An attempt was iudeed made in Ex parte law of trade marks in force here. and that in Stephens, 3 Ch. Div. 659, bring a newly force elsewhere, and might be productive of invented word within the description of considerable difficulties in connection with "device," but without success, and down to the registration in England of the trade the coming into operation of the act of marks of foreign owners. In support of the 1883, fancy words continued to be excluded contention of the Board of Trade reliance from registration, except where they had was placed upon the words "not in common been used before the act of 1875. The use" as showing that a registrable fancy word definition section of the act of 1883, how must be newly coined, but Mr. Justice Chitty ever (Sec. 64), not only allows "any special, fortunatety found himself able to take the and distinctive word or words" to be reg- view that an existing word might constitute istered as an old mark, but specifies among a "fancy word not in common use" if applied the essential particulars the possession to an article which it had no natural or esof one of which qualifies for registration tablished connection. irrespective of previous user, any distinctive. "fancy word or words not in common nse. Newly-coined words are especially open to the objection that they may easly come to be descriptive of a special article, and so cease What was wanted by the trader who pro- to be distinctive, as "linoleum" was held to cured the recognition of fancy words as be discriptive: Linoleum Manufactring Co. trade marks was the assimilation of the sym- v. Navin, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 448; 7 Ch. bols registrable as new trade marks to the symbols registrable as old ones, and the assimilation generally of the trade marks recognized in this country with those generally recognized abroad, especially in America. The words "fancy word or words" being included in the section, it does not seem to have accurred to those concerned, that the addition of the words "not in common use" by the Board of Trade, might have the effect of raising a difficulty, and even of taking away with one hand what was given by the other. It seems to have been assumed that "not in common use" was equivalent to "not in common use as applied to the goods in respect of which they are registered;" so that the effect would be to make the registrability of words depend, not upon their novelty in se, but upon the novelty of the mode of application. Div. 834; whereas such appellations as "Eureka" shirts, "Sefton" cloth, "Crown Seixo" wine, or "Dog'shead" beer, are not nearly so much exposed to the same risk. On all grounds Mr. Justice Chitty's decision is on the side of the ballance of convenience; if the point were determined the other way it would be necessary for traders to endeavor to get the act amended, Although the decision in the 'Alpine' case is so recent, there has already been time for it, to receive support from Mr. Justice Pearson's ruling in the case of Slazinger v. Mallings (noted ante, p. 95), in which he held that the words "The Lawford," which had been registered as a fancy name for lawn-tennis racquets, were properly registered and capable of protection. We ought not to omit to mention that in the "Alpine" case Mr. Justice Chitty very properly ridiculed a contention by the Board of Trade that a word not distinctive The Board of Trade, however, in the very recent case of Re Stapely and Smith's in itself could be made so by prefixing "The" Trade Mark "Alpine" "ttemted to set to it, so that, according to their argument, up a distinction between words newly "Alpine" would be a bad trade mark, but inserted and existing has never hitherto been "The Alpine" a good one. It seems recognized either in English or American dificult to conjecture who could have inlaw, and which, if established in England, vented such a theory.-(The London Law would set up a new differentia between the Times.) BANKERS and business men generally have Messrs. Allen & Harben, for the plaintiff suffered considerable inconvenience by the in error. The case here falls within the provisions section 79 of the Criminal Code. It defines the offense, and fixed the punishment, thereby excluding all the other punishments for this offense: Gaddis v. Richland Co., 92 Ill. 119; Eldridge v. Pierce, 90 Ill. 474. delayed payment of drafts and orders pre-, The indictment was under section 74 of sented for payment after the death of the the criminal Code, which presupposes that drawer. The Legislature of Massachusetts the goods must have been "delivered" to has just past a law by which savings banks the party charged, as contradistinguished can pay for thirty days after the date of the from a levy or a taking under legal prosess, order, and later, if by actual notice of the that is, they must have been given over in drawer's demise has been received, and trust. national banks, trust, safe deposits and all other depositories are allowed to pay out for ten days after the drawer's death, This law applies to single name checks, of course. Henceforth, therefore, the only thing to be considered in taking and depositing such single checks is the drawer's financial standing and character. Hitherto the taker had reason to be afraid that the drawer might die before payment, and if known to the payee, the holder would have to wait one or two years until the estate could be settled, and it might then he proved to be insolvent. Hence a man alone in business had not the same facilities (at least so far as given out checks in the settlement of accounts) as he who had a partner The amendment of the law just enacted was certainly called for, and business men will be glad to know that it has been made.--(Boston Traveler.) SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. MAN L. FREEMAN, OFFICIAL REPOR- 1—1.