The People v. Pease. sumed jurisdiction to admit aliens to naturalization, and thousands have been naturalized by them; and to hold at this day that they had no jurisdiction would be fruitful of mischief, creating doubts and uncertainty as to civil and personal rights, endangering titles to property, and in many instances, perhaps, destroying inheritances and changing the course of descent. If there is a doubt as to the jurisdiction we ought not to yield to it, except upon the clearest evidence that it is well founded. But I entertain no doubt, and am of the opinion that the county court is a court of common law jurisdiction and has jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings, under the act of congress. The judge at the trial also suffered the party to attack the certificate of naturalization by evidence aliunde, and to show that it was procured by fraud; that its recitals were false, and that the party was not entitled to be naturalized. The certificate was the legal evidence of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction collaterally in question in the action. It was final and conclusive. It imported absolute verity, and could not, if valid on its face, be thus impeached in this action. When alienage is in issue, the judgment of the court admitting the alien to become a citizen is conclusive evidence upon that point. (Ritchie v. Putnam, 13 Wend. 524.) A record of naturalization cannot be contradicted by extrinsic proof that no declaration of intention had in truth been madc. (Banks v. Walker, 3 Barb. Ch. Rep. 438.) Like any other judgment, it is complete evidence of its own validity. (Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters, 393.) This erroneous ruling does not appear to have affected the result, but as an exception was taken to the admission of the evidence, it is proper to pass upon it with a view to govern any future trial of the action. There must be a new trial granted; costs to abide the event. BACON, J. concurred. PRATT, P. J. was of the opinion that the qualifications of those who had voted at an election could not be inquired into Looney. Hughes. upon the trial of a right to an office, in an action in the nature of a quo warranto; that the action of inspectors, in receiving the ballot, was conclusive; and concurred in the remaining propositions put forth in the opinion. MULLIN, J. dissented. New trial granted. [ONONDAGA GENERAL TERM, January 3, 1860. Pratt, Bacon, W. F. Allen and Mullin, Justices.] LOONEY, Supervisor of the town of Lancaster, vs. HUGHES and BRIGGS. The duty of a town collector to pay to the several officers named in his warrant the sums required to be paid to them respectively, within one week after the first day of February, is the duty which the collector and his sureties, by their bond, undertake shall be performed; and on the failure of the collector to execute that duty, the condition of the bond is broken, and the liability of the obligors at once attaches. For the purpose of enforcing that liability as speedily as practicable, the legislature has provided, for the public benefit, a summary mode of proceeding against a collector in default, by the issuing of a warrant within twenty days by the county treasurer, against the property of such collector, directed to the sheriff. But the issuing of such a warrant, and the return thereof unsatisfied, are not conditions precedent to the right of the supervisor of the town to maintain an action against the sureties, upon the official bond of the collector. Nor will the omission of the county treasurer to issue his warrant within the time specified in the statute, discharge the sureties from their liability upon the bond. GREENE, J. dissented. The provisions of the statute, relative to the issuing of such warrant, by the county treasurer, being for the public benefit, and not for the benefit of the sureties, are merely directory, in respect to the time within which the warrant is to be issued. [OTION on the part of the plaintiff for judgment upon a M taken to The action was tried at the Erie circuit, before Justice GRAY and a Looney v. Hughes. jury. It appeared on the trial, that in 1855 one Osborn Jewell was collector of the town of Lancaster, Erie county. That on the 30th day of November, 1855, he, together with the defendants as his sureties, executed to the supervisor of said town a bond bearing date the 27th day of November, 1855, in the penal sum of $13,122.20, reciting that said Jewell had been duly chosen such collector, and conditioned that he should well and faithfully execute his duties as such collector, which bond was duly approved by the supervisor, and filed with the clerk of the county. That at the time of receiving and approving said bond, the supervisor delivered to said Jewell the assessment roll of the town of Lancaster with the warrant of the board of supervisors of the county, in due form of law attached thereto, directed to said Jewell as collector of said town, for the collection of the sum of $6561.20, and requiring said collector to pay divers sums to the several town officers therein named, and to