2. B. being indebted to H., it was
agreed between the parties that H.
should take certain property of B.,
which was pointed out and the price
of which was agreed on, and credit
B. the sum specified as the price,
upon his books. This was done by
H. as soon as he got home, where
his books were kept, which was dur-
ing the same day and within a very
short time after the making of the
agreement. Held that this was to
be regarded as a payment made at
the time of the agreement, within
the meaning of the statute of frauds;
and was a complete execution and
performance of the contract, on the
part of H., and a payment of B.'s
debt, to the extent of the price
ib
agreed on.

3. The moment payment is made, in
pursuance of such an agreement,
the transaction is taken out of the
statute of frauds, the party is bound
by his bargain, and he cannot after-
wards rescind it, or treat it as a nul-
lity.

G

GIFT.

ib

In an action to recover possession of a
farm, it was proved that a son of the
plaintiff married the defendant, in
1849, and had two children by her,
one of whom was living; that the
son, in 1850, went into possession of
the farm, by permission of the plain-
tiff, and occupied it until his death,
in 1855; the plaintiff, during such
occupancy, frequently saying the

farm was his son's. The defendant
offered to prove that her husband
worked for the plaintiff about eight
years after he became of age, at the
plaintiff's request; that in consid-
eration thereof, and of love and af-
fection, the plaintiff gave the farm,
by parol, to his son, who, in virtue
thereof, entered on the premises,
took possession, and made improve-
ments, and paid taxes, on it, as his
own, by and with the approbation
of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff
always treated his son as owner, and
at the deathbed of the latter in-
formed him and his wife that he
would never disturb them. The evi-
dence was excluded. Held that the
evidence offered should have been
received; and that it would have
entitled the defendant not only to
hold the farm, but to receive such a
conveyance from the plaintiff as
would vest in her and her surviving
child the title to the farm, according
to their respective rights as widow,
mother, daughter and heirs. New
trial granted. CAMPBELL, J. dis-
sented. McCray v. McCray,

GOVERNOR.

633

The governor may approve and sign a
bill after the adjournment of the
legislature, so as to render the same
valid and binding as a law. The
24
People v. Bowen,

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

An acting administrator was appointed
general guardian of the infant chil-
dren of the intestate, and he and the
widow and children resided togeth-
er, as one family, in the dwelling
house formerly owned by the testa-
tor; and he subsequently married
one of the infant children and con-
tinued to reside there, with his wife.
He advanced the means, from timo
to time, and paid the expenses in-
curred in the support of the family.
At three several times, as general
guardian of the infants, he obtained
orders from the county court, for the
sale of the lands which had de-
scended to his wards, from their fa-
ther, and in which the widow had
an estate in dower, the proceeds of
which sales, including the widow's
share, for her dower interest, went

into his hands. In an action brought
against the administrator and guar-
dian, by the widow, to recover a
compensation for her dower inter-
est; Held, that under these circum-
stances the law would not imply a
promise on the part of the widow to
repay to the guardian the money
thus furnished or expended by him,
in support of the family: but that
on the contrary, the legal inference
was, the money was furnished and
advanced by him as guardian, and
not as creditor of the widow. Ac-
cordingly held, that the moneys thus
advanced by the guardian could not
be set off or allowed as a counter-
claim, in such action, against the
widow's claim for dower. Elliott v.
Gibbons,
498

by her subsequently in carrying on
a business in her own name. Crop-
sey v. McKinney,

2. Such a case is not affected by the
acts of 1848 and 1849, giving addi-
rional rights to married women;
where the question arises between
the assignees of the husband and
assignees of the wife.
ib

3. A deed of separation, between hus-
band and wife, if executed without
any consideration, is void at law even
between the parties thereto. And
it is void and of no effect, even in
equity, as against the assignees of
the husband, on a question arising
as to the title to the property em-
braced therein.
ib

4. The wife's covenant with her hus-
band, in a deed of separation, being
void, cannot form a consideration
for the execution of the deed by
him.

5.