—Edward P. Stoker v. The People of I. (Opiniod by CBA G J.) The money in the hands of the officer is not the property of the plaintiff in the execution until paid over to him: Zschocke v. People, 62 Ill. 127; Lightner v. Steinagel, 35 Ill. 513. Messrs. McElvain & Martin for the people. It will be observed that the language used in section 74 of the Criminal Code is comprehensive in its scope and includes all who may embezzle. The offenses punishable under Sec. 79 are not those promted by a felonious intent, and under it a party could be justly prosecuted for a refusal to pay over moneys collected by him, whether he converted them to his own use or embezzled them or not. It is not necessary that Aultman, Miller & Co. should have an absolute title or right to the specific money collected by Stoker in order to sustain the verdict in this case. A general or qualified property in the goods stolen or embezzled and the right to possession is sufficient: Moore's Criminal Law, FILED AT MT. VERNON, JUNE 1885. CRIMINAL LAW LARCENY─Of money Sec. 501, and the authorities there cited; collected by a constable.-A constable who Wharton's Criminal Law, Sec. 932; Barnes collects money on an execution, and fails v. People, 18 Ill. 52. to pay the same to the party entitled thereto, is not liable to indictment and conviction for larceny, under section 74 of the criminal Code, but he may be fined under section 79. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Jackson County; the Hon. O. A. HARKER, the judgment debtor retaining a geneneral Judge, presiding. The general property in the money collected by stoker was in Aultman, Miller & Co., the judgment creditor. When goods are levied upon for the purpose of sale by a constable, he has a special property in them, property in them until their lawful sale on execution, when the judgment creditor acquires a general property in the proceds of the sale whether he receives such proceds or not: Zschocke v. People, 62 Ill. 127; 2 Arch., C. P. and Pl. 358. It matters not whether Aultman, Miller & Co. ever had this money in possession or not. Property may be embezzled before it reaches its owner: Wharton's Criminal Law, Sec. 1010. 1049. "Although there is not an express statute of limitations within which such a lien may be enforced, it would seem by analogy to the lien of judgments, and the limitations for entry upon and the recovery of lands, that seven years from the death of an intestate should bar such liens:" McCody v. Morran, 18 Ill. 519; Reed v. Colby, 89 Ill, 107, and other authorities there cited. And in Rosenthal, Admr., etc., 7. Renick et al., 44 Ill. 205, the rule is said to be es 36-22.-Catharine Rebhan V. Solomon tablished in order to protect innocent pur I. The reasons for protecting an innocent purchaser against a will kept secret are ascogent as those for protecting him against the secret lien of debts. (Opinion by CRAIG. J., affirming.) FILED AT MT. VERNON, JUNE 1885. WILL-Time within which probate of, may be had.—There is no statute or law in this Sate limiting the time of probating a By a modern regulation of the Prerogative will to any given number of years. In this Court of Canterbury, where probate of a case, a will was admitted to probate thirteen will is applied for more than five years after years after the death of testator, and letters the decease, some explanation should be of administration issued on his estate were given for the delay: In the goods of Darling revoked. 3 Hagg., 561; 1 Wms. Exrs., 195. It also respectfully submitted that a proceeding to probate a will is a suit or action, and that the Statute of Limitations may be held to be applicable to it. An action or "suit" has been defined by this court to be "an attempt to gain an end by legal process:" Dobbins et al. v. First National Bank. Mr. R. A. Halbert, for the appellee. It is expressly provided that, if at any time after letters of administration have been granted, a will of the deceased shall be produced and probate thereof granted according Mr. W. C. Kueffner and Mr. J. N. Dill, to law, such letters of administration shall be for appellant. revoked: Underwood's Statutes, Chap. 37 Sec. 28, p. 83. "The lapse of seven years after the death of a decedent constitutes a bar to granting letters of administration, but which bar may be removed by showing circumstances which prevented an earlier application for them:" Fitzgerald v. Clancy, Admr., etc., 49 Ill. 465 And with regard to the time within which the lien of a creditor against the lands of a decedent for the payment of the latter's debts must be enforced, this court has repeatedly decided that This is certainly an express declaration that wills may be probated at any time while the estate remains unsettled and in course of administration, as is the case here. It is said by Redfield, that in some of the American States, there is no limit to the time beyond which a will can not be proved: Redfield on Wills, Vol. 3. (7) note 2. It is held in Massachusetts that a will may be proved in the Probate Court after the lapse of twenty years, for the purpose of the contract, is an error working no harm establishing a title to real estate: Shumway and no ground of reversal. 4. SAME Relevancy. v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 114. When parties Although a less period is limited to a living together as husband and wife, separagrant of letters of administration: Waters ted and agreed in writting for the division of v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 12, 13; Marcy v. Marcy, 6 Met. 370. their property, real and personal, in which contract the wife upon receiving her portion The case of Fitzgerald v. Clancy, 49 Ill. was to release the husband from all further 465, decides only that claims against an claims for dower, it was held on bill by the estate can not be enforced against the realty wife for the specific performance of the of decedent after seven years; that the lien agreement and for partition, that proof thereon is lost. offered by the defendant to show that the The Prerogative Court of England of wife defended a suit brought by him for course may establish a rule requring an ex- divorce and claimed alimony was properly planation, if the will is not presented for rejected as irrelevant. probate for five years. But this is in reference to wills bequeathing personalty and does not apply to realty, as probate of wills devising realty was not requird: Jarman on Wills, Randolph and Talcott's Edition, Vol. 1, p. 50. 