1. A, having entered up judgment against B, a trader, on a warrant of attorney given to A by B, whilst in embarrassed circumstances, but before the committing of an act of bankruptcy, issued execution against the goods of B, and levied the amount of the judgment. Within two months after the giving of the warrant of attorney, and after the execution of the writ of fi. fa. by seizure and sale, a petition of bankruptcy was presented against B, under which he was adjudged a bankrupt. No fraudulent preference was alleged to have existed.-Held, that by the 20 & 21 Vic., c. 60, s. 333, the warrant of attorney became, under the circumstances, a nullity; that the judgment was equally void, and that the assignees of B were entitled to maintain, against A, an action of trover for the goods seized under the execution. C. P. Orr v. Devin 100

2. Upon a general adjudication of bankruptcy, it is not necessary that the particular grounds upon which the party has been declared a bankrupt should be set out upon the adjudication; this being requisite only where

COMMISSION, &c.

the proceedings are the subject of arrangement, under the arrangement clauses of the Bankrupt and Insolvent Act (20 & 21 Vic., c. 60, ss. 143, et seq.). Q. B. Palmer v. Gatchell

238

BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT CONSOLIDATION ACT (IRELAND).

See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

BOND.

See SURETY.

BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See FREIGHT.

BREACH OF COVENANT TO REPAIR.

See LEASE, 2.

BURGESS.

A person is not disqualified from being enrolled as a burgess, pursuant to the Municipal Corporation Act, Ireland (3 & 4 Vic., c. 108, s. 32), by having received medical relief under the Medical Charities Act, Ireland (14 and 15 Vic., c. 68), within twelve calendar months next before the revision of the burgess list. Q. B. Phibbs v. O'Hara 279

CAPACITY IN WHICH PLAINTIFF SUES. See EJECTMENT, 1.

CERTAINTY.

See DEED.

CONCEALMENT.

CONCEALMENT.

See POLICY OF ASSURANCE, 1.

CONDITION.

See EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, 1.

SURETY.

CONSTRUCTION.

See EJECTMENT, 2.

RAILWAY COMPANY.
REGISTRY ACT, 1.

CONTRACT.

See FREIGHT.

SHIPPING.

CONTRACT PROHIBITED BY

STATUTE.

See CORRUPT PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT 1854.

CONUSOR.

See WRIT OF Revivor, 2.

CONVEYANCE OF LANDS. See AWARD.

CORRUPT PRACTICES PRE-
VENTION ACT 1854.

To an action for use and occupation of apartments, and for meat and drink supplied to divers persons at defendant's request, the defendant pleaded that, in April 1857, after the passing of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vic., c. 102), an election was held in and for the county of S., to return two representatives to Parliament, at which election defendant did not propose or second any candidate; and that plaintiff's apartments were used, and the meat, &c., supplied, with the view and for the purpose exclusively of promoting the election of J. B., one of the candidates at such election, of all which plaintiff had due notice; and that defendant had not agreed to pay said expenses to any candidate,

CORRUPT PRACTICES, &c. 521

or to or under the authority of the auditor.

Held, upon demurrer, that this defence was good, and that the plaintiff was precluded by the 17 & 18 Vic., c. 102, s. 24, from maintaining the action. [CRAMPTON, J., dissentiente.]

Sed, per O'BRIEN, J.-If the defendant had represented to the plaintiff that he had procured, or would procure, the authority of the election auditor for the payment of such expenses, the defendant might be held liable for such representations.

To the same action the defendant also pleaded, as a further defence, that the moneys claimed in the plaint were properly a charge against J. B., one of the candidates at said election, in respect of the election; and that the plaintiff's claim was not sent in within one month from the declaration of the poll to J. B., or to his authorised agent.

Held, upon demurrer, that this defence was bad; because, assuming that the defendant (the agent), as well as J. B. (the candidate), was liable to the plaintiff, the remedy, though barred by the 17 & 18 Vic., c. 102, s. 16, as against the latter, may nevertheless exist as against the former.

