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ceeding general term, and shall deliver the judgments of the judges who held the preceding term, in causes there argued and held under advisement.
The arrangement in this section is such as essentially to modify the provisions of the judiciary act. By that act it seems to be intended, that each judge shall perambulate the state and perform an equal share of the duties of each judicial district. Very earnest remonstrances against the continuance of this rule have been made, as being less convenient to the public, and very onerous to the judges. Under the section here proposedl, a considerable interchange among the judges is secured. The inequality caused by the large number of circuits in some districts, and by the business of the commercial cities in others, may be equalized among the judges, while at the same time the terms and circuits may be so arranged, if desirable, as that the business of every judge may be confined to his own and an adjoining district. Or, on the other hand, if experience shall demonstrate that a greater and more distant interchange is desirable, the governor may make the designations accordingly.
The reason for conferring upon the governor the power to make the designations, is founded upon the peculiar structure of the supreme court. The judges are elected by districts, though the object of the constitution plainly is, that they shall compose one court. The judges are, as far as the proper performance of their duties will allow, to be divested of a local character; and to effect this object, the exercise of some general superintending power over the arrangement of the courts and the designation of the judges to hold them is necessary. We have before said, that the governor is, in our judgment, the most fitting depositary of this power. He is so, because, of his opportunities of being correctly informed as to the wants of every portion of the state in this particular, and because, as the chief executive officer of the state, he can be more conveniently than any other, entrusted with the discretion proposed to be vested in him.
§ 28. In case of the inability, for any cause, of a judge assigned for that purpose, to hold a special term or circuit court, or sit at a general term, or preside at a court of oyer and terminer, any other judge may do so.
§ 29. Within ten days after the expiration of every term and circuit court, the clerk shall certify to the governor, the number of actions on the calendar, the number tried or heard, the number decided, the number remaining undisposd of, and the duration of the term or circuit.
§ 30. The judges shall, at all reasonable times, when not engaged in holding court, transact such other business as may be done out of court. One of the judges elected in the first judicial district, to be designated from time to time, among themselves, shall attend for that purpose, at the city-hall in the city of New York, on every judicial day, from ten o'clock in the forenoon until three o'clock in the afternoon, and longer, if the business require it; and every proceeding commenced before one of those judges, may be continued before another, with the same effect as if commenced before him.
$ 31. The supervisors of the several counties shall provide the courts appointed to be held therein, with rooms, attendants, suel, lights and stationery, suitable and sufficient for the transaction of their business. If the supervisors neglect, the court may order the sheriff to do so; and the expense incurred by him in carrying the order into effect, when certified by the court, shall be a county charge.
Of the County Courts.
SECTION 32. Repeal of existing statutes, defining their jurisdiction.
33. Their jurisdiction.
8 32. All statutes now in force, conferring or defining the jurisdiction of the county courts, are repealed ; and those courts shall have no other jurisdiction than that provided in the next section. But the repeal contained in this section shall not affect any proceedings, now pending in those courts
$ 33. The county courts shall have jurisdiction, in the following actions and proceedings :
1. The exclusive power to review a judgment rendered in a civil action within their respective counties,
by a court of a justice of the peace, or by the justices' courts in the cities of Albany, Troy and Hud on, respectively;
2. For the foreclosure or satisfaction of a mortgage, and the sale of mortgaged premises, within the county ;
3. For the partition of real property, within the county;
4. For the admeasurement of dower in real property, within the county ;
5. For the sale of the real property of an infant, when the property is situated, and the infant resides, within the county ;
6. For the care and custody of the person and estate of a person of unsound mind, or an habitual drunkard, residing within the county;
7. For the mortgage or sale, on the application of a religious corporation, of its real property within the county, and the appropriation of the proceeds thereof;
8. In cases, in which jurisdiction was vested by the Revised Statutes, in the late courts of common pleas, under the provisions relating to attachments against absconding, concealed or non-resident debtors, to voluntary assignments, made pursuant to the application of an insolvent and his creditors, and to voluntary assignments by persons imprisoned on execution in civil cases;
9. In proceedings for the remission of fines and forfeited recognizances.
The most important feature of this title is embraced in these two sections, and relates to the powers to be conferred upon the county courts. On this subject, a question of great importance has arisen, as to the nature anıl extent of their jurisdiction, as defined by the judiciary act, and as intended to be conferred by the constitution. From the tenor of the constitutional provisions relating to the county courts, and from the ample judicial force provided for the trial of issues in the supreme court, it has, we believe, been generally understood that it did not contemplate, that jurisdiction in ordinary civil actions would be vested in the county court. The judiciary act, however, gives a different construction to that instrument, and invests the county court with powers and jurisdiction similar to those of the old common pleas.
The peculiar circumstances under which that act became a law, afford reasonable ground for considering any constitutional construction which may be found characterizing its provisions, rather as the result of impressions forced to a hasty result by the circumstances, than as the expression of any deliberate conviction or opinion of he legislature. It is well known, that the act in question first came under consideration during the last few days of the session, under the great pressure of business which always attends that period, and when every member felt the imperious necessity of immediate action upon the various provis ons of a law, whose extended sections embraced the entire ju licial organization under the new constitution. Pressed by the positive requirements of that instrument, and the peril of absolute suspension in the administration of justice, prompt rather than deliberate action became a matter of necessity.
Even if this law had come into existence under circumstances more favorable to give it weight as a legislative construction of the constituiion, still we would feel ourselves obligeil, in the proper discharge of our duty, to consider the subject with entire and uneinbarrassed freedom, and to propose such changes as we might deem necessary, either to obviate consti