles, viz. malt, beer, fpirits, wine, tea, tobacco, and fugar, confumed in the refpective countries, he found that the value of the British articles amounted to 46,891,6557., and that of the Irish articles to 5,954,8561. forming a proportion of 7 and 7-8ths to one. The medium, therefore, or 7 to 1 was to be taken as the fair proportion; and upon this principle Great Britain ought to contribute fifteen parts, and Ireland two, to the general expences of the em pire.

In the article which related to this head, the firft fection provided, that the past debts of the two kingdoms should be borne by them respectively; and, if they coupled this liberal provifion with the ninth fection of the article, which gave to Ireland a participation in whatever fums might be produced from the territorial revenues of the dependencies of Great Britain in India, they would. acknowlege not only the juftice but the generofity of the terms. Great Britain held out to Ireland a proportional enjoyment of all the advantages of the empire, without requiring the fmalleft participation in the burthens, which she had incurred to procure them; and Ireland would acquire a revenue of 58,000l. a year, in ease of her own burthens, out of the revenues paid by the Eaft India company, from the territories fubdued by British arms..

By the second section, the proportional contribution of 15 to 2 would continue for twenty years, that the system of the Union might acquire stability, before it should be fubjected to the flighteft modification..

When he ftated the fyftem of contributing on the principle of proportional. ability, he was aware that a natural objection would arife, that, however fair

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or liberal the fyftem might appear at prefent, it might at a future period, and under different circumftances, prove to be both partial and disadvantageous. It was therefore intended, that the imperial parliament fhould have a power to revife the proportion at the given period he had mentioned, but that the revifion fhould be grounded upon the fame principles, upon which the original proportion was formed, and limited to the refult of those principles. Their contributions, therefore, might hereafter vary according to their relative increased or diminished ability; but, until the period of a common taxation should have arifen, the principles and the bafis of their contribution were unalterably fixed. The only power referved to the imperial parliament, was to examine and ascertain the criteria, by which the abilities of the two countries were to be determined: the criteria themfelves were to remain unaltered and unalterable: and, fince they were of fuch a nature that they could not fail of leading to a fair refult, Ireland had by these means the utmost poffible fecurity, that the could not be taxed beyond the measure of her comparative ability, and that the ratio of her contribution muft ever correfpond with her relative wealth and profperity.

By the fourth fection, the revenues of Ireland would conftitute a confolidated fund, which would be charged in the first place with the interest and finking fund of the debt of Ireland, and be afterwards appropriated to its proportional contribution. The fifth fection gave power to the imperial parliament to impofe fuch taxes in Ireland as might be neceffary for her contingent; but it should in no cafe be enabled to impofe higher taxes, after the Union, upon any article in Ireland, than the fame article fhould bear in Great Britain. The fixth fection afcertained the manner, in which any furplus of the revenues of Ireland might be applied. There were four confiderations which occurred with respect to any occafional excess of revenue. The firft, and moft obvious, was the diminution of taxes; the fecond, the application of such excefs to local purposes of ornament or improvement in Ireland; the third to provide against any poffible failure of revenue; the fourth to fuffer fuch excefs to accumulate at compound intereft, in cafe of their contribution in a future period of war.

It was provided by the seventh section, that all future loans, for the interest and liquidation of which the respective countries had made provifion in the proportion of their respective contributions, should be confidered as a joint debt; and, on the other hand, that, where they did not make correfponding

provisions

provifions, their respective quotas of the fum fo raised fhould remain a feparate charge.

The eighth fection contained a provifion, that, when the feparate debts of the two kingdoms fhould be either extinguished, or in the proportion of their respective contributions, the general expences of the empire might be thenceforward borne by common taxes, in lieu of proportional contribution. It might perhaps be alleged, that common taxes with Great Britain would impofe upon that kingdom heavier burthens than the would otherwife be required to fupport. But let the houfe confider, that the charges of the debt of Great Britain amounted to twenty millions a year, and the charges of the debt of Ireland to 1,300,000l. of British money a year; and that common taxes were not to take place, till either the past and separate debts of both countries fhould be liquidated, or till they fhould become to each other in the proportion of their contributions; that is, in the ratio of 15 to 2. Before that could take place, the taxes of Great Britain must be reduced by the amount of ten millions a year; in which cafe, the scale of her remaining taxation would be lowered to the fcale of taxation in Ireland, and the adoption of British taxation would become a benefit. A fimilar refult would take place, and to a greater degree, were the paft debt of the two countries to be entirely liquidated: for, in that event, Ireland would be exonerated from taxes, to the amount of 1,300,000l. a year, and Britain to the amount of 20,000,000l. and the fyftem of common taxation would become still more beneficial to Ireland. It might happen, however, that if war fhould continue, and Ireland fund her fupplies, whilft England raifed a great part of her's within the year, and mortgaged her income tax to their rapid reduction in peace, the proportion of the debt of Ireland might rife, and her scale of taxation increase accordingly. In this cafe, alfo, the fyftem of common taxation perfectly fecured the interefts of Ireland, being produced by natural caufes and in no degree forced. It could not impofe any burthen on that country, to which she would not in the ordinary courfe of her expenditure be liable, whilst the provifion, which went to preclude any article from being fubject to a higher rate of duty in Ireland than the fame article paid in Great Britain, would exempt her from having the fcale of her taxation raised above that of England, even though the natural progrefs of her expence fhould lead to it. And whilft Ireland was thus fecured against any injustice in fubftituting a fyftem of common taxes for proportional contribution, the VOL. II.

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