Where a statute prohibits, under a penalty, any person from agreeing to pay certain expenses, an agreement to pay such expenses is invalid, and no action is maintainable upon it, although the statute does not expressly prohibit the other party to the agreement from receiving such expenses, or impose a penalty upon him for so doing. [CRAMPTON, J. dissentiente.]

Under the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854, s. 24, it is lawful to pay, or to agree to pay, money to a candidate himself, to promote his election; but it is not lawful to pay, or agree to pay, money to any other person than a candidate, in order to promote the election, except to or

under the authority of the election auditor, and except in the instances specified in the Act.-[Per O'BRIEN, J.]

The Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854, s. 16, applies only to claims for which the candidate himself is liable.-[Per O'BRIEN, J.]

Semble. An innkeeper is not precluded, by the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854, from recovering from an agent of a candidate, at an election of Members to serve in Parliament, the amount of the agent's own hotel bill, although such bill was incurred while the agent was engaged in promoting the election of the candidate. Q. B. O'Brien v. Dillon 318 COSTS.

DEED.

Where a deed contains two descriptions, of sufficient and equal certainty, and a variance is shown by extrinsic evidence to exist between them, the earlier description must prevail.

A deed of conveyance purported to convey to G. R., subject to a lease of the entire, "the town and lands of Dromardmore, situate in the barony of I. and county of T., containing 1085a. Or. 23p., statute measure, or thereabouts, and described in the annexed map, with the appurtenances." In an ejectment brought by the grantee to recover forty-five acres, parcel of the above, it was proved that these forty-five acres, although included in the map, and although necessary to make up the 1085a. Or. 23p. comprised in the deed of conveyance, were not portion of the lands of Dromardmore, but belonged to a denomination called Dromard beg.Held, that the name of the townland "Dromardmore, situate," &c., being a description of sufficient certainty to pass the lands, the subsequent description, contained in the words "described in the annexed map," was to be rejected, and therefore that nothing which was not part of "Dromardmore passed under the deed of conveyance.

Held also, that the description in the map did not come within the rule "præsentia corporis tollit errorem

nominis."

The Dublin and Kingstown Railway Co. v. Bradford (7 Ir. Com. Law Rep. 57, in Error, 624) followed. C. P. Roe v. Lidwell 184

DEED OF SUBMISSION. See AWARD.

DEFENCE.

See WRIT OF REVIVOR, 1.

DEMURRER.

See CORRUPT PRACTICES PRE

VENTION ACT 1854.

Action for rent upon an indenture of demise. Defence-That, prior to the making of said demise, the plaintiffs had demised two roods, part of the said demised premises, to W., which demise to W. was still in force; whereby the defendant was kept out of possession of said part of the demised premises, and was prevented from having all the profit and advantage he otherwise would have had thereout.-Held, upon demurrer, that this defence was no answer to the plaintiffs' claim for the entire rent reserved; the demise to the defendant, which was under seal, operating as a lease in possession of all that part of the lands of which the lessors had the possession at the time of the demise, and as a lease of the reversion, with the rent incident thereto, of that part of the lands of which the lessors had not the possession, and thereby conveying to the defendant the whole interest in respect of which the entire rent was reserved.

Neale v. Mackenzie (1 M. & W. 747) distinguished and approved of. Q. B. Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. O'Connor

DEPOSIT STAKEHOLDER.

See HORSE-RACE.

DESCRIPTION.

See DEED.

PLEADING, 2.

DISQUALIFICATION.

See BURGESS.

242

DUBLIN CARRIAGE ACT 1853. Section 25 of the Dublin Carriage Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vic., c. 112), which imposes a penalty upon persons using or letting to hire, at any place within the limits of the Act, any hackney carriage, job carriage, stage carriage, cart, &c., without having license in force for the same, or without having paid the annual duty for such license, as provided by the Act, applies only

to vehicles coming within the boundaries of the police district of the city of Dublin, which ply for hire for the accommodation of the public, but not to vehicles used for private purposes only. Carts, therefore, brought within the police boundaries of the city of Dublin, for the transaction of the private business of their owners, are not within section 25; and a conviction of an owner of such cart for not having a license held wrong, and ordered to be quashed.