the treasurer of Erie county the sum of $4860.40, on or before the first day of February, 1856. That said Jewell failed to repay the amount required by said warrant, or to make returns for unpaid taxes. That the amount unpaid and unaccounted for by the said Jewell was $2259.91. That on the 10th day of April, 1856, the treasurer of Erie county issued his warrant to the sheriff of said county, commanding him to levy that sum of the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of said Jewell, and to make return thereof within forty days. That said sheriff duly returned the warrant nulla bona, and certified that the same remained wholly uncollected, and thereupon the supervisor of said town was duly notified and this action brought. It was shown on the part of the defense, that by subsequent collections and returns of another collector, the deficiency was reduced to the sum of $2118. That the county treasurer issued no other warrant than that above mentioned, and that Jewell had disappeared before the warrant was issued. That he was seen in the city of Buffalo on the 4th day of April, 1856, having Looney v. Hughes. then in his possession money in bank bills and checks to the amount of $1200, and county orders to the amount of $300. That about said 4th day of April he left the public house at which he was stopping in the morning, leaving some papers, amongst which were some county orders, two pocket books, his assessment roll and his overcoat, and has not since been seen or heard of. That while he was collector, and up to the time of his disappearance, he was a householder in said town of Lancaster. Upon these proofs, the defendants claimed that the neglect of the county treasurer to issue the warrant within the time prescribed by the statute, exonerated the sureties; and that on the defendants' proof, the legal presumption was that if the warrant had been issued within the prescribed time, the alleged deficiency would have been collected; and that in the absence of all proof to the contrary, it prima facie appeared that the loss was occasioned by said neglect of the county treasurer, and the sureties of Jewell were thereby exonerated. The court directed a verdict for $2118, subject to the opinion of the court at general term, upon a case to be made by the plaintiff. Johnson Parsons, for the plaintiff. E. Thayer, for the defendants. DAVIS, J. The bond executed by the collector Jewell and the defendants, is in conformity to the requirements of the statute. (1 R. S. 346, § 19.) Its condition is, that Jewell shall well and faithfully execute his duties as such collector. These "duties" relate solely to the public, and not to the manner of executing his office in those respects in which it relates to or affects the rights or property of individuals. They are defined and declared by statute with great care and exactitude. "Every collector shall within one week after the time mentioned in his warrant for paying the moneys directed to be Looney v. Hughes. paid to the town officers of his town and to the county treasurer, pay to such town officers and county treasurer the sums required in such warrant to be paid to them respectively, first retaining the compensation to which he may be legally entitled." (1 id. 398, § 6.) The statute directs, that the warrant "shall require all payments therein specified to be made by such collector on or before the first day of February then next ensuing;" (1 id. 396, § 37;) and such was the requirement of the warrant in this case. The duty to pay to the several officers named in his warrant the sums required to be paid to them respectively, within one week after the first day of February, is therefore the duty which the collector and his sureties by their bond undertake shall be performed. So far as relates to taxes, which "the collector shall not be able to collect," the statute provides a mode and the terms, upon compliance with which he may be "credited by the county treasurer with the amount thereof." (1 id. 399, § 10.) But failing to secure this credit, the liability of the collector and his sureties upon their bond is at once fixed and certain by his default. This is the view of the statute and of the liabilities imposed on the collector and his sureties, taken by the court in Muzzy v. Shattuck, (1 Denio, 233.) "I cannot assent," says Mr. Justice Jewett in that case, "to the proposition, that the liability of the collector is limited by the common law rule applicable to the ordinary case of misfeasance or neglect in the discharge of the duties of office by a public officer. The provisions of the statute seem to me to recognize the collector of taxes in the light of a debtor for the amount of the taxes directed to be collected, and to provide the manner in which that obligation is to be discharged." And again: "The statute imposes a definite liability on the collector and his sureties for the omission to collect and pay, and whether that omission is the result of misfeasance or neglect, unavoidable accident or felony committed by another, I do not think it furnishes any defense to the action." Onerous as this obli |