A deed of separation between hus-
band and wife, by which the former
relinquishes to the latter personal
property and a business carried on
by her in her own name, for her
sole and separate use, and covenants
that the property and business, and
the profits of the business, shall
thereafter belong to, and be carried
on by her for her sole and separate
use as if she were a feme sole, being
executed without consideration, and
without any covenant on the part
of the trustee to indemnify the hus-
band against the debts of the wife,
is void even in equity, as to subse-
quent creditors.
ib

6. The assent of the husband to his

wife carrying on a business in her
own name, carries with it an im-
plied authority to contract debts, in
conducting the business in her name.

canceled; and that upon such sur-
render the assured should be enti-
tled to receive his deposit note, upon
the payment of his proportion of all
losses and expenses that had, oc-
curred previously. The by-laws
contained a provision that whenever
a party insured should mortgage the
property, his policy should be void,
unless he should give notice thereof
to the company. At an annual
meeting of the members of the com-
pany, it was resolved that when an
insured had alienated his property
before loss sustained, his premium
note should not be assessed, al-
though he had not surrendered his
policy. Held that, independent of
the resolution, passed by the com-
pany, a person insured who had
alienated the insured property by
mortgage and deed, without giving
notice to the company of such alien-
ation, or surrendering his policy,
remained liable, upon his premium
note, for losses occurring subsequent
to the alienation. But that by the
resolution the company waived a
compliance by its members with the
provisions of the charter relating to
a surrrender of the policy, &c. and
in effect declared that it would dis-
pense with the formality of a sur-
render, when there were no losses
to be paid, and the assured had
aliened the insured property; and
that it would itself take notice of
the alienation, and would make no
assessment upon the premium note,
to pay future losses. Huntley v.
Beecher,
580

2. Accordingly held, that the receiver

of the company could not maintain
an action to recover an assessment
upon a premium note thus situated,
made for the purpose of paying
losses occurring since the alienation
of the property.
ib

3. Held also, that the resolution was
not void, as being in conflict with
the provision contained in the char-
ter of the company.

5. Nor will the insured be entitled to
any rebate, or deduction, from the
amount of an assessment, or from
the amount of the premium note, on
account of the fact that the charter
of the company was to expire, and
did expire, prior to the expiration
of the period during which the pol-
icy, by its terms, was to continue.
ib

INTEREST.

See AGREEMENT, 4.

J

JUDGMENT.

1. A statement upon which a judgment
is entered by confession, which al-
leges the consideration for the judg-
ment to be a promissory note given
by the debtors, to the plaintiff, for
value received, but without specify-
ing the amount or consideration of
the note, is defective; and it has
been held in repeated cases that
such a judgment may be set aside
on motion, at the instance of other
judgment creditors. Norris v. Den-
ton,
117

2. And the right to set aside, or at-
tack, a void judgment thus entered
up by confession, upon a defective
statement, is not limited to judg-
ment creditors.

ib

3. A judgment confessed without full
compliance with the provisions of
the code, is to be deemed fraudulent
and void, as against the creditors of
the judgment debtor; and it may be
attacked by a grantee or mortgagee
of premises upon which such judg-
ment is a lien, as well as by judg-
ment creditors. JOHNSON, J. dis-
sented.
ib

4. They may do this, either by bring-
ing an action for that purpose, or in
defense of an action brought to en-
force such judgment, to which they
are made parties.
ib

5. A judgment, entered by confession,
upon a statement in these words:
"The above indebtedness arose on
a promissory note made by the de-
fendants to the plaintiff, dated June
21, 1854, in the sum of $700, with

interest, that amount of money be-
ing had by the defendants of the
plaintiff, and upon which there is
this day due the sum of $782.07, to-
gether with $80.41, now due the
plaintiff from the defendants as
costs in an action brought against
the defendants by the plaintiff on
said promissory note, in the supreme
court, which suit is now discontin-
ued by the plaintiff upon this con-
fession of judgment to him by the
defendant," set aside, on the ground
of the insufficiency of the state-
ment. Freligh v. Brink, 144

6. A motion to set aside a judgment
entered upon confession, on account
of the defectiveness of the state-
ment, is not founded upon an irreg-
ularity, so as to require the moving
party to specify in his motion pa-
pers the grounds of the motion.
Winnebrenner v. Edgerton.
185

7.

8.

Requisites of the statement of in-
debtedness, upon which a judgment
by confessior is to be entered. ib

9. A statement, upon which a judg-
ment by confession is entered, in
these words: "This confession of
judgment is for a debt justly due to
the plaintiff, arising upon the fol-
lowing facts: for money lent and
advanced by said plaintiff to me on
the 1st day of April, 1856, and in-
terest on the same from the 1st day
of April, 1857," is defective, in not
showing that the sum for which
judgment is confessed "is justly due
or to become due;" that is, that the
sum confessed does not exceed the
debt or liability. Clements v. Ge-
row,
325
10. So, a statement in this form: "This
confession of judgment is for a debt
justly owing from me and due to the
plaintiff, arising from the following
facts: for money borrowed by me,
of him, in June, 1855, for which I
gave him my note, and one year's
interest thereon," is defective for the