be required by getting to a point, which others pass far beyond, and yet confess themselves to be wretched sinners. Thus, then, people's opinions about what they ought to be are as different as their endeavours to make themselves what they ought to be; and the more they attempt to do, the more they are conscious of what they have undone. This consideration alone one would think sufficient to show the difficulty of attaining religious knowledge, and ought to convince us that in order to understand what it is that God requires of us, we have more to do than just to call to mind the good advice which we have from time to time received, and to talk over the principles which the Bible proposes to us; for if those who have done this can still differ as widely in their notions of what is right as careless persons do from self-denying persons, and since one of the two must be mistaken, it is clear that this way of learning our duty must be very uncertain and imperfect.

But the same thing may be brought home to men's minds more clearly, if they will reflect how different the knowledge is which can be got by reading and talking in all the common matters of life from that which is to be got by experience. This any one will see at once by thinking over any art or business in which he is personally engaged; he will then acknowledge at once that nothing which he could be told beforehand, no advice or instruction which could be given him by others,

will ever supply the place of experience. He will recollect how different he has often found things, when he has come to be actually engaged in them, from what he had expected to find them beforehand. Suppose, for instance, that a mason or carpenter had read in a book the rules for doing some difficult piece of work, and that he had taken ever such great pains to understand them, it is ten to one that when he came to put them in practice he would find a hundred difficulties and perplexities that he had never thought of before. He would find that he had overlooked many points which it was necessary to attend to, and misunderstood many, without the knowledge of which his work would not come true. Indeed in all cases where we want to know how to act, so little value is set on that kind of general knowledge which can be got by reading and talking, that if any one was to trust to it for the regulation of his own concerns in matters where he had no experience, he would be thought deficient in common understanding. For instance, if a man had an estate to let, and wished to ascertain the value of it, how absurd he would be considered if he chose to judge for himself about the goodness of the soil and the advantages of the situation by general rules which he had heard laid down, instead of trusting it to the management of an experienced agent. Or if a man had a house to build, what would be thought of him if, instead of consulting some one acquainted with the kind of

work, he was to set about making calculations for himself out of books about the labour and materials that would be wanted, and all the contrivances for executing the work. If in such things as these a man is foolish enough to trust any knowledge but that of experience, he is sure to get into numberless difficulties, and to bring down on himself the ridicule of his neighbours.

Are we to suppose, then, that while in the common concerns of life it is so difficult to know what we ought to do, and that while in these so much knowledge is necessary which can be supplied by nothing but experience, the greatest of all our concerns, our duty towards God, is so very easy to understand, that we are able to execute it at once by the rules which we have heard and read?

If any one does suppose this, let him only take any single one of these rules, and consider how he should turn it to account in the regulation of his conduct. Take, for instance, the first words of our duty to our neighbour; "My duty towards my neighbour is to love him as myself, and to do unto all men as I would they should do unto me." Nothing can be simpler than this rule, and yet one who has not been in the habit of applying it to his conduct, would find, on his first endeavours to live according to it, that even here he had much to learn which nothing but experience could teach him. He would constantly find himself at a loss to know how his love should show itself, and what was in reality

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the course which he would have others pursue towards him. It would often happen that by doing what his neighbour most wished, and would take most kindly, he would really be doing him an injury, and that in order really to advance his welfare, it would be necessary to do what seemed harsh and morose. Here, then, he would often find a source of perplexity; he would feel unwilling to give his neighbour pain, and yet would know that this pain would in the end be of service to him. we then to consult for his interest or for his wishes? are we to take upon ourselves to be his guardians, and force him to do what is unpleasant that he may obtain what we consider for his good? There are cases in which such conduct would be an impertinent interference, and some in which it would be an imperative duty; but how we are to distinguish between the cases, how we are to know when we ought to consult his wishes, and when his interest ; this is a point of which the rule cannot inform us, for it we must trust to our own experience. Sometimes we shall have to comply with foolish requests, sometimes to resist very earnest intreaties. At first we shall often act injudiciously, and sometimes wrongly, even when we try best to keep a straight course; but by degrees we shall find out what is the right course, and learn to feel that punishment itself may often be an act of charity; indeed, that it is wrong to punish except with a charitable intention.

Such is the case as regards our duty towards our neighbour; and exactly the same thing is true as regards our duty towards God. It is very easy for us to know that we ought constantly to preserve a serious frame of mind, and that we should have God uppermost in all our thoughts; and men, who lead careless unthinking lives, fancy that they quite understand what is meant by this; yet any one who converses with them on the subject, or who watches the perverse feelings that will frequently intrude upon himself, must be aware that, without care and experience, it is impossible to have any idea of the conduct to which such a rule would lead. He will see that the notion which most unthinking people annex to a serious life, is that of constant weariness and constraint; that they suppose it impossible to enjoy pleasure seriously; and that they connect the idea of religion with moroseness and melancholy. To have God uppermost in their thoughts, seems to such persons impossible, without destroying all that freedom of mind which makes life tolerable. And yet those who have most tried to live serious and holy lives, will be found to give a very different account of the effect which is produced in them by the thought of God. To them, it seems, that the oftener they can think of Him, the more nearly they approach to living in His presence; and that living in His presence seems like living in the presence of the greatest and kindest of benefactors, who has done most for their good,