5. PARTITION-Party held to his agreement in prespect to.-Two persons who had been living together as husband and wife agreed to divide a lot of ground so that the woman should receive one third in value of the whole lot, and they each selected a man who made the division, which was satisfactory to them: on partition the court confirm 4—29.—William McDowell v. Julia Ann ed this division, without regard to the Mc Dowell. exact value of the part set off to the woman. Held, that the husband could not be heard to allege that the woman received more in value than one third of the whole lot. 56—35.—James A. Jackson et al. v. Eugene H. Lahee, receiver, etc. Opinion by GRAIG, J., affirming. FILED AT MT. VERNON, JUNE 1885. I. CHANCERY JURISDICTION.—A court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill for the partition of land and for the specific performance of a written contract for the conveyance thereof, although a court of law (Opinion by SCOTT, J., affirming.) may also have jurisdiction. But when a FILED AT OTTAWA, JUNE 13, 1885. party has an adequate remedy at law, a I. JUDGMENT-Creates no lien on propcourt of equity in general will not interfere. erty in hands of receiver.-The recovery of 2. When a court of equity acquires ju- a judgment against partners after the aprisdiction of a case, such as a bill for partiti-pointment of a receiver to take charge of tion of land and to have a written contract the firm assets for the benefit of the firm respecting other lands, specifically enforced the court on decreeing partition may also enjoin the enforcement of a judgment against the complainant in a forcible detainer suit for possession, although he might have defended successfully at law creditors generally, creates no lien against any property or funds of the firm in the hands of the receiver. Such property or funds can not be levied on by an execution, or reached by garnishment, for the reason of its being in the custody of the laws. 3. EVIDENCE-Evidence that works no 2. RECEIVER-Funds in his hands subharm. The admission of parol evidence ject only to order of court appointing him.which may vary or change the terms of a The possession of a receiver, or an officer written contract, when the party introduc- of the court, is the custody of the law, and ing the same obtains no relief whatever on he holds the property or the funds for the benefit of the party or parties whom the firm by the voluntary act of the parties court shall find entitled thereto; and the law under the control of the court for the benefit will not permit the receiver's possession to of their creditors generally, and that after be disturbed without the consent of the the court had assumed jurisdiction, the court that first obtained jurisdiction to ap- parties would not have been allowed to dispoint him. miss the suit. 3. SAME When creditors may acquire 6. ESTOPPEL-By acts inconsistent with liens on property and be entitled to priorities claim.-Where a creditor of a firm obtained over others. When a receiver has been ap- judgment after the appointment of a receiver pointed on a bill filed by one partner on a bill between the partners and proved against his copartner, merely to hold the property or funds pending the litigation between the parties, creditors of the firm are not bound to wait till the equities between the parties may be adjusted, as that might never be done. In such case the assets are treated as still belonging to the firm, and creditors may proceed in any lawful way to aquire a lien, entitling them to priority over less diligent creditors. 4. When a receiver was appointed on bill filed by one partner against the other for the settlement and adjustment of the partnership accounts and the payment of creditors of the firm, which was insolvent, and the court had ordered notice to be given to all creditors to come in and prove their debts before the master, it was held that one of the creditors by the recovery of a judgment against the firm, during the pendency of said bill, and the filing of a creditor's bill on the same day that the notice to creditors was ordered, did not acquire any lien upon the assets in the hands of receiver, or right to be preferred over other creditors, and this more especially when such creditor proved his claim before the master and shared in the distribution of the funds in his hands. his judgment before the master, in pursuance of an order of the court authorizing the same, and filed his petition to prevent the partners from dismissing their suit and discharging the receiver, and contested other claims presented before the master, and received his pro rata share of a dividend ordered to be paid by the receiver: Held, that these acts estopped such judgment creditor from claiming priority over other creditors in the final distribution of the assets. Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County: the Hon. M. F. TULEY, Judge, presiding. Messrs. Monk and Elliott, for the appellants. Mr. I. K. Boyeson, for the appellee. SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. Where the clerk of the District Court refuses to issue an exe- compel its issue.-Mandamus will not lie. APPEAL FROM MITCHELL DISTRICT Court. This is an action of mandamus. 5. When one partner files his bill against his copartner for a full settlement of the business and affairs of the firm, showing an embarrassed state of affairs, the bringing of of various suits against the firm, and that ROTHROCK, J.-It is averred in the petithere was danger of wasting the partnership' tion, in substance, that the plaintiffs are the assets in litigation, and asking the appoint- owners of a money judgment, which was ment of a receiver, who took possession of duly recorded in the Circuit Court of Mitchell all the effects of the firm: Held, that this County; and that defendant is the clerk of was equivalent to placing the assets of the said court; and that defendant, although |