Per LEFROY, C. J.-If there be in the provisions of an Act of Parliament anything admitting of a doubt, the title of the Act is a matter proper to be considered in the interpretation of the Act.

1. In actions of ejectment under the Common Law Procedure Act 1853, it is not necessary that the plaintiff, when he sues otherwise than in his own right, should state in the summons and plaint the character in which he sues.

The Common Law Procedure Act 1853, s. 10, is applicable to personal actions only, and not to the action of ejectment.

In construing Acts of Parliament which infringe upon the Common Law, the state of the law before the passing of the Act must be ascertained, to determine how far it is necessary to alter that law, in order to carry out the objects of the Act. Q. B. Swanton v. Goold

234

2. In an ejectment on the title, to recover possession of "certain quays, with the fore-shore, or unreclaimed mudbanks of the river L.," the plaintiff gave in evidence a patent, A. D. 1620, granting to his ancestor the "fishings and fishing places of all the river L., and the ground and soil of all the said river;" also a settlement, made in 1792, by the said grantee's decendant, who was also the common ancestor of plaintiff and defendant, whereby the said property was settled "as all that the river of L., and the ground and soil thereof," on the settlor for life, with remainders over, and with powers of leasing to the settlor; also a lease of 1793, by the said settlor, under that power, to one J. H., of the premises in dispute, as "a piece of strand, being part of the ground and soil of the river L." Plaintiff also proved that the L. was a tidal navigable river, and the fresh water stream thereof was traceable at low water down to a spot seaward of the banks in dispute.

The defendant gave in evidence, first, certain ancient patents and inquisitions, dealing with other properties, for the purpose of showing, by the description of the boundaries therein, that what was called the "L." in 1620 consisted only of a portion of the river, ending at a point to the inland of the premises in dispute, and that all the banks below that point were then the bay of K. Secondly; certain leases, and other acts done by the owners of those other properties, with respect to portions of the bank lower down than those in dispute, but within the point to which the fresh water flowed; some of which bore date subsequently to 1792.

The Judge left it to the jury to consider whether the premises were or were not, in 1620, part of the bed and soil of what was then known as the river L., and directed a verdict for the plaintiff, if they should find in the affirmative; if in the negative, for the defendant.

Held (affirming the judgment of the Exchequer), a right direction, and not derogating from the plaintiff's grant; there being a distinction between the grant of a river as such, and of a river by a particular name, as the "L."-[LEFROY, C. J., and CRAMPTON, J., dissentientibus.]

Held also-That the documents offered by the defendant were properly admissible: the first class (being ancient instruments, coming from the proper custody), as evidence of reputation of what in 1620 constituted the "L;" and the second class as evidence of possession. [LEFROY, C. J., and CRAMPTON, J., dissentientibus.]

Per CRAMPTON, J.-That the documents were admissible as evidence of title in the defendant, by presumed grant or adverse possession.

Held also, per totam Curiam— That the defendant was not estopped by the settlement of 1792 and the lease of 1793, from denying that the premises formed part of the bed and soil of the "L.;" as this proceeding was collateral to the purpose for which those deeds were made, and such estoppel would not be mutual.

Held also-That the acts of ownership subsequent to 1792, whilst the tenant for life was living, were admissible as evidence of possession, not of acquiescence. Ex. Ch. Donegall v. Templemore 374

EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.

1. Where a pier or quay is built by presentment (either before or after the passing of the Grand Jury Act, 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 116), on part of premises situate on the banks of a tidal and navigable river, and demised at a yearly rent, with a proviso for reentry on non-payment thereof, the public thereby acquire a right to the use and enjoyment of such pier or quay, by virtue of the 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 116, s. 88; but the ownership of